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Abstract 
 
As microfinance moves beyond its traditional function as a niche development tool and 
towards becoming an integrated and self-sustainable part of the formal financial market, 
the need to deepen our understanding of its players and their financial and organisational 
behaviour increases. However, with primary focus in most research being on the social and 
cultural side of microfinance, the study of the financial behaviour of its institutions has been 
neglected.  
This thesis explores the ability of microfinance institutions (MFIs) to function as liquidity 
creators for the market, on par with more traditional financial intermediaries. Using fixed 
effects estimations, it evaluates a range of financial and developmental drivers of liquidity 
creation (LC), including deposit insurance, capital ratio and risk profile. In addition to these, 
essays 2 and 3 evaluate the impact of specialisation and the regulatory framework, as well 
as a range of conditions unique to development and microfinance, such as joint lending 
methodologies, profit-status and the Human Development Index (HDI). 
In essay 1, I find that microfinance institutions are able to create liquidity for the 
surrounding market, on par with, and at times surpassing, more traditional financial 
intermediaries. These results are similar across geographical regions and organisational 
types, and are positively impacted by the presence of formal regulation. However, contrary 
to the suggestion of traditional banking theory, the presence of deposit insurance does not 
appear to have significant impact on the level of liquidity created, nor does it appear to be 
primarily pushed by the institution’s risk profile. Instead, my findings suggest that the 
primary drivers of liquidity creation should be found elsewhere.  
In essay 2, I find strong, consistent and positive correlation between levels of liquidity 
creation and the use of joint lending methodologies by microfinance intermediaries, in 
particular group loans.  The effect is observed across all 4 LC measurements, and in both 
models presented.  The findings support the theoretical suggestion that joint lending serves 
as a form of risk mitigator for MFIs in the absence of traditional collateral. In addition, it 
suggests that while microfinance institutions as previously found are able to create liquidity 
on par with traditional intermediaries, the mechanisms behind the successful production 
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are different. The unique conditions in developing and emerging financial markets appear to 
drown out the effects of most (though not all) of the more traditional financial drivers.  
Finally, in essay 3, a two-tiered approach is used to study the effect of formal regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks, using MIX and World Bank data in cross-country and regional 
estimations. The results suggest a consistent, strong and positive effect of regulation, across 
very diverse areas, in terms of formalised financial frameworks and levels of development. 
The thesis adds to the relatively new and still scarce empirical research on liquidity creation 
in general, and brings attention to the unique conditions facing financial intermediaries in 
emerging and especially developing financial markets. It specifically provides some first 
insights into the creation of liquidity in microfinance, and explores the drivers of LC by 
studying the impact of a range of traditional, development- and microfinance-specific 
variables. The empirical work adds an in-depth, cross-country look at the creation of 
liquidity, and provides academics, policy-makers and practitioners alike with a much needed 
new insight into the external financial performance of microfinance institutions, and their 
ability to live up to their societal role as liquidity creators for the surrounding market.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are financial intermediaries that provide a range of 
microloans and other financial services, usually to poor, marginalised and previously 
unbanked clients, who are outside the reach of traditional banks (Cull et al., 2013b). The 
MFIs typically use a market approach to their lending and repayment activities, and ensure 
continued high levels of repayment, despite the absence of collateral, by employing a range 
of innovative lending methodologies, such as joint lending schemes and relationship-based 
banking models (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).  These innovative methodologies are 
used as risk-reducing mechanisms, in an attempt to compensate for the high costs of 
transactions, screenings, monitoring and contract enforcement, which historically have 
priced out more traditional intermediaries. 
The size of institutions, both in terms of borrowers and assets, vary significantly from region 
to region, with most of the microfinance clients found in South Asia, specifically India and 
Bangladesh, while the number of institutions engaging in microfinance is highest in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Figure 1.1 and 1.4). 
 
Figure 1.1: % of Borrowers and MFIs per Region, 2004 - 2015 
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There is an estimated 10,000 MFIs globally, though as many as 80% of these are believed to 
be small, informal entities (Hailey et al., 2016). Although the exact volume of extended loans 
is somewhat uncertain, recent data from the MIX database, found a combined gross loan 
portfolio of $US 114bn, extended to 139mn borrowers (Convergences, 2018).   
However, available asset estimations vary significantly between surveys, and so far there 
exists no comprehensive map of the industry. The 2016 survey of microfinance investment 
vehicles (MIVs) done by the Symbiotics, suggested a combined asset pool of about 11.6 bn, 
held by fixed investment, mixed and equity funds (Symbiotics, 2016; Khamar, 2017).   
Although the concept of microfinance has a long history behind it, with roots stretching 
back into antiquity, the use of modern microfinance has primarily been as a poverty 
reduction tool in development.  
However, over the past two decades, microfinance has gained increased acceptance as a 
viable if niche financial sector, and has seen growth in both emerging and developed 
markets (Khamar, 2017).  After suffering the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, the sector 
has bounced back, and the global portfolio grew 15.6 in 2017 (Convergences, 2018).  
 
1.1. Definition of Microfinance 
Looking back throughout history, microfinance has its primary roots in various forms of 
microcredit schemes, where very small loans were specifically designed to reach the poor, 
the marginalised or otherwise unbanked.  Even in modern microfinance, the methodology 
initially centred on microcredit, the extension of small loans, either through some form of 
relationship banking, or via joint lending approaches, in the form of group and village loans 
(Christen et al., 2004).  Today, the concept of microfinance has been broadened significantly 
from its inception, and is used as an umbrella term for a range of financial services, though 
its target clientele is still the poorer segments of society.  These services cover not just 
microcredit, but also savings, insurance as well as the ability to transfer funds. Microfinance 
is seen as one form of impact investing, where the specified goal of an investment is, in 
addition to a reasonable financial return, to create environmental, social or (corporate) 
governance (ESG) impact (CGAP, 2013). 
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Figure 1.2: Loans and Borrowers per Region, by Location, 2004 - 2015  
  
 
The loans are typically extended to small and informal agricultural ventures or 
microenterprises, and are usually given without a collateral requirement. The loan sizes 
currently average $2500 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, but as little as $250 in South 
Asia (Convergences 2015, citing MIX benchmarks). In comparison, the average commercial 
and industrial (C&I) loan size for a standard non-microfinancial commercial bank with assets 
over $3.7 billion was $400,000 in 2011, $95,000 in smaller banks (Gup, 2011:115).  
With exception of Latin America, most loans are still given primarily to rural clients outside 
of the reach of traditional financial institutions, though urban microfinance is growing, 
especially in Africa, where small micro-business ventures and salary-based microfinance is 
finding increased footing (figure 1.2 and Convergences 2018). 
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Microfinance is still heavily aimed at female clients, though it varies some by region, loan 
size and organizational type. In South Asia, where loans are small and often given as group 
loans, by far the majority of clients are women. In Eastern Europe, however, where 
individual lending is the primary lending methodology, and the loan are larger, the male-
female distribution in terms of total GLP is about 50%, while there are still slightly more 
female borrowers than male (figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3: Loans and Borrowers per Region, by Gender, 2004 – 2015 
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For all regions, the percentage difference between men and women is larger in favour of the 
women when it comes to numbers of borrowers vs total loan size, suggesting that men on 
average take out larger across all five regions (figure 1.3). 
Deposit-taking and GLP are largest in Latin America, an emerging region with comparably 
strong microfinancial infrastructure, and a longer history of modern microfinancial activity 
than most other regions (figure 1.4). Eastern Europe is one of the smallest regions in terms 
of number of borrowers  (figure 1.1), but one of the largest in terms of loans and deposits 
extended by microfinancial institutions (figure 1.4). 
 
Figure 1.4: % of Deposits and Loans per Region, 2004 - 2015 
 
 
There is some disagreement as to whether consumer loans (to salaried consumers as well as 
micro-entrepreneurs) also fall under inside the microfinancial bracket. The EU specifically 
excludes consumer loans and defines microcredit or micro loans as loans up to 25,000 
euros, strictly for self-employment or small business ventures (EU Expert Group to the EC, 
2007:7). Some voices within the microfinancial sector agree, citing in particular the risk of 
perpetuating the over indebtedness of MFI clients (Eitzen, 2014; Etzensperger 2013; Hulme 
2000) and advocate the development of a framework for identifying ‘good’ consumer loans 
such as school fees and health care, from the ‘bad’ or ‘unneeded’ forms of consumer loans 
(Rozas 2012; Schicks 2010). Other research, such as Banerjee and Duflo, argue that 
microcredit can be seen as just another form of disciplined microsaving, if traditional and 
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reliable options for saving through deposit-taking is unavailable (Banerjee and Duflo 
2007:16).   
In practice, most microfinance institutions include a handful of retail loans in their loan 
portfolio, of which some are long-term with maturities over a year (education, life-cycle 
loans and mortgages), and some which are short- and medium-term consumer-oriented 
products with maturities of less than a year (emergency, household finance and 
consumption loans) (Helms, 2006). The distinction made above is important because the 
scope of microfinancial loan portfolios has a direct impact on the ability of MFIs to create 
liquidity. 
 
1.2. Definition of Liquidity Creation 
In banking literature, the primary functions of financial intermediaries are traditionally 
identified as risk reduction for investors and liquidity creation for the surrounding market 
(e.g. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Bryant (1980), Bouwman (2013)). In this thesis, 
liquidity is defined as the degree to which an asset can be converted into cash, and liquidity 
creation is the process whereby financial intermediaries transform liquid liabilities into 
illiquid assets (Ledgerwood et al., 2013; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). The process is said to 
‘create liquidity’ for the surrounding market, because it transforms the ‘ease, time and cost’ 
associated with providing capital to previously un- and underserved clients in the 
microfinancial market (Berger and Bouwman, 2009: 3790)1. 
In older literature, the creation of liquidity has been solidly tied to the concept of maturity 
transformation; the level of created (transformed) liquidity was seen as the ‘gap’ between 
liquid assets and liabilities, divided by total assets, and the liquidity levels of a loan was 
defined entirely by its maturity length (Schaefer and Deep, 2004). However, in more recent 
theoretical and empirical work, it has been suggested that this approach is too narrow 
(Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Rather than simply looking at the liquidity transformation gap 
between loans with different maturities, Berger and Bouwman suggested to consider the 
                                                          
1
 For discussion of how liquidity creation is calculated in this dissertation, including classifications and weights, 
please see chapter 4. 
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ease, time and cost associated with an intermediary’s efforts to obtain liquid funds to meet 
customer demands, as well as the ease, time and cost associated with customers’ ability to 
obtain liquid funds from the intermediary (Berger and Bouwman, 2009) 2.   
The provision of microfinance loans to previously unbanked is a prime example of a context 
where liquidity creation takes place in spite of the lack of maturity transformation. Due to 
their inherently small sizes, microfinance loans would be considered liquid in Deep and 
Schaefer’s model (due to maturities typically being shorter than 1 year), but the lack of ease 
and high potential cost associated with the liquidation of a loan. Given the lack of collateral 
and underdeveloped financial infrastructure, microfinance loans are therefore considered 
highly illiquid, using Berger and Bouwman’s estimation (Berger and Bouwman 2009; 
Bouwman, 2013)3.  Thus, the general hypothesis is that liquidity is created for the 
surrounding microfinance market, because the MFIs’ risk reduction processes and liquidity 
transformation enables the extension of loans to formerly unbanked clients, which were 
previously thought too risky. 
In financial literature focusing on developed financial markets, liquidity creation is measured 
in what several studies call “normal, healthy commercial banks”, which excludes banks with 
negative equity, no outstanding loans and assets below $25M (e.g. Berger and Bouwman, 
2009; Pana, 2010; Pungacova, 2010; Horvath et al., 2014; Fungacova, 2015. In the case of 
microfinance and developing financial markets, a similar definition is used, though only 
excluding financial institutions with GLPs below $1000. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 In microfinance, the types and scale of institutions involved in microfinance are very diverse, and the 
institutional framework and size has impact on the liquidity created for the market. Differences in scaled LC 
between traditional and non-traditional liquidity creators, as well as between MFI types within the industry, 
are discussed in further detail in sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
3
 Please see appendix A for a table of liquidity classifications in Berger and Bouwman’s paper (2009). For 
further details on its empirical use and microfinancial classifications, please see chapter 4. 
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1.3. Motivation and Contribution 
Empirical research discussing the impact of micro loans and savings on household income 
and poverty levels abound.4 While there continues to be widespread debate about the 
accuracy of the methodologies used to measure micro-level impact, the general consensus 
is that microfinance institutions (MFIs) at this stage have proven their ability to remain 
financially self-sustainable.5 
However, while a lot of attention has been paid to microfinance’s ability to fulfil a host of 
stated social goals, from poverty reduction to female empowerment and job creation, the 
financial debate has centred primarily on the micro-level. The vast majority of current 
quantitative impact evaluations of microfinancial initiatives focus exclusively on 
microeconomic factors. However, conventional bank theory has continuously highlighted 
the macroeconomic importance of financial intermediaries to create liquidity and transform 
risk, ever since Adam Smith first described the need for banks in 1776 (Manchev, 2009). It is 
only recently, however, that empirical assessments of liquidity creation have begun to 
surface, and they are still quite sparse.6  
With a few notable exceptions, the macroeconomic impact of microfinance remains 
understudied, and none of the existing research seeks to evaluate the ability of 
microfinance institutions to act as liquidity creators.7  The institutional meso-level has so far 
been investigated using either traditional performance parameters such as return on assets 
(ROA), bank risk with portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30), or sustainability measures such as 
operational and financial self-sustainability (OSS and FSS).8  While these are all important 
indicators of internal financial performance, they say very little about the institution’s 
external financial performance, or whether the institution is fulfilling its role as financial 
                                                          
4 
See, for example, Robinson (2001), Morduch (2002), Odell (2010), Orso (2011). 
5
 Examples of these are Odell (2010); Agha and Ojoko-Okello (2004);  World Bank (2007); Hermes and Lensin ( 
2007); Hulme (2000); Simanowitz (2001);  Karlan  (2007). 
6
 See in particular Berger et al., (2011) and Schaefer and Deep (2004). 
7
 Buera et al. (2012) provide a quantitative assessment of microfinance’s aggregate and distributional impact 
on macroeconomic indicators such as output, capital, TFP, wages and interest rates. Kaboski and Townsend 
(2012) look at the general equilibrium effects of village banking on wages and interest rates. Finally, Ahlin and 
Jiang (2008) provide a theoretical framework for the conditions under which microfinance may create 
macroeconomic development.  
8
 See, for example,  Buera et al. (2017);  Doci (2017) ; Ahlin et al. (2011) 
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intermediary for the market as a whole.  ROA is a problematic measurement of mission 
success in a sector where a significant portion of its players are non-profit institutions. OSS 
and FSS are both good indicators of an institution’s internal financial health, but say little 
about its ability to successfully extend loans to the previously unbanked: an overly risk-
averse institution may for example have strong OSS/FSS and PAR30 ratios, but create little 
liquidity for the surrounding market, because very few loans are given in the first place.   
The measurement of liquidity creation presented in this study addresses this issue, and 
provides first insights into how much liquidity is created by microfinance institutions, as well 
as what drives the liquidity creation. These answers will help academics, practitioners and 
policy-makers evaluate the extent to which an individual or cluster of microfinance 
institutions fulfil their roles as financial intermediaries and bridge the gap between investor 
and client. There currently exists no other research which attempts to provide theoretical or 
cross-country empirical measurements of liquidity creation, or of MFI ability to fill the 
macroeconomic void of standard banks in times of financial crisis. Some research indicates a 
high and positive correlation between microfinance and the ability of micro-businesses to 
absorb shock (Gonzales, 2007 and 2011; Oloyombo 2013), but the research is fairly new and 
scarce.  In looking primarily at the profitability of microfinance institutions through history, 
Constatinou and Ashta (2011) find that MFIs have been better than conventional financial 
intermediaries at surviving financial crises, though they do not comment on their 
macroeconomic impact specifically.  
Data is drawn primarily from the MIX database and is used to explore a range of 
relationships between liquidity creation (LC) in microfinance and its drivers.  A formula 
based on current bank literature is developed and adapted to the unique microfinance 
context. The primary drivers of LC are identified, from an array of traditional finance 
variables, as well as specifications uniquely important in development markets in general 
and the microfinance sector in particular.  
Each of the questions sought answered in the dissertation’s 3 empirical essays are plucked 
from the current microfinance debate, while still relevant to the overarching theme of 
liquidity creation.  As mentioned above, the essays provide some first insights into the level 
of liquidity created by microfinance institutions across regions with very different 
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development profiles, while also contributing to current debates related to the identity and 
nature of microfinance, its institutional impact and the effects of regulation on microfinance 
performance. 
 
1.4. Notes on Limitations and Delimitations 
While findings in this thesis can provide researchers, practitioners and policymakers alike 
with some much needed guidance with regard to the nature of MFIs and their ability to 
perform as financial intermediaries, it is important to note that the study has a number of 
limitations to consider.  
 
1.4.1. Dataset Concerns 
The dataset used in the study is provided primarily by the MIX database, which is the largest 
publically available dataset collected in microfinance, has historically been under continued 
critique for lack of reliability. The criticism stems from the fact that the database originally 
arose from purely self-reported data, and was notorious for its poor data quality.  
Despite the data concerns, the database remains the primary source of data for most 
research done in microfinance, and by far the majority of top-tier papers on microfinancial 
topics in journals of development economics and finance, have used and continue to use 
the database. A small sample of these are Cull et al., 2011; Morduch, 2011; Hermes and 
Lensink, 2011; Bogan, 2012; Mersland, 2009;  Conning, 2011. About 90% of the peer-
reviewed microfinancial studies in this dissertation use MixMarket data either exclusively or 
in combination with other data sources. 
However, over the years, the data has been cleaned extensively, and this dissertation limits 
the data used to verified financial data, in MIX marked as diamond levels 4 and 5 (out of 5), 
which indicates audited financial data.  Previous literature does not usually disclose what 
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diamond level they are using in their study, but those that do refer to it largely use diamond 
levels 4 and 59.  
 Even so, it is still valid to raise concerns about the data quality. The nature of development 
research is unfortunately such that available data very rarely reach the quality standards of 
data from better developed financial markets. It is an unfortunate but unavoidable reality 
for most academics interested in the development field, but one that will hopefully improve 
over time. 
 
1.4.2. Calculating Liquidity Creation 
The calculations of liquidity creation build mainly upon new literature from Berger and 
Bouwman (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Bouwman 2013). They suggest that maturity 
transformation is inadequate as sole determinant for the level of liquidity created, especially 
in sectors, such as microfinance, where maturities are inherently short, due to the size of 
the extended loans. It is currently the best empirical alternative to Deep and Schaefer’s 
2004 calculations of the maturity gap; a method both inadequate for an industry such as 
microfinance, as well as inappropriate due to data limitations (Schaefer and Deep, 2004).   
There is a reasonable argument to be made against the Berger and Bouwman theory that 
institutions not taking deposits also create liquidity through asset allocation and funding of 
illiquid assets previously deemed too risky. This dissertation specifically looksat deposit-
taking microfinancial institutions, in an effort to evaluate how MFIs perform when the 
liquidity transformation taking place is calculated the same ways as in non-developing 
financial markets. As the results in chapter 4 (specifically table 4.5)  show,  the average ratio 
of liquidity creation to total assets through the years is higher in microfinance institutions 
than in developed financial institutions (as given in studies by Berger and Bouwman, 2009  
and Horvath et al., 2014). Regardless of this, however, there is certainly reason to argue for 
                                                          
9
 2 exception to this are Bogan (2012) and Gwasi and Ngambi (2014), who use diamond levels 3-5. Neither 
study discusses the inclusion of level 3 further, but it is likely due to constriction on amount of available data. 
Examples of studies that do mention using only diamond levels 4 and 5 are Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) and 
Ahlin et al. (2011). 
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further studies in liquidity creation in microfinance, where non-deposit-taking institutions 
are considered through asset allocation10. 
 
1.4.3. First Insight 
Finally, the study is the first of its kind in microfinance, and while it provides a first look at 
correlations between levels of liquidity created by MFIs and their drivers, there are very 
likely influences that have not been considered here. A much wider range of possible 
drivers, both social and financial in nature, such as the impact of national and organisational 
culture, ownership structures and funding structures, deserve additional attention.  
 
1.5. Dissertation Layout 
The overarching theme of the dissertation is liquidity creation in microfinance, and though 
the thesis is quantitative in approach and methodology, its build is deductive.  New 
generalised theory from traditional banking literature is used to form a test of hypotheses 
related to LC in microfinance, by exploring a range of unique industry conditions.  
Epistemologically, the subsequent discourse developed between theory and data has been 
more of a hybrid approach than purely deductive or inductive, but I have still chosen to 
provide an overarching introduction to the history, development and theory of 
microfinance, before diving into the specifics of the observed data. 
 
1.5.1. The Creation and Development of Microfinance 
Following the overall introduction to the field, a broader framework for the industry is 
provided, as well as a historical backdrop for the sector, to which most of today’s actors are 
anchored.  The chapter outlines the development of the microfinance industry from 
antiquity to today.  The analysis of today’s conditions identifies 4 key areas of discussion in 
current research, each of which forms a section of the following literature review. 
                                                          
10 For further discussion of this, please see perspective and future research in chapter 7. 
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1.5.2. Trends in Microfinance Research 
The overarching literature review presents the main themes currently at the forefront of the 
microfinance debate, as identified by the previous background chapter. The four sections 
making up the literature review are: identity, methodology, institutional impact and 
outreach. Each of these is addressed in the following 3 empirical chapters, and key 
questions from current literature are sought answered. 
 
1.5.3. Empirical Essay 1: Liquidity Creation in Microfinance 
A continuous and contentious debate in microfinance circles is whether the very 
fundamental nature of the industry can and should be more than a social tool for poverty 
reduction. As the industry sees steady growth in more developed markets, such as Greece 
and Spain after the 2008 financial crisis, and in the US especially after Hurricane Katrina in 
2005, it becomes still more important that we understand the industry’s effect on financial 
markets as a whole. If MFIs are to be seen as more than a development tool, their ability to 
function as traditional financial intermediaries, becomes increasingly relevant.  Ultimately, 
the ability of MFIs to function parallel to traditional banks should influence how investors, 
practitioners and especially policymakers view them, and how they choose to regulate their 
activities. 
Essay 1 provides some first insights into the ability of MFIs to perform on par with 
traditional financial intermediaries. The essay evaluates a range of traditional financial 
drivers believed to impact liquidity creation, including the presence of deposit insurance. 
The results suggest that unit for unit; MFIs can create liquidity on par with traditional 
financial intermediaries. The calculated levels of liquidity creation in MFIs show that LC 
ratios, when scaled by size, are consistently higher in MFIs than in most western FIs. The 
finding is consistent across geographical regions and organisational structures, though it is 
particularly pronounced in cooperatives, NGOs and rural banks.   
Using fixed effects estimations, the study finds a highly significant negative correlation 
between capital and liquidity creation, which is in line with the findings of previous banking 
literature. However, little correlation is found between the presence of deposit insurance 
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and levels of liquidity creation, and where vague correlation is found, it is positive, unlike 
the assumptions made by literature, expecting banks to withhold effort when the risk of 
bank runs is diminished (e.g. Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond and Rajan, 2001). 
Similarly, the relationship between bank risk to LC was also mostly insignificant, and where 
correlated, it was negative, rejecting the notion that high-LC MFIs are creating more 
liquidity through undue risk-taking (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Berger, 2011; Bouwman, 
2013). 
 
1.5.4. Empirical Essay 2: Drivers of Liquidity Creation 
While the results presented in essay 1 suggest that MFIs can produce liquidity on par with, 
and often in excess of, traditional intermediaries, the results also question the impact of a 
number of financial variables that literature has suggested may be correlated with liquidity 
creation, such as deposit insurance, bank risk, age and size.  Based on these results, it is 
plausible to assume that certain conditions which are unique or of particular importance in 
development and microfinance exert such impact on levels of liquidity creation (LC) that 
they counterbalance the impact of other more traditional variables.  
The second essay investigates a range of financial and development-specific drivers. Of 
particular interest is the impact of joint lending methodologies, which in literature is often 
listed as one of the primary risk-reducing strategies employed by the microfinance industry. 
The results show a strong, positive and consistent correlation between both specialisation 
and the use of joint lending methodologies, and levels of liquidity creation. 
 
1.5.5. Empirical Essay 3: Regulation and Liquidity Creation in Microfinance 
From a policy perspective, the impact of regulation and supervision on MFI performance is 
one of the most important, but also one of the most contentious current debates. 
Depending on the ideological perspective, the view on macro, meso- and microecnomic 
state interference in market activities varies widely from study to study.    
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However, if policymakers as a whole are interested in a prosperous and well-functioning 
microfinance sector, a deeper understanding of the relationship between the regulatory 
framework and performance indicators is needed. This is particularly important in the case 
of liquidity creation, which is measured in an attempt to gauge the individual institution’s 
ability to perform as a financial intermediary for the surrounding market.  
In Essay 3, a two-tiered approach is used to study the effect of regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks, using MIX, World Bank and IMF data in cross-country and regional estimations, 
with country-level fixed effects. The results suggest a consistent, strong and positive effect 
of regulation, across very diverse areas, in terms of both formalised financial frameworks 
and levels of development.  
 
1.5.6. Conclusion 
In the final chapter, the findings of the previous chapters are summarised, and their 
implications for policymakers and practitioners are discussed. Finally, areas needing 
additional research are identified and outlined. 
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2. The Creation and Development of Microfinance 
While microfinance has gained footing as a legitimate approach to poverty reduction, 
notably in the last 40 years, the provision of microcredit as a tool to eliminate poverty is far 
from a modern invention. The creation of microfinance, both as a way to reduce poverty 
and as a sustainable and profitable financial approach, is often mistakenly believed to be the 
creation of Nobel Prize winner Muhammad Yunus’s Grameen Foundation in the 1970s.11  
However, examples of microfinancial activity have existed as far back as antiquity. 
The exact beginning of microfinance is hard to pin-point, because the roots of the industry 
are as diverse as the institutions engaging in microfinance today. The revival of microfinance 
within the last few decades has followed the same paradigm shift as the general 
development discourse, but both the informal and organised extension of micro-credit has 
been a way for poor and marginalised to gain access to funds since antiquity. Understanding 
the many and diverse historical roots and ideological perspectives which have impacted the 
development of the microfinance concept, thus becomes key to understanding the many 
approaches to and opinions on, microfinance today. 
This chapter outlines the development of microfinance, from the extension of both informal 
and formal microcredit in antiquity, to its modern revival as poverty alleviation tool and 
niche financial market.  The aim is to understand the many and varied branches which 
together form the modern microfinance tree, and to show how history may help provide 
insight into some of the challenges and pitfalls still facing the industry today. 
The final section looks at the status quo for microfinance sector, and identifies the four main 
trends in current microfinance research.  The same four categories form the structure of the 
following discussion of current microfinance research. 
 
                                                          
11 
 The assumption is repeated by, among others, Milford Bateman et al (Bateman, Sinković, and Škare, 2012), 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2004), and the New York Times (Malkin, 2008). 
Other sources, such as the Milana and Ashta (2012) and World Bank (World Bank, 2007) mark the 1970s as the 
beginning of ‘modern microfinance’, though the reason for the distinction is not fully defined.  
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2.1. Microfinance in Ancient Rome 
Some of the earliest known examples of microcredit provision can be traced back to ancient 
Rome. The emperor Augustus placed state income from the sale of confiscated property, 
previously owned by prisoners of war and criminals, into a fund, which provided loans to the 
poor. The loans were interest-free, but required collateral; the lender had to pledge values 
amounting to twice that of the amount borrowed, before the loan could be dispensed 
(Sartain, 1940; Cheong and Sinnakkannu, 2012).  The loan system was continued by Tiberius, 
who expanded the scheme to include larger sums of capital, to be repaid in two to three 
years, which still required securities of twice the value of the loan (Weber and Musselhoff, 
2013). The emperor Severus Alexander decreased the market interest rate on lending, by 
providing a form of subsidized lending to poor free men, sometimes at below market rate, 
but also at times, interest-free.  The loans were given for the purchase of agricultural land, 
and repayment was taken from the produce grown on the lands by the lender, much like 
seasonal microcredit schemes today (Weber and Musselhoff, 2013; Gilbart, 1837).  
Under Roman law, women were excluded from all banking and lending business in the 
antiquity. They could not be involved in legal monetary transactions without the permission 
of a male guardian, usually the husband or father (Lázaro, 2009; Gardner 1999). However, 
according to recent studies of inscriptions found in the Pompeiian house of A. Granius 
Romanus and waxed wooden tablets found at Murecine near Pompeii, the women of 
ancient Rome had found a way around this exclusion, leading to one of the earliest known 
forms of informal microlending. They set up informal credit contracts for very small 
amounts of money, typically extended by women to other women (Panetta, 2004).  The 
loans were guaranteed by pledging agreements for personal items – in one case, a female 
lender extended small loans, typically between 15 and 20 denarii, to other women at 
interest levels ranging from 3% monthly to 45% annually. The loans were guaranteed 
through the pledges of smaller personal items, such as earrings and coats (Lázaro, 2009).12 
Unlike other lending or borrowing activities, these could be done without the need for the 
approval of a male guardian; Lázaro proposes that this was possible due to the transactions 
                                                          
12
 The loans were endorsed with ‘pignus-pawns’, in which personal items such as jewellery or clothing, were 
pledged as collateral (Lázaro, 2009). 
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being ‘res nec mancipi’, freely exchangeable, and thus, did not have to live up to legal 
requirements.13 Additionally, as the deposited amount was the capital of the pawn broker, 
the loan may have been a form of irregular deposit, which would only create obligations for 
the deposit taker. This way the lender would also be able to legally avoid the required 
presence of a male guardian (Lázaro, 2009). 
The tablets show that despite the formal exclusion from banking activities, women found a 
way to bend the system to gain access to capital. Given the constant resurgence of war, it is 
perhaps not so surprising that women sometimes became a necessary and active part of the 
business environment: it was necessary to keep trade and production going.14 Microloans 
between women enabled the mobility of small amounts of capital. These were often 
extended by wealthy women to other women who could not obtain credit through 
traditional means, either due to not having the required collateral or lacking the permission 
of a male guardian (Lázaro, 2009).  
While non-interest loans were provided by the Roman state and versions of informal finance 
similar to that of microcredit were practiced among Roman women and slaves, the first 
well-documented examples of organised, non-state micro lending and pawn broking took 
place across the world in China. 
  
2.2. Medieval and Renaissance Pawn-broking 
Outside of Europe, some of the earliest attempts at non-state provision of micro-loans can 
be traced back to larger monasteries in 4th and 5th century China, which engaged in both 
pawn broking and moneylending (Woloson, 2009).  
During the Southern Song Dynasty (960 – 1279), the capital was moved to the city of 
Huizhou, causing a boom in construction and the start of a flourishing trade sector. This was 
further strengthened when the merchants began forming partnerships with nearby 
                                                          
13
 Res nec mancipi in Roman property law is one of two categories defined by Gaius. Res mancipi means 
property of particular importance (such as house, slaves, land), which may only be traded or transferred 
formally.  Res nec mancipi is the opposite, ie. trade or transfers less important and thus not covered by formal 
requirements (De Zulueta, 1946)  
14
  In Roman Egypt, where the most comprehensive records of the demographic conditions of the time can be 
found, an estimated 60% of women were widows by the time they reached their 40s (Gardner, 1999) 
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monasteries to open pawn shops, allowing them to avoid paying a number of property taxes 
from which the monks were exempt, and causing the region’s economy to further 
accelerate (Walsh, 2010). These moneylending practices generally used capital from the 
‘inexhaustible treasuries’ of the monasteries, known as ‘wujinzang’, and were often given 
without collateral or other guarantees, because the threat of divine wrath, should the loan 
not be repaid, ensured timely repayments (Walsh, 2010). 
In Europe, the spread of pawn broking really began in northern Italy in the early 1400s. The 
budding Renaissance brought both prospering trade as well as increased poverty in the 
lower classes. The Catholic church prohibited making a profit on lending, so monks of the 
Franciscan order, founded upon a vow of poverty, suggested the creation of charitable 
pawn shops, where pawn-based lending could be performed, and provide an alternative to 
more usurious moneylending practices (Helms, 2006).    
In 1450, the Franciscan monk Barnaba Manassei started a ‘monte de pieta’ in Italy’s Perugia. 
The institution extended interest-free loans, secured with pawned items. The borrower 
could typically get up to two-thirds of the value of the pawned item, and initial loans could 
not exceed 25 lira for clients from the city, and 10 lira for rural clients (Weber and Remer, 
2011).  
While the Catholic Church initially forbade charging interest on lending money, it allowed 
taking collateral (Weber and Remer, 2011). Non-charitable pawn shops could thus lend 
money using a contract which sets the ‘fine’ for not fulfilling the terms of the ‘interest free’ 
loan. They could also restructure the repurchase by the borrower so that interest actually 
was charged, having been built into in the new price. In practice, the one requirement for 
entering the financial sector in the Middle Ages was the ability to read and write. Since 
knowledge of bookkeeping was usually kept within families, the skill only spread slowly 
across Europe. This caused a significant difference between the Jesuits and Jews who had 
access to this knowledge and those who did not, causing those two religious groups to have 
a major impact on the development of the European financial system in the following 
centuries (Weber and Remer, 2011).  
Pawn shops spread quickly across Italy in the latter half of the 1400s, and by 1470, 40 pawn 
shops existed across northern Italy alone. In 1515, Pope Leon X gave his permission for 
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pawn shops to charge interest, to cover their costs, causing a dramatic rise in shops across 
Europe (Walsh, 2010; UNCDP and UNDP, 2009).  By the early 1600s, pawn shops had 
opened in Augsburg and Nuremberg, as well as Amsterdam, Ghent, Antwerp and Brussels 
(Weber and Remer, 2011). 
In the mid-1600s, the Bank of England created the first comprehensive guidelines for pawn-
broking, but it was not until the 19th century that an official legislative framework was 
passed by the British Parliament. The Charitable Corporation, which was founded in 1707, 
lent funds to poor households, using small pledges and interest to ensure repayment and 
financial sustainability. Up through the 1700s, the organisation became the largest in 
England. However, extensive fraud and lax lending procedures caused the organisation to 
begin bankruptcy proceedings in 1731, which were not concluded until the late 1740s 
(Weber and Remer, 2011).  The reputation of the pawn-broking industry continued to 
decline up through the 1800s, where the so-called ‘dolly-shops’,  a form of unlicensed pawn-
broking operation known for charging usurious interest rates, became synonymous with the 
trade. The resulting general negative opinion led to the Pawnbrokers Act of 1878, in which 
interest rates were tightly regulated, along with the duration of loans (Weber and Remer, 
2011). 
 
2.3. Microcredit during the Enlightenment: the Irish Loan Fund 
In Europe, the first formal and large-scale use of collateral-free microcredit as a direct 
means to reduce poverty took place in Ireland in the early 1700s.  In 1720, Dean Jonathan 
Swift,  author of Gulliver’s Travels, founded a £500 pound charitable lending foundation, 
intended to provide small loans to poor Irish tradesmen and farmers, who were 
experiencing rampant poverty at the time (Jackson, 1940:10).15 The loans were without 
collateral, and instead employed the guarantees from a minimum of two neighbours, who 
would be notified in case the borrower failed to make the repayment. The system of social 
                                                          
15
 Hollis and Sweetman note the resemblance between the beginning of the Irish Loan Funds, and the ‘rebirth’ 
of modern microfinance in Bangladesh, where Mohammad Yunus, like Swift, used his own funds to initiate a 
loan scheme specifically aimed at poor clients without previous access to capital (Hollis and Sweetman, 2001: 
295) 
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pressure resembles that still used to ensure repayment of microfinancial group loans, which 
are typically the smallest form of microcredit provided, and where a smaller group of people 
all are responsible for the repayment of the full loan (Sweetman, 1996).  The loans provided 
were £5-10, and were typically repaid in weekly instalments of between 2 and 4 shillings 
(Hollis and Sweetman, 2001).  According to Hollis et. al, the system was a success, and Swift 
suffered no losses. The practice was repeated by other charitable investors, of which the 
Dublin Music Society is an example, who by 1768 had provided 5290 loans to needy clients 
(Hollis and Sweetman, 2004).  
The famine of 1822 drew attention to the needs of the poor and considerable charitable 
donations were established, of which a sixth of the funds remained when the famine ended. 
These surplus funds were gathered into the Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Institution (RLFI), 
emulating the Dublin Music Society. The fund put in place a system which prohibited 
salaries or profits of any kind to its managers, in an attempt to prevent this moneylending 
from becoming just another speculative venture (Damme, 2011; Hollis and Sweetman, 
2004).  In 1823, legislation was passed that allowed the charitable funds and societies to 
charge interest, and exempted them from paying stamp tax.16 
The stamp tax exemption made the funds preferred to standard banks and moneylenders, 
effectively removing 2% of the lending cost. Additionally, the provisions effectively gave the 
charities property rights over the assets of a defaulter, strengthened their enforcement 
mechanisms and enabled the charities to accept deposits at interest (capped at 6% by the 
state) and lend the proceeds at a profit (Damme, 2011; Hollis and Sweetman, 2001:297-
303), vastly expanding the funds’ capital.   
This change in legislation led to a massive expansion of privately-funded charitable societies 
and funds up through the 1830s, and enabled these initiatives to stay profitable. The Irish 
state passed laws which introduced the Loan Fund Board, intended to keep a regulatory eye 
on the more than 500 funds existing in 1840, and attempt to keep ever-growing concerns of 
corruption and sloppy management of funds under control.  By 1848, the RLFI ceased to 
                                                          
16
 According to Hollis and Sweetman, the maximum interest rate payable by borrowers permitted was initially 
13,6%, reduced to 8,8% in 1843 (Hollis and Sweetman, 2001: 303). In comparison, loosened usury laws from 
1786 allowed pawnbrokers to charge up to 30% in interest. 
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exist, its funds having been depleted and heavily burdened by rampant corruption 
(Sweetman, 1996).  
At the height of their existence in the 1840s, the Irish loan funds serviced as much as 20% of 
the Irish population (Hollis and Sweetman, 2001: 300). The massive demand for access to 
credit for the poorest in society, still ignored by the standard banks, combined with the 
funds’ ability to charge interest, enabled the societies to accumulate substantial profits. 
With the exception of now being able to charge interest, the Irish Loan Funds did not 
develop much in terms of how the loans were distributed; the procedure by the mid-1800s 
still followed those set in place by Swift in the early 1700s: a loan taker was still required to 
have two co-signatories, and pay back the loan in weekly instalments, typically over a 20 
week period (Hollis and Sweetman, 2001).   
Despite continued demand, the latter half of the 1800s saw a dramatic decline in number of 
funds and borrowers serviced. Sweetman and Hollis offer 3 key reasons for the decline: 
1. The funds were directly dependent on favourable state legislation, which controlled the 
framework in which the funds were allowed to determine their interest rates, 
management salaries and payment procedures. With the introduction of new legislation 
in 1843, which reduced the permitted interest rate that the funds could offer from 6% to 
5% and maximum rate payable by borrowers from 13,6 to 8,8%, the operating margins 
of the loan funds narrowed from 7,6 to 3,8%. According to Hollis and Sweetman, the 
forced reduction was primarily political, brought about by what was perceived as undue 
competition with regular banks for small loans (Hollis and Sweetman, 2001: 295). 
2. Famine in 1822, and especially the Great Irish Famine from 1845-1852 had a substantial 
negative effect on the survival of the Irish loan funds. The Great Famine caused an 
excess mortality rate and migration, which totalled over 25% of the Irish population, and 
predominately hurt the poorer classes in society, which were the primary clients of the 
loan funds. Records show depositor losses of over £10,000 during the famine, and a 
larger number of the smaller and weaker loan funds perished from the impact of the 
Famine. However, Hollis and Sweetman note that the real surprise is that many 
survived, and did reasonably well, despite the very harsh circumstances (Hollis and 
Sweetman, 2004). 
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3. Competition increased incrementally from the commercial banks in the late 1800s.  
Damme argues that the loan funds undermined their own business by developing credit 
history, which effectively removed their lower tier competitive advantage over the 
banks and thus made them vulnerable to competition (Damme, 2011).   Additionally, the 
loan funds had another significant advantage over the banks in the 1830s, where the 
banks still primarily operated in the larger cities, while the loan funds were placed in the 
more rural areas, and thus knew the local conditions and clientele much better.  
However, this advantage began to diminish in the 1850s, when an increasing number of 
rural bank branches began to open. 
Sweetman and Hollis also suggest that the loan funds battled the same issues as higher 
tier agencies, where internal corruption and sloppy lending policies were responsible for 
the primary losses by the funds (Hollis and Sweetman, 2001).  While the Irish loan funds 
showed that they were able to tackle defaulting loans, widespread corruption and faulty 
management issues, combined with increased competition, proved too serious to be 
overcome.  
A fourth reason for the decline of the funds is put forth by Eoin McLaughlin, who argues that 
the  failure of the Irish Loan Funds was caused by “…both regulatory failure and regulatory 
capture, which in turn was a product of the lack of institutional reform.” (Mclaughlin, 
2009:110). The Loan Fund Act of 1843 provided the legal framework for the loan funds for 
the rest of their existence, despite vastly changing circumstances.  Mclaughlin suggests that 
“…such institutional stagnation created a niche banking institution located in an ever 
shrinking niche.” (Mclaughlin, 2009: 110).  
  
2.4. Microcredit in the 1800s 
As the financial system expanded and developed throughout Europe, so did the initiatives 
put in place to specifically address poverty and inadequate access to adequate credit among 
lower classes of society. These initiatives took a number of different shapes, from charitable 
‘friendly societies’ operating primarily in Britain, to savings banks and credit unions, all 
operating with varying degrees of commercial agendas. 
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2.4.1. Friendly Societies and Savings Banks 
The mutual savings banks have their roots in the cooperative movement, which saw its first 
well-documented consumer cooperatives come into existence in mid-1700s England and 
France (Bonner, 1970).  In the late 1700s friendly societies, which were comprised of people 
forming smaller organisations for mutual savings, pension, and insurance or banking 
purposes, were seen as a way for groups of similar religious or trade affiliations, to band 
together for mutual benefit.   
This movement formed the foundation for future mutual savings banks, the first of which 
was Priscilla Wakefield’s small Tottenham Benefit Bank, established in 1804 (Leach and 
Goodman, 2000).  The benefit bank was created to provide a place for the savings of poor 
women and children in the local area of Tottenham, and to provide pensions or disability 
support when members grew older. A similar initiative was aimed specifically at children, 
who could deposit pennies, which later could be used to cover apprenticeship fees and work 
clothes.  The bank required timely deposits, and members would incur penalties if the 
deposit requirements were not met. The savings earned 5% interest, and once the loans 
matured, they could be withdrawn without penalty (Maltby and Perriton, 2013). Similar 
schemes are still used in microsavings schemes, aimed to ensure funds for children’s 
education and school uniforms, which often represent a significant cost and barrier to 
education (Majid et. al, 2013) 
5 years later, in 1810, the Scottish Reverend Duncan formed the Ruthwell Parish Bank, 
which drastically lowered the minimum deposit entry barriers for his parishioners to open 
an account. Where the minimum deposit in other banks in Scotland and England at the time 
was £10, the Ruthwell Parish bank only asked 6 pence, if the client agreed to save a 
minimum of 48 pence per year, for the following 3 years (Maltby and Perriton, 2013). 
Duncan cooperated with a commercial bank, to reach previously unbanked clients, much in 
the same way that a number of commercial banks today attempt to reach microfinance 
clients, by working with local SACCOs (savings and credit cooperatives) and other forms of 
local credit organisations of varying degrees of formality.17 
                                                          
17
 See, for example, the work of the commercial bank CRDB in Tanzania, which employs local SACCOs in rural 
regions to reach previously unbanked clients (Jensen, 2009). 
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2.5. Post-WWII Microfinance 
In the mid-1900s, the approach to development changed. The period after the two world 
wars pushed state intervention and the desire to develop socially and financially stable 
societies.  Top-down policy approaches in development dominated, making the 
governments of developing nations the primary party responsible for ensuring economic 
and social development (Martinussen, 1997; Milana and Ashta, 2012). Where lending with 
the aim to reduce poverty and ensure social stability before had been done almost entirely 
on a micro-level, the approaches to development in the 50s, 60s and early 70s often centred 
around state-funded initiatives. One of the main examples of this type of lending, and the 
challenges it faced, was the widespread state loans in Latin America’s agricultural sector. 
 
2.6. Latin America’s State-Run Agricultural Banks 
With the spread of the cooperative idea in the early 1900s, other versions of the agricultural 
financial initiatives with a similar social agenda appeared. In Latin America, rural 
intermediaries were initiated in an attempt to modernise the agricultural industry through 
commercialisation. This was done by increasing investment through better access to credit, 
and by mobilising idle savings (Helms, 2006). However, unlike the cooperative banks and 
credit unions elsewhere, these agricultural initiatives were typically owned by government 
agencies or private financial institutions, rather than the poor borrowers themselves, and 
over time, most of the initiatives became inefficient and insolvent.  
In the 1950s, large-scale agricultural development initiatives run by government agencies, 
came into existence especially in Latin America.  The focus for most of the initiatives was on 
small, poor and marginalised farmers. The provision of state-sponsored credit and loans at 
below-market rates was distributed with the intent to increase income levels and the 
production capacity of the agricultural sectors. In some cases, agricultural cooperatives 
received concessional loans and re-loaned the capital to their borrowers, at rates well below 
market level interest (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995). 
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The agricultural banks provided both long-term agricultural credits which had been rejected 
by traditional banks, as well as loans specifically targeting smaller farmers deemed too risky 
by the commercial banks to quality for a traditional loan.  
The banks often received the majority of their capital from international donor agencies, as 
well as central banks and national, regional and local government agencies.  The loans were 
heavily subsidized, and often extended to clients with sub-par creditworthiness (Gonzalez-
Vega and Graham, 1995). 
The state-run agricultural initiatives were a dominant development approach up through 
the 1960s and 1970s. However, as time went by, it became clear that most of the heavily 
subsidized initiatives were unsuccessful. The agricultural development banks suffered from 
widespread inefficiency and high levels of corruption, and suffered from quick depletion of 
their capital reserves due to the below-market lending rates and poor repayment ratios, 
resulting in extensive credit rationing (Helms, 2006). Additionally, the funds supplied did not 
always reach the farmers most in need, but instead got funnelled to wealthier farmers with 
better networks and influence (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995). 
Most agricultural banks became insolvent over time. It was common that banks received 
numerous recapitalisations and, following name and management change, were allowed to 
continue operations, usually with equal lack of long-term success.  Over time, however, the 
willingness of donors to invest in the agricultural banks waned, and the financial institutions 
either closed or transformed into development banks through extensive organizational and 
financial restructuring (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995). 
 
2.6.1. The Challenges for State-owned Agricultural Banks 
The financial intermediaries were defined by their state ownership, focus on agriculture, 
NGO status and bank charter regulation. According to some research, a large part of the 
continuous failure of the agricultural banks stemmed from difficulties associated with the 
complex nature of agricultural lending, without having the necessary training and tools 
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available (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995).18 Gonzalez-Vega argues that the development 
of the agricultural banks stemmed from a “…naïve response to the perceived limitations of 
credit markers, in the belief that all it took to overcome the extraordinary difficulties of 
agricultural finance was to get the government involved” (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 
1995).  
Other research agrees that state ownership was a key part of the problem, because public 
opinion and interest forced the financial institutions to adhere to social and political 
agendas, even if they were in direct opposition to the financial stability and health of the 
organisation (Binswanger and Deininger, 1995; Bourne and Graham, 1984). 
Gonzalez-Vega argues that the state-owned agricultural banks, despite being covered by a 
reasonable degree of regulation and monitoring, suffered from sub-par financial 
supervision. This was due to a regulatory framework, which typically was primarily 
concerned with the social aspects of the lending, and ensuring that the financial institutions 
lived up to the required caps on interest rates and loan targets (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 
1995). Because of the banks’ ownership structure, the intermediaries were vulnerable to 
policy-level intrusions, guided by fickle public opinion and a volatile political environment, 
be it from government or donors. 
The high degree of donor involvement in the agricultural banks also contributed to 
governments using the intermediaries as sources of support for their balance of payments, 
through foreign exchange and loans, at heavily subsidized rates. This effectively turned the 
agricultural banks into agents for government and donor alike, and the contracts extended 
were often high risk in nature. Additionally, some of the credit programs evolved into little 
more than a tool for fiscal transfers, taking the shape of welfare support rather than a 
financially self-sustainable bank, resulting in reduced repayment rates and profitability 
(Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995). 
The centralized organisational structures typically present in the agricultural banks, coupled 
with the highly politicized nature of the contracts extended, led to extensive lack of 
                                                          
18
 Agricultural lending is vulnerable to issues arising from geographical dispersity, weather volatility and severe 
market price fluctuations (Adams, 1994). 
38 
 
accountability and proper risk management. Lack of investment in adequate training and 
technology was widespread, and operational standards and guidelines were vastly dissimilar 
from program to program, and often lacking in substance. Furthermore, politically 
incentivised decision-making by managers did not always promote the solutions which 
served the banks best. This led to undue forgiveness of loans in arrears, as well as a neglect 
of deposit mobilisation from its customers (Von Pischke, 1991 and Gonzalez-Vega and 
Graham, 1995). 
According to Patten et al., the agricultural banks were created with the borrower in mind as 
the primary stakeholder (Patten et al., 2001). Implemented policies and practices focused 
primarily on furthering the interests of the customers of the banks, as opposed to ensuring 
the long-term financial sustainability of the intermediaries. Because of this, heavy use of 
subsidised credit was used, and the bank client base was chosen based on social reasoning 
rather than their ability to repay the loans, or lending history. The political nature of the 
decision-making process, coupled with the singular focus on customer interest, meant that 
the agricultural banks displayed a fundamental lack in their grasp of their own operational 
risk. This is in stark contrast to more depositor-oriented institutions, in which the financial 
intermediary is primarily concerned with securing the deposits of its customers, through 
prudent practice and customer assurance. Because of the risk of potential bank runs, the 
financial intermediaries are forced to seriously consider the repayment capacity of its 
borrowers, and ensure prudent procedures for successful loan collection (Bryant, 1980 and 
Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995). 
Additionally, moral hazard became a problem, because of the cost of adequate monitoring 
and the perceived levels of risk associated with lending. With a lending portfolio that is 
difficult to diversify among borrowers, the volatility of weather and geography cause 
additional uncertainty for the agricultural bank, leading to monoculture.  According to 
Gonzalez-Vega and Robinson, the key mistakes were the lack of focus on non-farm activities 
to reduce portfolio risk and insufficient attention to the successful mobilisation of deposits 
(Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995; Robinson, 2001). 
The agency issues facing microfinance institutions in general is likely to have made the 
situation worse for the agricultural banks, given the large geographical distances between 
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institution and customers. Monitoring the small farmers and branch staff was costly and 
difficult. In particular, determining whether threatening insolvency was due to local issues 
with management or general hardships, widespread corruption and/or subpar lending 
guidelines, was almost impossible (Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995). 
Finally, some research has argued that the state-owned agricultural banks failed primarily 
due to the implementation of import-substitution strategies, which led to over-taxation on 
food and non-food commodities, inflation, repressive financial regulations and over-valued 
exchange rates (see Adams, 1994 and Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1991 and 1992).  This 
repressive regulation is suggested to have limited the ability of the financial intermediaries 
to adequately respond to market changes. Additionally, it inadvertently reduced their 
efficiency through excessive loan targeting, interest rate control, severe reserve 
requirements and restrictions on entry into new financial markets (Adams, 1994 and 
Gonzalez-Vega and Graham, 1995).  
Similar convictions were the foundation for the structural adjustment programmes 
introduced by the IMF in the 1980s, stipulating harsh requirements in order for developing 
nations to be allowed macroeconomic support from the monetary fund.  Most of the 
agricultural banks fell apart once mandatory privatisation schemes and deregulatory 
requirements were introduced (Stiglitz, 1998). 
 
2.6.2. Credit Unions 
Much like the first mutual savings banks, the credit unions developed from the mindset of 
the cooperative movement.  In the mid-1800s, the first formal savings and credit unions 
were formed in Germany, by Herman Schulze in 1850, who focused primarily on urban 
artisans and masters (Macpherson, 1999, McKillop and Wilson, 2011). In 1865 Friedrich 
Wilhelm Raiffeisen, who became a key influence on the further development of the credit 
unions, created the first agricultural credit union. The credit union was specifically intended 
to provide access to capital for rural poor, otherwise wholly dependent on usurious 
moneylenders (McKillop and Wilson, 2011). Throughout the 1860s and 1870s the 
movement began to expand rapidly across Germany, as well as the Netherlands, France, 
Austria, Belgium and Scandinavia. Between 1850 and the start of the First World War in 
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1914,  credit cooperatives had over two million poor and middle-class members, all men 
(MacPherson, 1999). Like the loan funds of Ireland, the credit unions in Germany also had 
maximum loans (£50), but with longer term limits, a lower interest rate on loans, and they 
received deposits as well as paying interest on said deposits. Membership was required in 
order to take a loan with these societies. 
Credit unions began spreading across the globe, including the USA, in the beginning of the 
1900s.  In 1895, the Priyayi Bank of Purwokerto in Java, Indonesia was founded and, inspired 
by the German credit unions, the bank was converted to a version of a cooperative bank in 
1897.  This reorganisation marked the beginning of Indonesian rural banking and formed the 
foundation of what would become BRI, Indonesia’s oldest bank and part of the largest 
network of microfinance institutions at the time (Robinson, 2001). 
 
The Structure and Aim of Credit Unions 
In microfinance, the most common version of the credit union still widely used today is the 
cooperative bank. A cooperative bank has a structure similar to that of a credit union, but  
typically targets a more diverse client base than credit unions, which are often trade-specific 
(Mook et al, 2015). The cooperative bank functions much like the credit union in that it also 
provided access to capital through membership of the bank, but its ownership structures 
can be quite diverse and also include external investors, for example in the form of donors, 
government agencies or private equity investments.19 
A common trait for both credit unions and cooperatives even today is the usual presence of 
strong social mission statements. The aim is still to provide access to loans for people 
without adequate access from traditional sources, and provide the credit and loans at 
reasonable interest rates (Macpherson, 1999).  Today, credit unions and cooperatives still 
consistently offer savings accounts with higher interest rates and credit at lower interest 
and fees than most traditional banks (Macpherson, 1999).  
                                                          
19
 One of the more celebrated MFIs with a structure similar to that of other cooperative banks, is the Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh, originally founded by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus. In 2008, 94% of the bank was 
owned by its borrowing members, while 6% was owned by the Bangladeshi government (retrieved from 
grameen.com.) 
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For most credit unions and cooperatives, the financial intermediary operates either as a 
non-profit financial institution, or in the spirit of one (McKillop and Wilson, 2011).  The 
positive net income is used to improve services and reduce costs, or is at times given as 
dividends to members, as a form of rebate (McKillop and Wilson, 2011).  
In credit unions both in and outside the microfinance sector, the members own the 
organisation, and voting is usually structured after the democratic principle of one vote per 
member.  Board members are typically elected from the member base, as are the 
participants in other committees and work groups (Wilcox, 2011).  The board members of 
credit unions and cooperatives typically are elected from the intermediary’s local 
community. Thus, a mechanism similar to that present in solitary group loans may keep the 
board members vigilant in terms of making the best decisions for the community as a 
whole. MFI cooperatives and credit unions also are likely to suffer from issues similar to that 
of other NGOs, such as stagnant management, inactive members (e.g. Spear, 2004, 
Cornforth, 2002).  Additionally, some research suggests that smaller credit unions especially 
suffer from the conflict between performance-maximizing concerns and the board’s 
eagerness to ensure community standing, by optimizing its quality of service (Byrne et al, 
2012). 
 
2.7. The 1970s and 80s: The (Re-)emergence of Private Sector 
Microfinance 
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw increased scepticism and scrutiny of the previously so 
widespread use of subsidized and targeted rural credit, brought about by consistent poor 
performance and widespread corruption. In addition to sub-standard performance, the 
programs were accused of high operational costs, insolvency, provision of credit at below 
market rate to wealthy customers outside the target group, and poor loan recovery rates 
(Stiglitz, 2002). 
The rejection of state-run development programs happened as the general political climate 
turned in the 1980s, focusing almost exclusively on private sector initiative. A similar change 
was evident in the development methodologies encouraged and, at times, forced upon 
42 
 
regions across the South. This change had a profound effect on the financial system, and 
with it, the nature of microfinancial activity (Martinussen, 1997). 
State-run initiatives were replaced by the belief that private initiatives in the form of micro-
businesses could play a key role in development (Martinussen, 1997).  Development policy 
was now guided by a staunch belief in market principles and heavy liberalisation, evidenced 
in the structural adjustment programs and the policy-prescriptions of the Washington 
Consensus (Stiglitz, 1998). The Washington Consensus was a set of neo-liberal principles 
promoted by the IMF and the World Bank, which strongly encouraged developing nations to 
eliminate both the import-substitution strategies of the 1950s, 60s and 70s as well as tariffs 
and to promote deregulation.   
In financial development, the state-sponsored methodologies using primarily credit 
programs targeting poor and marginalised groups, were replaced by a new methodology 
born out of the neo-liberal principles, called the ‘financial systems approach’.  This approach 
was promoted heavily by both the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s and early 1990s 
and viewed microcredit as simply another form of financial service, which should be priced 
freely and according to market principles, to ensure a sustainable and permanent supply, 
and hinder potential credit rationing (Helms, 2006).  The emphasis of the financial systems 
approach was on the elimination of interest rate ceilings and all forms of credit subsidies, 
arguing that both hindered natural and healthy development of financial systems and 
intermediaries.  Additionally, it was believed that any sort of state intervention discouraged 
intermediation, and was claimed to benefit large-scale productions over that of small, local 
businesses (Martinussen, 1997; Lynn, 2002).  
In this climate where development policy turned heavily toward the private sector as the 
key ingredient in economic growth, the microfinance sector saw a number of innovative 
initiatives emerge, which in line with the prevalent discourse centred around the promotion 
of micro-business and private initiative; the most famous being the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, founded by professor in Economics and later Nobel Laureate Muhammad 
Yunus (Yunus, 2003).  The ‘Grameen methodology’ distinguished itself by primarily focusing 
on micro-businesses, and much like the methodology employed by the Irish loan funds in 
the 1700s, by promoting very small, collateral-free loans, where the members in ‘solidarity 
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lending groups’ provided mutual guarantees and social pressure to ensure repayment (Hollis 
and Sweetman, 2001; Yunus, 2003). Additionally, focus was moved to female borrowers, 
based on a belief that women would have better repayment rates, and put more funds 
aside to cover key household expenses, such as funds for education and emergency savings 
(Yunus and Weber, 2009). 
However, the unwavering macroeconomic push of free market principles came under 
increasingly heavy fire in the late 1980s and 1990s. The approach was criticised for not 
recognising that a free market is not infallible, and for the hypocrisy of forcing developing 
nations to remove tariffs and subsidisation of local industries, when both were used 
extensively in both Europe and the USA (Stiglitz, 2002; Schmitz et al, 2006, ). The demands 
for fiscal austerity, trade liberalization and de-regulation of the capital markets was accused 
of contributing directly to both the East Asian crisis in 1994 and the Argentine financial crisis 
in 1998, and for being based on fundamentally unsound economic assumptions (Stiglitz, 
2002). 
 
2.8. Microfinance in the 90s and 00s: The Rise of the ‘Enabling 
Environment’ 
While focus in development continued to be on the private sector up through the 1990s and 
2000s, a significant shift towards a more inclusive institutional approach was nevertheless 
evident, both in development policy as a whole, and in the approach to microfinance.  
Where the 1980s saw a very uncompromising belief in the market’s ability to best create 
growth and poverty reduction,  development research in the 1990s introduced a clear 
distinction between ‘economic growth’ and ‘economic development’ (Lynn, 2002). The 
private sector was still considered the ‘engine of growth’, but the need for a strong meso-
level was highlighted: institutions and infrastructure were meant to link the macro economy 
with the micro-level conditions of the poor (Martinussen, 1997).  The approach seemed to 
work, and high repayment rates bolstered by sustainable interest rates allowed MFIs to 
develop long-term financial sustainability (Robinson, 2001). 
As the conditions of the Washington Consensus were scaled down, and the imperfections of 
the capitalist market approach to development were acknowledged even by economists at 
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the World Bank (Stiglitz, 1998 and 2002), the emergence of more holistic, all-inclusive 
approaches to development had a direct impact on the way microfinance was considered. 
While microcredit was still a key element of microfinance, the range of financial services 
defined as ‘microfinance’ began to expand rapidly, to include both microsavings and later 
microinsurance. Especially microsavings was argued to be as important, if not more, as 
microcredit to ensure economic well-being, due to its ability to smooth consumption and 
increase investment  (Hulme et. al, 2009).  
The growing support for microfinance caused a dramatic increase in microfinancial activity 
and research in the mid-1990s, and became a favoured tool in the struggle to reduce 
poverty. It received support from the left for its focus on poverty alleviation amongst the 
poorest in society, while satisfying the right with emphasis on private initiative and private 
sector development (Helms, 2006). 
The early 2000s saw an explosive expansion of the microfinance sector. Scepticism slowly 
waned in favour of an at times near-euphoric embrace, which culminated around the turn 
of the century, with Yunus calling for an ‘end to poverty’ and receiving the Nobel Peace 
Prize for his work with microfinance in 2006 (Yunus and Weber, 2009; Yunus, 2003).   
 
2.9. The 2008 Financial Crisis 
Before the financial crisis took hold in late 2007, most research had only observed weak if 
any relationship between the performance of microfinance institutions and events affecting 
national macroeconomic conditions and the international capital markets (e.g. Di Bella, 
2011; Ahlin et al., 2010; Krauss and Walter, 2006).  
The years from the late 90s up until the start of the financial crisis boasted strong growth, 
profitability and asset quality for the microfinance intermediaries, across regional, 
institutional and regulatory divides.  Institutions specialised in microfinance lending 
appeared, as did new products meant to target localised needs. The assets of the median 
MFI grew 36%, with borrowing levels increasing at annual rates above 50%, suggesting a 
decrease in capital asset ratios, but significant increase in levels of liquidity provided for the 
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market.  Median profitability was good, with equity returns at 10%, and low levels of both 
portfolios at risk (PAR30) and write-offs (Di Bella, 2011). 
Its apparent robust ability to withstand external shock was a key selling point for investors 
in the use of microfinance assets to diversity the risk of investment portfolios20 (Gonzalez, 
2011; Patten et al., 2001; Krauss and Walter, 2009). The reasons usually listed for its robust 
nature included the lower financial leverage of microfinance intermediaries compared to 
other financial institutions, and especially the insulation of its client base to changes in 
formal domestic and international financial market (Gonzalez, 2011; Krauss and Walter, 
2009).  
Post-crisis, however, some authors suggest that the lack of impact observed is mostly 
speculative, due to the poor quality and sample size of data available for the time period 
(Wagner and Winkler, 2012). With the exception of the brief recession of 2001, the data 
sample available for microfinance pre-crisis coincided with a strong period in the global 
economy, which was furthermore a time period of diffusion and expansion for the 
microfinance sector (Di Bella, 2011; Gonzalez, 2011). The high levels of growth were 
boosted by significant increases in the operational capacity of well-functioning MFIs, and 
the steep increase in clients and capacity came largely from increased dependency on 
foreign investment, from both commercial and donor sources (Kruiff and Hartenstin, 2014). 
When the financial crisis spread across the globe in 2007 and 2008, the first initial reactions 
from the microfinance sector was that the MFIs had fared reasonably well, all things 
considered. However, while the microfinance industry still expanded, it happened at 
significantly lower speeds than in the years prior to the crisis. Assets increased by 22% and 
borrowings by 23%, which was 28% lower than the levels recorded from 1998 to 2006 (Di 
Bella, 2011; Lützenkirchen, 2012). Mean ROE was 5% lower, and both levels of PAR30 and 
write-off ratios increased. 
                                                          
20 For additional discussion of forms of social finance and its ability to address the conditions that led 
to the 2008 financial crisis, see for example Chapra, 2009  & 2010 (discussing Islamic finance in 
particular) Krauss and Walter (2009), Wagner and Winkler (2012), Galema et al. (2011), Gonzalez 
(2007) and Gonzalez (2011). 
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Research published post-crisis suggests that the degree of impact differed depending on the 
MFI’s level of integration with the traditional financial market, and by the severity of the 
regional macroeconomic crisis. Some developing and emerging nations were significantly 
burdened by declining GDP and trade balances, which reduced the repayment capacity of 
the microfinance borrowers, and made refinancing options for the MFIs harder to come by 
(Di Bella, 2011). In cases where the microfinance industry had become closely linked with 
the general financial market, the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and state of the 
global financial markets appeared to have more direct and severe consequences for the 
microcredit intermediaries (Ahlin et al, 2011).  
However, even in regions where the link between the traditional financial market and the 
microfinance industry was weak, the national and international mainstream financial 
markets appeared to have deeper impact on the level and speed of growth and health of 
assets in the microfinance industry than previously thought (Di Bella, 2011; Kruiff and 
Hartenstin, 2014). Wagner and Winkler argue that the microfinance industry displays a 
pattern of boom and busts increasingly similar to that of the mainstream financial markets, 
possibly due to an increased inclusion of foreign funding (Di Bella, 2011). Additionally, 
increased regional competition and rapid market growth also contributed to the 
deteriorated asset quality and declining rates of growth (Kruiff and Hartenstin, 2014).   
Although it appears to be clear that the financial crisis while less harsh to microfinance than 
to other financial sectors, did weaken the industry, some research suggests that it was not 
the main cause of the slowed growth and declining asset quality. Kruiff and Hartenstin 
argues that a combination of irresponsible expansion strategies, resulting from an overflow 
of capital from over-eager donors and social investors, contributed just as much. The 
marginal increases in lending in 2006 and early 2007 were of lower quality than previous 
loans, often larger in size, and extended without the lending standards of previous years 
(Kruiff and Hartenstin, 2014).  In his paper calling for BASEL standards for the microfinance 
sector, Kruiff and Hartenstin muses on the changes in lending practices, commenting:  
“After years of evidence proving the microfinance sector to be fairly resilient to financial 
crises one wonders what has happened to the sector’s risk mitigating traits: conservative 
credit technology, short-term lending with frequent instalments, clients with flexible informal 
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businesses, and a market environment where over-indebtedness is not common.” (Kruiff and 
Hartenstin, 2014: 12)   
 
In addition to the findings of Kruiff and Hartenstin and Di Bella, Gonzalez notes that the 
increased degree of integration of the microfinance industry into the mainstream financial 
market caused a decline of the microcredit portfolio quality when the macroeconomy was 
weakened by the economic recession (Gonzalez, 2007). When the crisis began to be felt, the 
lower lending standards meant higher administrative costs to control levels of delinquency, 
and the general recession meant decreased access to liquidity funds on the liability side 
(CGAP, 2010).  
Additionally, increased levels of competition had a negative impact upon the dependency 
relationship between customer and MFI, which a lot of the intermediaries are reliant on. 
With increased competition, the incentive for a customer taking loans without collateral is 
less impactful, especially if the quality of available credit registries is still subpar. In an effort 
to attract new customers, new loan products have increased the cross-over between MFIs 
and the mainstream financial markets, and through it increased exposure and vulnerability 
to GDP contractions during the recession. 
 
2.10. Microfinance Today 
Today the euphoria of the early 2000s has died down, with the financial crisis issuing a 
sobering stop to the explosive growth seen both in the number of MFIs emerging and the 
number of loans extended pre-crisis, especially in the more developed regions, which were 
closer tied to the formal financial market (figure 2.1). This slowed growth was additionally 
strengthened by a general decline in available funds for development initiatives, especially 
in the 3-4 years following the crisis (Figure 2.1; Ngo, 2012:175).  
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Figure 2.1: Regional Growth by Year, in % 
 
 
 
However, despite the slowed growth and dampened euphoria of previous years, 
microfinance today still appears to be a success. The sector has bounced back, and 
experienced an average annual growth of 30% in 2017 (Khamar, 2017; Convergences, 2018). 
Additionally, microfinance lending has seen increased use outside the traditional 
development context.  With the establishment of microfinance as a genuine niche market in 
finance, the interest in micro-financial activity is no longer strictly reserved for those with an 
interest in development policy alone (Khamar, 2017).    
After the financial crisis in 2009, the EU became interested in microfinancial activity as a 
possible way to minimise the effects of future financial shocks, and help job creation in 
regions where rampant unemployment, weak banks and explosive poverty made 
conventional lending near impossible (EIF 2009:5). According to the European Microfinance 
Network (2013), over 200,000 loans with a loan volume exceeding €1 billion were disbursed 
in 2011.  
With the addition of the Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) program introduced in 
the 2015-2020 budget, an additional €450 million in loan volume is expected.  The primary 
focus of the new budget is job creation, particularly among the youth, and microfinance is 
presented as a tool for creating and expanding income-generating activities through 
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improved access to capital (EC and EIB, 2013; European Investment Bank Group, 2011; 
European Microfinance Network, 2014a and 2014b) 
 
Figure 2.2: Assets by Type by Year, in USD Mn  
 
  
. The increased interest from more well-developed markets and formal financial institutions 
is directly visible in the asset distribution, where banks now contribute by far the largest 
portion (figure 2.2). 
In addition, the 2010s saw the emergence of ‘micro-savings’, where the importance of 
savings both as a means to escape poverty for clients, as as a way for institutions to 
strengthen their capital base, came into play for many microfinancial strategies (figure 2.1). 
The nature of microfinance in the in the EU and the US is different, with regard to both the 
size of loan and the primary lending practices: where traditional microfinance loans are 
often $US100 or less, the EU defines microloans as loans of a sum less than 25,000 euros 
(Murdoch, 2008; European Commission, 2007). The legislation and regulation of 
microfinance in the developed regions often blends with that of small, formal businesses, 
and the majority of microfinance providers in both the EU and the US are formal private 
institutions or the state. The loans given are typically individual, and the regulation of 
institutions is typically much higher (EIF 2009; EMN 2014a and 2014b).  
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Figure 2.3: Deposits by type by Year, in USD Mn 
 
 
While the differences between developing and developed countries use of microfinance are 
numerous, there are lessons that can be learned on both sides. Where traditional 
microfinance initiatives and NGOs argue that the failed financial systems in the EU and US 
should look to sustainable finance to ensure the well-being of the client, it is also very likely 
that lessons from microfinance in developed regions may help shed light on the challenges 
in developing countries (e.g. Yunus and Weber, 2009).  A stronger regulatory framework, for 
example, as well as the challenges facing microfinance in developed financial markets, may 
help show the way to strengthening the microfinancial industry as a whole. 
The debate today is moving away from questions of basic financial performance and client-
level impact, to more fundamental questions regarding what the core identity of 
microfinance is, and with it what role microfinancial institutions should play in the general 
economy.  Within this context of an ever-evolving industry, 4 key areas are currently moving 
to the forefront of the microfinance debate: a) the identity of microfinance, b) the search 
for efficient lending strategies, c) the macroeconomic impact of microfinance, and d) the 
increase of the scale and scope of microfinance. These 4 categories are explored further in 
the following chapter on recent trends in microfinance research. 
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Figure 2.4: Regional MFIs, by Year 
 
 
 
2.11. Conclusions 
The roots of microfinance are as many and as varied as the approaches used in the 
microfinance industry today.  Throughout history, the successful extension of micro-credit, 
and later provision of microfinance, has been dependent on a number of factors.  
First, legislative and state intervention needs to be enabling, not hindering. The decline of 
the Irish Loan System demonstrates what may happen when regulatory failure and 
imprudent legislation come together to form a strongly impeding context for the further 
growth of the microfinancial activities taking place at the time. 
Second, the role of the state has an undeniable impact on the health of the microfinance 
sector, regardless of whether said influence is negative, as was the case for most state-
owned agricultural initiatives, or positive, as has been the case when the state has 
successfully created an enabling environment for the industry.  Looking at history, 
regulatory failure and rampant corruption are some of the key threats to ensure the 
continuous prosperity of the sector.  
Finally, post-crisis research indicates that the microfinance industry is slowly increasing its 
direct links with the mainstream financial market, for both good and bad. The high levels of 
growth observed since the late 1980s have meant an increase in both scale and scope of 
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most well-established microfinance intermediaries.  The increased size of the microfinance 
sector has meant higher impact on macroeconomic conditions, both in terms of GDP and as 
a provider of liquidity to the private sector, which also increases the systemic risk for 
microfinance.  
In the wake of increased political interest from the EU and similar governmental bodies in 
microfinance to boost job creation and reduce social exclusion, it becomes increasingly 
important to improve our understanding of the ability of MFIs to function as liquidity 
creators for the overall economy, in the same way as traditional financial intermediaries.   
 
We need to understand what initial mechanisms made microfinance lending successful 
where traditional banks were not, and what approaches to microcredit and microfinance 
have not worked. Additionally, we need to understand the behaviour of microfinance 
institutions compared to that of traditional banks, especially as the number of traditional 
institutions entering the microfinance industry increase. 
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3. Trends in Microfinance Research 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter on the history and development of the microfinance 
concept, the trends in current microfinance research can be split into 4 main categories21: 
identity, strategy, impact and access.  The following theoretical chapter outlines the key 
topics of each category. 
Studies related to the identity of microfinance takes a closer look at its use as a poverty 
reduction tool, and evaluate both its original framework, as well as the transition of some 
MFIs from non-profit charities toward more commercial and formal financial institutions. 
They discuss the presence of a mission drift within the microfinance industry, as well as the 
key drivers and potential consequences of such a transition. 
Research on the strategy of microfinance institutions investigate the unique methodologies 
employed by MFIs to reach previously unbanked clients. The studies look at the strategic 
alliances sometimes formed between formalized commercial financial institutions and local 
savings and credit schemes, to reach microfinance clientele. Studies in this category also 
look at the drivers for successful repayment, and analyse the impact of factors such as 
gender, age and education of the successful microfinance loan-taker. 
Research on the impact of microfinance typically moves along two very different paths: the 
impact of microfinance on the lives of its loan-takers, and the impact of the microfinance 
industry on the societies and capital markets in which they operate. While microeconomic 
impact is an area of much debate and activity, there is less research done on the 
macroeconomic impact of microfinance.  For the specific purpose of this thesis, the primary 
focus in this theoretical chapter is on the macroeconomic impact of MFIs, as these impact 
analyses have a direct impact in MFI ability to create liquidity for their surrounding markets. 
Finally, research on access and outreach discusses the ways in which to improve the scale 
and scope of microfinance activity and to increase access for previously unbanked clients.  In 
terms of scale, studies look at the impact of the size and structure of the MFI, as well as 
                                                          
21 The four trends were identified through a thorough review of the current, relevant literature in 
microfinance, as it related to this dissertation. 
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discuss the poverty range in which microfinance may successfully be employed to reduce 
poverty. The discussion of scope looks at the lending products offered and identifies the 
benefits and challenges of portfolio diversification in MFIs. 
 
3.1. The Identity of Microfinance 
As microfinance has found increased use and recognition, its spread has moved beyond its 
original actors, NGOs and donor-financed initiatives, whose primary objective was entirely 
of a social character. There exists a plethora of individual case-based research studies and a 
few larger empirical ones, which support the notion that successful microfinance initiatives 
can provide a financially sustainable option in the struggle to reduce poverty (see, for 
example Cull et al., 2009; Odell, 2010; Goldberg, 2005; Robinson 2001). However, as the 
industry grows, the differences between social and financial strategies have become more 
apparent, and the critique of opposing viewpoints on both sides of the fence is fierce. With 
increased use has come a move among some microfinance institutions towards 
commercialisation, and with it, an interest in not just financial self-sustainability, but also 
the increased profitability of their microfinancial activity (e.g. Carrick-Cagna and Santos, 
2009; Christen, 2002; Helms, 2006). 
 
3.1.1. The Compartamos Controversy 
The debate, which has raged both in academic and practitioner environments, came to a 
head, when the Mexican MFI Banco Compartamos went public in 2007. Banco 
Compartamos sold 30 percent of their holdings, bringing in a net worth of over $US1.6 
billion, and from one side, praise for the bank was abundant: The Economist called the bank 
“...not the biggest, but the most important Mexican bank”, and venture capitalist Steven 
Funk expressed his support for the IPO, stating “...one must allow and support the 
development of capital markets to fund the impoverished“. (Economist, 2007; Cull et al., 
2008; Malkin, 2008).  A number of academic studies have also supported this transition 
from non-profit MFI to for-profit mode of operation, noting that relying on deposits and 
revenue rather than donations is more secure long-term, and these institutions appear to be 
more cost-effective (Bogan, 2012a;  Caudill et al, 2009; Ledgerwood and White, 2006).  
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 However, Compartamos and other microfinance institutions taking a commercial approach, 
came under heavy fire from the supporters of more traditional microfinance.  Yunus stated 
that Compartamos was “...on the money-lender’s side, not the poor” (Carrick-Cagna and 
Santos, 2009), and Chuck Waterfield of Microfin accused the MFI of “...monopolistic 
exploitation of the poor” (Economist, 2008). Critics claimed that the MFI took advantage of 
its market position, and charged interest rates which were far from a social optimum; close 
to 100%, allowing the company an average annual return of 53% (Carrick-Cagna and Santos, 
2009). The bank was, along with other commercial initiatives, accused of simply substituting 
one form of loan shark with another (BusinessWeek, 2007). Others agree, arguing that the 
social impact of microfinance must take priority over full financial return (Grene, 2012). 
Additionally, some research contends that when commercial microfinance grows but does 
not raise the interest rate over time, the MFI will exhibit a natural tendency to stop being a 
microfinancial institution, in order to prevent falling below the profitability threshold 
(Jensen, 2009). As the organisation grows, overhead costs, transaction costs and 
shareholder expectations will increase.  Consequently, the smallest MFI customers that 
were once profitable for the organization will over time no longer continue to be so. The 
smaller clients are considerably more expensive for the MFIs than the larger customers, and 
the new cost structures and legal limitations that the MFIs experience with growth will 
prevent the poorest clients from being served adequately. With upward-expanding markets, 
the low end of the market will be increasingly ignored (Jensen, 2009). 
In contrast to commercial MFIs such as Compartamos, the average interest rate lies around 
31% among non-profit MFIs (BusinessWeek 2007). However, the non-profit approach has its 
own set of critics, and its own challenges to meet. Placing primary focus upon poverty 
reduction, a large majority of the non-profit MFIs fail to keep themselves financially 
sustainable in their infant and growth stages, and struggle to even survive to maturity: 
according to Carrick-Cagna and Santos, only 2% of the non-profit microfinancial initiatives 
are considered self-sustainable (Carrick-Cagna and Santos, 2009). 
Some literature holds that it is less a case of argument for or against commercialization, but 
rather a question of understanding the life-cycle stages that a successful MFI passes through 
(eg. Helms, 2006 and Bogan, 2012a). 
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3.1.2. The Life-Cycle Theory 
The life-cycle theory considers the nature of microfinance institutions from an institutional 
evolutionary perspective. It argues that most MFIs change capital structure as they mature, 
evolving from NGOs in their infant and youth stages, to eventually becoming full-fledged 
financial institutions in later stages of maturity (Farrington and Abrams, 2002; Helms, 2006; 
Maisch et al., 2006). Microfinance institutions thus typically start out with a social mission, 
financing their loan portfolio entirely through grants and concessional loans. Funding comes 
primarily from donors and international financial institutions, who “...effectively serve as the 
primarily sources of risk capital for the microfinance sector” (Bogan, 2012a:1047). 
The life-cycle theory states that sources of financing are directly linked with the maturity 
stage of the institution (Helms, 2006), suggesting that both age and organisational type may 
have significant impact on the levels of liquidity both held and created by the MFIs. Donor 
grants and soft loans make up the major part of funding at earlier stages of maturity, and 
eventually develop into more traditional funding in the form of deposits and equity capital 
(Bogan, 2008; Farrington and Abrams, 2002). In their 2002 article, Farrington and Abrams 
provide support for the claims of the life-cycle theory, finding that an increase in 
competition is changing the shape of the microfinance industry (Farrington and Abrams, 
2002:5). According to the authors, the leveraging of capital is increasing, with non-profits 
having an average leverage of 4.5 times the value of their equity, compared to previous 
levels of 1.3. Additionally, they observe a strong increase in deposits, as well a move away 
from grants toward commercial funding, though the tendency demonstrates strong regional 
differences, with Latin America showing the strongest changes (Farrington and Abrams, 
2002:6-7). 
The life-cycle theory is also supported by the findings of other studies. In their 2007 study of 
Vietnamese NGOs, Nghiem propose that the degree to which either financial sustainability 
or social benefits is prioritised depends both on the nature and maturity level of the specific 
MFI (Nghiem, 2007). An example of this is for-profit MFIs, which in their infant stage often 
need subsidies from donors to cover initial establishment and operational costs, but in their 
maturity stage would be expected to sustain themselves with some profit margin. In 
contrast, the non-profit MFIs tend to start on a lower level of both outreach capacity and 
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financial sustainability. Priority is typically given to increasing the depth of the services 
provided, rather than long-term sustainability (Schreiner, 2002; Nghiem, 2007). 
In opposition to the life-cycle perspective, some academics and practitioners in favour of 
increased commercialisation and integration into the traditional financial system, argue 
against this. Microfinance institutions need to use commercial funding in all stages of 
development, in order to achieve both social and financial self-sufficiency. The supporters 
argue that commercial funding and a for-profit approach has a positive impact on both 
outreach and efficiency (Carrig-Cagna and Santos, 2009; Bogan, 2012a). Since donor grants 
are limited in both scale (limited amount) and scope (typically only given for one or two 
donor cycles, spanning 3-5 years), the theory argues that relying on donor grants can have 
detrimental impact on the operations of the MFI (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Bogan 
finds support for the for-profit theory in her research, noting that grants and soft loans 
decrease the operational self-sufficiency (OSS) of microfinance institutions (Bogan, 
2012a:1052).  
Some recent empirical research argues that the distinction between profitability and 
commercialisation implies a belief that social and financial goals must be mutually exclusive, 
which may not be correct. Studies exploring the financial performance of for-profit MFIs and 
non-profit organisations find evidence that non-profit and for-profit MFIs perform equally 
well (Lützenkirchen, 2012; Mersland and Strøm, 2008 and 2009), and in some cases provide 
evidence of non-profits outperforming for-profits (Downey and Conroy, 2010a and 2010b).  
Supporting these findings, additional research suggests that mature non-profit organisations 
display increased rather than diminished efficiency (Nghiem, 2007). 
Not all research agrees, though: Cull et al. argue that the non-profit and for-profit MFIs have 
to navigate between a number of distinct practical trade-offs. They find that the NGO 
median operating costs are roughly double of the for-profit initiatives, and ask whether the 
NGOs should “...move upmarket to provide larger loans and improve financial performance” 
(Cull et al., 2009: 4). 
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3.1.3. Why Identity Matters 
The debate on the primary nature of microfinance institutions is important, because it is 
directly linked with how the industry should be seen in relation to the rest of the financial 
market, and how the state should regulate it. Is it only a development tool, meant to 
primarily reduce poverty and grant access to finance for clients otherwise not reachable by 
more traditional financial institutions? Or has it developed into a niche financial market in 
its own right, functioning as a sustainable and profitable alternative to traditional financial 
institutions? The distinction becomes increasingly important as microfinance methodology 
is re-introduced into societies with more developed capital markets, for example in an effort 
to reach those left behind by the most recent financial crises. Do we regulate MFIs as a 
social initiative meant to reduce poverty, or as financial institutions embedded in the 
traditional financial market, on a par with banks and other commercial financial 
intermediaries? Should the state be allowed to direct or regulate the lending activities of 
MFIs, in an effort to optimize their social output, even if it happens at the expense of its 
financial self-sustainability?  The answers given depend on the perceived identity of 
microfinance.  
The first empirical chapter of the thesis uses current banking theory to calculate the level of 
liquidity created by microfinance institutions for the market they operate in, which is 
considered one of the primary functions of banks from a societal point of view. I do this to 
shed light on the ability of MFIs to perform like traditional financial intermediaries, and to 
better understand under what conditions an MFI may be able to contribute to the financial 
markets, and serve as liquidity creators on par with other financial institutions. 
 
3.2. Lending Strategy in Microfinance 
The lending strategies employed by microfinance institutions, both in terms of to whom and 
how they lend, as well as the alternative forms or complete absence of collateral required, is 
a key part of what makes microfinance activity different from that of more traditional 
financial intermediaries. MFIs normally operate in regions with poorly developed financial 
infrastructure, without well-developed credit registries, and typically extend loans to poor 
people without access to adequate collateral. Because of this, the MFIs have had to develop 
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innovative lending methodologies to address the challenges of asymmetric information and 
of the high risk of adverse selection. These unique lending strategies, comprised primarily of 
joint liability lending to groups of varying size, enable the MFIs to extend illiquid loans to 
borrowers that would otherwise have been considered too risky to lend to, positively 
affecting the liquidity created by the MFI.   
Traditional commercial banks typically run into a number of troubles, when extending loans 
to customers about which they have limited information. This is especially true in 
developing markets where credit registries are either partially or completely absent, and 
where banks typically cover very large and diverse geographical areas outside the main 
cities (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). When clients have no loyalty to the financial 
intermediary in question, and the intermediaries suffer from asymmetric information, the 
protection against adverse selection is found through the employment of collateral (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981; Stiglitz, 1990).  In addition, some literature argues that the better quality 
of information accessible to group-lending approaches reduces the price of monitoring for 
the bank, by taking advantage of the monitoring mechanism among peers within each group 
(Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990). Before microfinance became reasonably common, the high 
transaction costs and problems with asymmetric information for traditional banks meant 
that the poorest and most rural regions were often completely void of any access to 
financing, unless the borrower was desperate enough to accept the usurious practices and 
interest rates of informal money lenders (Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Helms, 2006).   
In microfinance, joint lending methodologies such as village banking and solidarity group 
loans, are used to overcome the troubles more traditional banks face without adequate 
information or collateral.  Studies evaluating the impact of joint lending strategies typically 
discuss four main challenges facing traditional lending to the poor. These four are adverse 
selection, moral hazard, transaction costs and enforcement issues.  
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3.2.1. Adverse Selection 
Issues arising from adverse selection happen when clients have undesired characteristics, 
which are unobservable by the lender, but have adverse effects on the ability of the client to 
repay its loan.  
Microfinance institutions are able to bypass the intermediary’s need for credit rationing due 
to the risk of adverse selection, by using group loans (De Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Group 
loans are small loans given to individuals in groups of typically 4-8 people, who share joint 
liability for the repayment of the loan. In small groups, where borrowers pick their group 
members, adverse selection is avoided because the borrowers are well informed about the 
risk-willingness of potential group partners (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999).  
If the group defaults on its loan, all individuals in said group will be excluded from additional 
lending activity.  Default cases are thus reduced because the group members are in a better 
position than the MFI to screen, monitor and enforce timely repayments, while keeping the 
MFI costs for same activities down (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). Without the group 
constellation, loans of same size would be too small to be cost effective, given the high level 
of risk associated with it (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999).  
The delegation of agency issues from MFIs to its borrowers results in increased efficiency for 
the MFI.  Adverse selection issues are minimised through the reduction of asymmetric 
information between the borrowers and the MFI, and with it, the risk is passed on from the 
microfinance institution to the borrowers (Conning and Murdoch, 2011).   
 
3.2.2. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is the risk that a client will spend their loan in a less than optimal way, making 
poor choices because the associated risk is shouldered by someone else.  When a 
microfinance client has received a loan from the intermediary, the payoff is dependent on 
financially prudent behaviour from the client. This includes, for example, the level of effort 
put into making the financed project a success. Generally, the expectation is that the client 
chooses actions in which said action equals its marginal cost (Becchetti and Pesani, 2010; 
Simtowe et al., 2006).  However, with asymmetric information and the lack of collateral, the 
intermediary and loan taker are at risk of not holding same objectives, due to the fact that 
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the loan taker is not internalising the full cost of potential project failure (Ghatak, 1999).  In 
addition, the intermediary may not know the optimal behaviour as well, since the loan 
taker’s actions are not all observable, and comes with high costs, especially in a 
development contexts.  
The theoretical literature on joint lending strategies and peer monitoring argues that groups 
are able to take preventive measures and install corrective behaviour in peers, to ward 
against group members who may mismanage their loan (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). 
This is possible due to the shared liability. The individual group members carry the liability 
both for themselves and for other members of the group, but the increased quality of the 
group’s decision allows the intermediary to pass on potential benefits to the group to 
reward good behaviour, for example in the form of lowered interest rates.  This, in turn, 
increases welfare and economic position of the individual client, as well as repayment rates 
for the intermediary and, subsequently, the level of liquidity created for the market (Ghatak 
1999;  Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). 
 
3.2.3. Transaction and Auditing Costs 
The effects of joint lending in empirical literature are often studied by looking at its impact 
on transaction costs.  Theoretically, the transaction cost argument put forth in existing 
literature is that it may be only slightly more expensive to extend and administer a group of 
loans, than it is extending a single loan. For this reason, group lending allows the 
intermediary to reduce its transaction costs per loan.   
Ghatak and Guinanne (1999) explains that if the characteristics of the loans extended are 
‘simple and similar’ with regard to their repayment procedures and locality, then the 
intermediary  may save processing and screening time, by extending clusters of group loans, 
rather than individual (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). The intermediary can thus avoid costly 
auditing costs for each potential client claiming low output, by getting group peers to 
monitor and perform initial auditing. Only when the entire group expresses inability to reach 
repayment goals, will the intermediary have to perform an extensive audit of the loan 
agreement (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Hermes and Lensink, 2007). 
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The challenges related to high auditing costs are directly connected to the instability of the 
financial markets, in which access to good information on potential clients is hard to come 
by. Public credit registries are often of poor quality or completely lacking, and because of 
this, traditional intermediaries must reject loans to poor clients, due to their inability to 
verify information provided by the loan taker.  In addition, the lender is unable to verify the 
quality of information given by existing clients, who claim they are unable to repay at the 
agreed upon time. If the information given by the client is true, there are situations where it 
will benefit the intermediary to accept lower rates of repayment, but it is financially 
unfeasible for the institution to do so for every client and still break even, thus running into 
problems with false reporting. 
Traditionally, the issue of false reporting and avoiding high auditing costs is solved through a 
standard debt contract, in which the borrower agrees to pay a fixed fee. The lender in turn 
agrees only to audit if fee is not repaid in time, causing the borrower to lose their returns 
(Townsend, 1979; Ghatak, 1999). However, too high costs of auditing may present a 
situation in which the bank is unable to break even. Ghatak suggests that joint liability 
lending addresses this issue by reducing expected auditing costs and improving efficiency. 
Group members face lower costs for verifying the group’s output, due to locality and 
intimate knowledge of day to day activities.  Intermediary auditing is thus avoided, unless or 
until the entire group decides that they will have to default on the loan. 
 
3.2.4. Enforcement 
The challenges with regard to enforcement of disciplinary action due to an infraction of a 
contractual agreement between intermediary and loan taker, is typically not related 
asymmetric information. Rather the challenges faced by the intermediary in imposing 
effective sanctions in a typically unstable macro-environment, and against borrowers who 
often have nothing to confiscate (Ghatak, 1999).  In unstable macro-environments, often 
with weak institutions and poorly developed enabling frameworks, clients may refuse to pay 
what they owe the intermediary. This might be due to the poverty level of the borrower, or 
simply because the legal system is not able to instil effective sanctions upon the loan taker 
(Besley and Coate, 1995).  
63 
 
Some studies argue that joint liability contracts increase the repayment rates for MFIs, by 
utilising the ability of ‘good’ borrowers, to cover the losses from bad (e.g. Besley and Coate,  
1994 and 1995). However, Besley and Coate also found that borrowers, who perform at a 
mediocre level in groups, may be at risk of defaulting on their own loan, because of the 
added burden from having to carry the loan of a bad loan taker. The authors argue, 
however, that if the social connection between the group members is strong enough, the 
net effects observed on repayment rates is positive, due to the double threat of sanctions, 
from both the financial intermediary, as well as the community they belong to (Besley and 
Coate, 1995). As long as the group holds sufficient ‘social capital’, the joint liability group is 
likely to enforce repayment above what is possible for more traditional financial institutions, 
issuing individual loans.  
In related research, it has been found that loan takers will voluntarily agree to joint liability, 
regardless of whether the terms from the intermediary formally are joint or individual 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).  Some literature has thus taken a closer look at the ability 
of joint lending to mitigate issues arising from strategic default. Diagne (1999) develops a 
model based on peer pressure, in which the loan takers hold incomplete information on one 
another. They do not know the level of the other group members’ willingness to tolerate 
social sanctions. The author argues that peer pressure only works in contexts, where the 
bad loan taker cannot tolerate the pressure from social sanctions well (Diagne, 1999).  While 
studying the optimal size for groups, as well as the most efficient structures for monitoring, 
de Aghion discusses the impact of strategic default. The author proposes a model in which a 
loan taker’s group can verify the level of returns. Based on this, the group is able, at a cost, 
to impose sanctions upon a defaulting group member, if they default strategically, thus 
allowing the overall returns of the group to be correlated (de Aghion, 1999). In addition, 
some research suggests suggests that a rise in joint liability defaults may be due to strategic 
defaults, brought about by lack of flexibility in the adherence to repayment regulation from 
the lenders’ side (Giné et al, 2011). 
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3.2.5. The Role of Loan Commitments 
Traditional, commercial banks make commitments to lend to borrowers in the future, and 
through that commitment, develop systems needed to screen and monitor the borrowers.  
The commitments create liquidity by insuring the borrower against the risk of being 
rationed in a spot credit market in the future (Diamond, 1984; Thakor, 2005). In the context 
of microfinance, traditional loan commitments are seen in MFIs, but data is rare and hard to 
come by. However, an example of a unique form of MFI ‘loan commitment’ can be found in 
the methodology of group lending, where successful repayment of group loans is 
encouraged through the promise of access to larger, individual loans in the future. The 
individuals in the joint liability groups are incentivized to ensure repayment of all, in an 
effort to reduce the future risk of being exposed to credit rationing (Armendáriz and 
Morduch, 2010).  Following the argument of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), it is ex-ante efficient 
for the financial intermediary to threaten with future credit rationing, if joint liability 
borrowers perform actions that may adversely affect the returns of the MFI.  The incentive 
deters group lenders from undue risk-taking, and increases their incentive to address 
asymmetrical information issues within the group through the mutual monitoring of 
economic activities of each by the rest of the group members. 
In traditional banking theory, Boot and Marinc (2013) find that loan commitments improve 
the welfare of its borrowers, despite being a form of commitment which the financial 
intermediary may ultimately choose not to fulfil (Boot and Marinc, 2013).  The intermediary 
is faced with a trade-off between financial capital and potential loss of reputational capital.  
The latter can be especially expensive for microfinance institutions, where loss of trust 
among its borrowers may snowball into increased default rates, which is especially 
expensive for the intermediary to address, given the lack of traditional collateral. If the MFI 
does not honour its loan commitment, it liquefies its illiquid reputational capital, in an effort 
to hold on to its financial capital, a trade-off which may have significant and unforeseen 
long-term consequences. 
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3.2.6. Why Lending Strategy Matters 
The use of alternative lending strategies to address the weak information available on 
borrowers, as well as the lack of adequate capital, are both some of the key traits of 
microfinance activity, which sets the industry apart from traditional banking. Far from just 
being a development tool to address poverty concerns in developing and emerging markets, 
it is today also finding increased use in more developed environments. Microfinance 
initiatives are used reach parts of the population which are considered too risky to be 
served by more traditional financial intermediaries, and because of this, are left without 
access to capital. 
If we want to understand the potential impact of MFIs as banking institutions, we need to 
understand what factors carry significant influence on their ability to function as financial 
intermediaries. To compare the behaviour of microfinance institutions with banks and other 
traditional financial institutions, we need to look closer the traits which make MFIs unique.  
In addition to the reasons stated above, recent studies indicate that the current push 
towards commercialization of microfinance institutions has caused a marked decline in 
intermediaries making use of joint lending schemes (e.g. de Quidt et al., 2018; Breza and 
Kinnan, 2016; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010; Giné and Karlan, 2014) . If the type of 
lending used by the MFI has impact on its ability to create liquidity in highly unstable 
financial markets, the continued disappearance of the lending methodology may have 
unintended and potentially negative consequences, both for the industry itself and for 
society as a whole. 
Chapter 6 (the second empirical chapter) takes a closer look at the impact of lending 
strategies upon the levels of liquidity created by MFIs. In particular, I am interested in the 
effect of diversification of lending approaches upon liquidity creation, and especially 
whether this applies across all lending strategies or for joint lending methodologies in 
particular. The results will help shed light on the drivers of liquidity creation in a 
development context, and provide both practitioners and policymakers with some insight 
into the hidden impact of changing lending schemes and strategies. 
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3.3. Macroeconomic Impact 
Prior to the financial crisis, most academic literature focused on the client- and micro-levels 
of microfinance impact (Milana and Ashta, 2012). The reasons for this were two-fold: one, 
the given primary use of microfinance as a development tool aimed at reducing poverty, 
making the client outcome a natural key aspect in the evaluation microfinance efficiency. 
Two, data in microfinance has been notoriously unreliable, to the point where even today 
reliable country-level analyses are hard to come by, especially if the approach is quantitative 
(see, for example Cull et al, 2007). 
Over the past few decades, available data for microfinance research has significantly 
improved in quality, enabling better-founded studies both in terms of scale and scope. 
However, while the impact debate has run hot for a while now, not much has been written 
with regard to the macroeconomic impact of microfinance on the financial health of the 
society they operate in. Generally, microfinance is still often considered separate from 
traditional entrepreneurial finance, and isolated from the rest of the financial structure 
(Milana and Ashta, 2012). 
Some research, such as Ahlin et al., looks at the impact of the general financial context on 
the performance of MFIs, and finds that the economic health of the surrounding 
environment does impact the performance of the MFI.  The authors find that MFIs are more 
likely to cover their costs if macroeconomic growth is strong, and that MFIs embedded in 
more developed financial systems have lower operating costs, lower interest rates and 
lower default rates (Ahlin et al., 2011). 
However, as microfinance begins to move further into the mainstream financial market, it 
becomes increasingly important to understand not just the level of robustness of 
microfinance institutions and how they respond to external interference, but also to what 
degree they in turn have a macroeconomic effect, whether they are able to fulfil the same 
function as traditional financial intermediaries, and how they potentially impact the 
surrounding environment. 
The evidence of the impact of microfinance institutions is mixed, and numerous studies find 
both positive and negative correlations. Some studies find empirical evidence suggesting 
that while small loans yield high returns, these decrease with higher capital investments (de 
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Mel et al., 2008).  Others find evidence of poverty reduction, but more so for non-
production loans than production loans, and with larger impact in rural than urban regions 
(Imai et al., 2012). 
Since the crisis of 2008, interest in the degree of robustness displayed by microfinance 
intermediaries has increased significantly. Prior to 2007, it was believed that MFIs were only 
mildly affected by shocks in the mainstream financial market and the macroeconomic 
environment in general (di Bella, 2011). This was affirmed by the negligible impact of the 
2001 crisis, but data was scarce and often unreliable (e.g. Cull et al., 2009b). 
The financial crisis of 2008 brought a sobering and rather dramatic stop to the explosive 
growth previously evident in both the number of MFIs emerging and number of loans 
extended pre-crisis. Growth in the microfinancial sector was subsequently slowed 
additionally by a general decline in available funds for development initiatives (Ngo, 
2012:175). However, while the general growth of microfinance has slowed down 
significantly, some newer research suggests that micro-businesses with access to 
microfinance loans are able to withstand significant shock better than those without (Krauss 
and Walter, 2009; Gonzalez, 2011; Olu, 2009; Oluyombo, 2011).  Other research, e.g. a study 
of the East-Asian crisis in 1997, suggests that microfinance institutions are able to survive 
financial crises on par with, and sometimes better than, traditional financial intermediaries 
(Patten et al., 2001:1066).  
The ability of microfinance to withstand financial uncertainty relies on prudent financial 
management within the individual MFIs, and a continued effort to support the development 
of the external framework within which the MFIs operate (di Bella, 2011). 
A more negative outlook on the macroeconomic impact of microfinance is presented by 
Adams and Raymond (2008). The authors argue that the macroeconomic benefits of growth, 
reduced poverty and the stability of the agricultural sector, have been vastly exaggerated. 
They argue that the global amount of funding funnelled into the sector is unknown, and that 
the industry is fragmented and data is often unreliable. Because we do not know the nature 
and size of the funding, they state that we cannot know the real impact on poverty levels, 
and proceed to argue that without subsidies, 90% of all MFIs would cease to exist (Adams 
and Raymond, 2008).  This is supported by a number of other studies, which find that the 
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real impact of microfinance and microcredit on overall development is hard to identify (e.g. 
Morduch, 1999a and 1999b; Sharma and Buchenreider, 2002 and Armendáriz and Morduch, 
2010). 
Other academics refute this, arguing that the fundamental economic key to understanding 
the impact of microfinance, is its ability to create access to liquidity for customers, who 
would otherwise have remain unbanked (Milana and Ashta, 2012). Like ordinary finance, 
microfinance is an approach which connects savers with investors, enabling investments in 
projects which would otherwise have been deemed too risky.  Through innovative lending 
strategies, the industry thus manages to create new liquidity for an underserviced market, 
and reach customers without access to the traditional financial market. Bauer et al, note 
that in addition to increasing access to finance for the unbanked, microfinance institutions 
were an innovative institutional approach to overcoming agency issues usually associated 
with asymmetric information (Bauer et al., 2012). 
 
3.3.1. The Regulatory Framework 
While the ability of microfinance institutions to help alleviate poverty and provide access to 
capital for previously unbanked is relatively well covered by a number of studies, there is an 
increased focus on the importance of a well-functioning regulatory framework to guide 
microfinance institutions.22 Microfinance can work, but it needs the right conditions to do so 
–and if they are not in place, recent events show that the results can be disastrous (Lapenu 
and Zeller, 2002; Milana and Ashta, 2012). The increased diversity in organizational 
approaches, strategies and mission statements, combined with the rapid expanse of the 
sector, has made it clear that a better understanding of the impact of regulation and policy 
approaches has become increasingly important.  Furthermore, the lack of consensus about 
appropriate ways to measure both its social and financial performance, has made it difficult 
to evaluate the behaviour and performance of microfinance institutions, and with it, nearly 
impossible to make recommendations for prudent regulatory policies (Cull et al., 2009b; 
Milana and Ashta, 2012). 
                                                          
22
 See, for example, Imai et al., 2012 and Imai and Azram, 2012. 
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The nature of a prudent regulatory framework is closely linked with the debate outlined 
previously, on whether microfinance fundamentally is a social tool to reduce poverty, or a 
financial niche market. In the previous case of Compartamos, the interest rates were 
severely criticised for being significantly higher than needed to ensure future growth. This 
has been the case for a number of other large commercial MFIs (Akula, 2010). 
Worse, in certain regions, the lack of prudent regulation and oversight of microfinancial 
activity, was revealed to push poor people into further debt, rather than increase their 
financial well-being. In Andra Pradesh, a number of suicides were blamed on excessive 
pressure to repay micro-loans, though no causal relationship was proven (Sanderson and 
Sengupta, 2011).  However, the local authorities responded with regulatory measures, 
which effectively shut down local operations, and indirectly encouraged clients to default on 
their loans. Some critical voices have pointed out that competing government interest may 
have had interest in shutting down local competition in the market (Banerjee et al, 2010).  
Since the events of 2010, the Indian government has made the Reserve Bank the main 
regulator of microfinance institutions in India, in an effort to standardize the regulatory 
framework imposed on the industry. The sector in this case, is currently regulated 
separately from the rest of the financial market (Sanderson and Sengupta, 2011; Milana and 
Ashta, 2012). 
These events caused some tarnish to the reputation of microfinance as legitimate tool for 
poverty reduction, but did help highlight the need for prudent regulation of the industry. 
Assurance that MFIs are careful and diligent in their lending and monitoring is key to the 
success of microfinance, since the social contract will cease to exist if too many clients 
default on their loans (Conning and Morduch, 2011). 
If the microfinance industry is considered apart from the traditional financial market, there 
is less incentive for lawmakers to be aware of potential negative impact from MFIs upon the 
general financial health, or vice versa. As pointed out previously, Ahlin et al, finds clear 
evidence that the general financial market impacts the health of the MFIs operating within it 
(Ahlin et al., 2011). The risk associated with microfinance should therefore not just be 
considered in relation to the niche market alone, but also to the risk potentially posed for 
the financial market as a whole (Banerjee, 2013). 
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The impact of regulation has previously been covered by a number of studies, mostly 
interested in its impact on the financial performance and sustainability of MFIs.  In their 
2011 study, Cull et al., found that regulation and supervision helps for-profit MFIs to keep 
their profit margins healthy, but has negative impact on the MFI’s level of outreach (Cull et 
al., 2011).  Contrary to this, non-profit MFIs instead reduce their profit margins, but 
generally manage to keep their level of outreach to marginalised and more costly 
customers. 
Other studies find that while regulation is associated with increased cost for the MFI, in the 
form of technology investments and security, it is also correlated with increased trust 
among MFI customers (Mersland and Strøm, 2009). The same authors, however, also found 
that increased regulation risks stifling innovation within MFI. 
Hartaska et al. find that more traditional financial institutions tend to have higher costs 
associated with regulation than MFIs, due to higher and more restrictive levels of regulation 
(Hartaska et al., 2013).  If the same regulation is imposed on MFIs, the authors argue that 
the increased costs neutralize the technical progress made by the MFIs. Because of this, the 
regulatory framework should encourage microfinance institutions to increase their 
management and governance capacity.  The findings of regulatory impact is not conclusive 
across studies, however. For example, Hartaska and Nadolnyak found that a regulatory 
framework does not directly impact the financial performance or outreach of MFIs 
(Hartaska and Nadolnyak, 2007) 
In terms of ensuring good corporate governance within the institutions, Barreiro and 
Ducasse suggest a Code of Conduct for MFIs, in accordance with the international standards 
for good practice in companies and institutions in general. The aim of the code is to 
promote a common culture and framework which encourages best practice within the 
institution (Barreiro and Ducasse, 2012). 
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3.3.2. Why Macroeconomic Impact Matters 
Despite the increased view of microfinance as more than just a development tool, used 
primarily by donors and NGOs to reach a set of pre-determined social goals, we know very 
little about how MFIs interact with its surrounding macroeconomic environment.  This is in 
part due to limited data, which until recently furthermore had very low levels of reliability, 
but is also due to a lack of studies which specifically examine the financial behaviour of 
MFIs. As previously mentioned, the first empirical chapter seeks to help remedy this, by 
studying the level of liquidity created by microfinance institutions, thus providing further 
understanding of their ability to fulfil the functions of a financial intermediary. 
We need to improve our understanding of the financial impact of MFIs, so that we may 
develop relevant and effective regulatory frameworks for the industry to operate within, as 
well as to more effectively be able to harness the possible macroeconomic benefits that the 
industry creates. 
In an effort to shed some light on the impact of regulation on the ability of MFIs to fulfil 
their function as liquidity creators, the third empirical chapter looks at the relationship 
between the regulatory status of MFIs and levels of liquidity created for the market. I use a 
range of macroeconomic variables to control for the impact of other contextual factors, and 
use a range of cross-country and regional estimations, with country-level fixed effects. 
 
3.4. Access and Outreach 
Ever since the re-emergence of modern microfinance, there has been debate about the best 
approach to it: does scaling up the size of microfinance operations mean increased 
outreach? What is the optimal size of microfinance institutions – and how does size impact 
the behaviour and performance of MFIs?  Does increased scope and depth of microfinance 
services improve outreach? How poor can clients be and still benefit from microfinance, and 
does increased product and lending diversification improve MFI performance?  In the 
following section, I present some of the key findings, from studies that seek to analyse the 
impact and importance of scale in microfinance, as well as its scope and depth of outreach. 
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3.4.1. The Scale of Microfinance 
For microfinance institutions, the debate on best practice in microfinance takes place both 
in terms of scale and scope. In terms of scale, questions are raised with regard to whether 
larger, successful microfinance institutions such as Grameen Bank, or the commercial for-
profit organisation Compartamos in Mexico, experience significant mission drift as they 
grow in size. The concern regarding size is often accompanied by the additional worry that 
with size comes increased for-profit emphasis by  microfinance institutions which initially 
started out as non-profit initiatives.23 
While looking at the traditional banking sector, DeYoung notes that the share of assets in 
small business lending is negatively correlated with the size of the banks studied, and Berger 
et al. suggests that smaller financial intermediaries make use of fundamentally different 
lending methodologies than larger intermediaries do (DeYoung et al., 1999; Berger et al. 
2003). Additionally Pilloff and Rhoades find that larger financial intermediaries do not have 
net competitive advantages when compared with smaller banks (Pilloff and Rhoades, 2002).  
These findings are all in line with what has generally been observed within the microfinance 
sector, where unique lending methodologies are employed to reach customers otherwise 
left unserved by larger financial intermediaries (see, for example, de Aghion and Morduch, 
2005;  Hermes and Lensink, 2007). 
From a macroeconomic perspective, newer research finds that microfinance does appear to 
have a positive impact on the population in question, due its ability to raise the equilibrium 
wage (Buera et al., 2012). However, the same study also finds that a scaling up of 
microfinance initiatives does not appear to have significant impact on income per capita. 
This is because the aggregate total factor productivity is countered by lower capital 
accumulation from the redistribution of income.  
 
 
                                                          
23
 For further discussion of this, please see the previous section of this chapter, on the identity of microfinance. 
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3.4.2. The Scope of Microfinance 
The scope of microfinance came to the forefront of the debate in what Milana and Ashta 
defines as ‘the second microfinance revolution’ of the 2000s, which focused on ‘customer-
centred finance’ (Milana and Ashta, 2012).  This approach is focused on the needs of the 
customer, and attempts to develop financial solutions and packages, which addressed a 
combination of social and financial needs. The provision of both credit, insurance and social 
support, was seen as a way to ensure that the both the social aims of microfinance were 
reached, as well as its financial goals (Collins et al, 2009; Hartarska and Mersland, 2012). The 
shift meant an expansion of products, to include both microsavings and insurance options. 
However, while the microfinance portfolio has developed rapidly in some parts of the world, 
others are still underserved and without adequate access to both savings and insurance 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). 
The expanded microfinance context, and move from micro-credit to microfinance in the 
1990s, where the focus was heavily on the institutional impact and context of microfinance 
and development in general, allowed a much broader range of institutions to fall under the 
microfinance bracket (Morduch, 2000).  
This broadened range of institutional contexts also brought with it a wide range of 
ideologies and perspectives, which caused the clash between for-profit and non-profit 
approaches, as outlined in the ‘identity section’ above. However, the debate has also 
impacted the academic discussion on how best to ensure optimal outreach in microfinance 
activities, but results so far appear to be non-conclusive. While some studies, such as 
Quayes and Tanweer find a positive correlation between financial self-sustainability and 
outreach, others find either no difference, or in some cases, both increased efficiency and 
outreach amongst non-profits, compared to for-profit MFIs (Quayes and Tanweer, 2014; 
Sagamba et al., 2013; Nghiem, 2007). Instead, these studies suggest that it is more a 
question of the quality of strategies employed and the maturity of the individual institution, 
which determines the extent of an MFI’s outreach. 
Concerns have been raised that it may not always be in the interest of smaller savings and 
credit institutions to let go of its good clients, as they move beyond the loan-size of 
traditional microcredit (Jensen, 2009). This is especially a concern in situations where a 
smaller MFI with sharp capital constraints seeks to become a formal partner of a larger 
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commercial institution. The smaller MFI experiences a potential clash between desires to 
maximise performance and its stated social mission to reach the most deserving clients.  
Instead of focusing continuously on poorer and previously unbanked clients, the financial 
intermediary is tempted to hold on to its larger clients and thereby risks exhausting its 
capital trying to serve their needs.  
For-profit institutions are typically concerned with the breadth of services offered, including 
an increased number of clients, and long-term survivability.  Non-profit organisations, on 
the other hand, tend to use the social, poverty-reducing approach, which focuses on the 
depth of service, especially in reaching increasingly disadvantaged groups (Nghiem 2007; 
Schreiner, 2002). The social approach assumes that the depth of outreach can compensate 
for a narrow breadth, short length and limited scope. Conversely, the financial sustainability 
approach assumes that a wide breadth, long length and ample scope can compensate for a 
shallow depth (Shreiner, 2002). 
Supporting the view that there is a trade-off between efficiency in terms of reaching social 
goals and the depth of MFI outreach, Hermes et al. finds that the level of outreach is 
negatively correlated, both to percentage of female borrowers, as well as small loan size 
(Hermes et al., 2011). 
  
3.4.3. Why Access and Outreach Matter 
In both traditional banking literature, as well as in microfinance research, the discussion 
about the scale and scope of the optimal institutional entity is not new.  And while this 
thesis does not dwell primarily on the impact of size upon levels of liquidity created and MFI 
performance, it is nonetheless an important and consistent variable to keep an eye on. As 
was demonstrated previously by the life-cycle theories, the age and size of MFI may have 
direct impact on the behaviour, efficiency and strength of links to the surrounding financial 
market. For this reason, both size and age are variables which are used consistently as 
controls in estimations across all 3 of the following empirical chapters. 
Additionally, the scope of microfinance, in terms of outreach and depth of service, is a 
debate that continues to raise questions. Microfinance is not the only tool that may be 
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employed to reduce poverty, and it is important to further understand the relationship 
between the ability to reduce poverty, fulfil social goals and the ability to perform the 
functions of a traditional financial intermediary, as liquidity creator.   
 
3.5. Research Challenges in Microfinance 
Most empirical research in development faces considerable difficulty with regard to the 
reliability of the data used. This is especially true for an area such as microfinance, which 
relies on specific types of accounting data to measure the financial performance of 
intermediaries engaged in microfinancial activity. 
The opinions on how to best measure financial performance in microfinance are many and 
varied. Some research relies on return on assets and return on equity as the primary 
indicators of internal financial performance, which may or may not be adjusted (Cull et al., 
2007; Christian, 2002). In general, however, standard return on assets and equity are often 
seen as too simplistic summaries of inputs and outputs (Olivares-Polanco 2007; Khan et al., 
2017).    
Instead, some studies advocate the use of financial and operational self-sufficiency 
indicators. Financial self-sufficiency measures the MFI’s ability to operate without ongoing 
subsidy, including soft loans and grants, and is defined as adjusted financial revenue, divided 
by the sum of adjusted financial expenses, adjusted net loan loss provision expenses, and 
adjusted operating expenses (Cull et al., 2007; MicroBanking Bulletin, 2007). Cull et al., who 
use all 3 types of performance indicators in their regressions, consider FSS the more 
accurate to measure performance, and argue that without it, any conclusions regarding the 
performance of MFIs become too inaccurate (Cull et al., 2007). However some practitioners 
and academics argue that it is extremely challenging to produce a reliable FSS ratio, and the 
most common measurement included by academic is still operational self-sufficiency (OSS), 
which measures to what extent the MFI is able to cover its costs through operating 
revenues (Yaron and Manos, 2007; Schäfer, 2011;  Khan et al., 2017; Hartaska et al., 2007).  
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3.5.1. Data Availability and Interpretation in Microfinance 
One of the key issues facing microfinance research is as mentioned the lack of reliable data. 
As the microfinance industry matures, access to larger datasets with more audited data 
improves, yet it is still an issue that causes major challenges for researchers. Most studies, 
including this thesis, use the MIX database for their work, although this database still 
contains significant amounts of unreliable and unconfirmed data, making the data cleaning 
process both tricky and laborious24.  
However, even when the same data is used, very different results can be reached, based on 
the methodological approach chosen. In 1998, Pitt and Khandker found that microfinance 
initiatives in Bangladesh had a positive impact on efforts to reduce poverty, especially if the 
efforts specifically targeted women as clients (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). However, 10 years 
later, Roodman and Morduch used the same dataset, and found that the previous 
conclusions could not be replicated, due to faulty data and issues of reverse causality 
(Roodman and Morduch, 2009). The debate evolved into an argument about prudent 
econometric measurements, with Pitt countering Roodman and Morduch’s findings in 2011 
(Pitt, 2012). He argues that the econometric model used by Roodman and Morduch is 
flawed, and not appropriate to discern the impact of microcredit, as well as having used a 
different set of control variables, which he sees as less appropriate (Pitt, 2012). Roodman 
and Morduch then subsequently fired back, arguing that even when adapting the variables 
previously used, the results were still problematic, since the positive impact in their mind 
stemmed largely from 16 outliers from 14 households, causing bimodality. When the 16 
highest spending observations were dropped, the bimodality collapsed into one, and results 
moved towards zero impact (Roodman and Morduch, 2014) 
While there is continuous debate about how to best measure the impact of microfinance, 
there does, however, seem to be a shared consensus that microfinance can work with the 
right conditions. As Milana and Ashta note, “Notwithstanding persistent problems and 
malpractice examples, microfinance seems to be firmly here to stay.” (Milana and Ashta, 
                                                          
24
  For further discussion specifically on the data limitations of the MIX database, please see section 1.4.1, 
‘Dataset Concerns’, under limitations in the introduction. 
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2012:299). However, the accuracy of future research will be dependent on an increase in 
the reliability, the scale and the scope of available industry data. 
 
The following 3 empirical chapters take a closer look at the financial behaviour of 
microfinance institutions. Using MIX data from 2004 to 2012, chapter 4 uses recent 
literature in traditional banking, to study the level of liquidity created by microfinance 
institutions for the market. Chapter 5 looks at the drivers and determinants of the liquidity 
creation in MFIs, and estimates the impact of diversification and lending strategies upon 
levels of liquidity creation. Finally, chapter 6 looks at the relationship between the 
regulatory framework and the levels of liquidity created by MFIs across geographical 
regions. 
 
 
4. Liquidity Creation in Microfinance 
 
In traditional banking literature, one of the primary functions of financial intermediaries is 
to facilitate the transformation of liquidity for the market, by issuing liquid, usually short-
term, liabilities, while holding illiquid, long-term assets  (Acharya et al., 2010; Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009). The intermediary bridges the gap between borrower and lender through 
the liquidity transformation process: it mediates investments in long-term illiquid assets, 
without taking undue risk (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  The study of how and how much 
financial institutions help bring about investments, which would otherwise have been 
considered too risky for the investor, is key to understanding the role of financial institutions 
engaging in microfinance. Increased insight helps policymakers and practitioners design and 
implement prudent strategic and regulatory frameworks, for traditional banking as well as 
for the microfinance sector.  
The level of liquidity of an asset refers to speed and cost with which the asset can be 
converted into liquid funds, such as cash.  It is “…the degree to which an asset or security 
can be bought or sold in the market, without affecting the asset’s price” (Ledgerwood and 
Earne, 2013:39). The level of liquidity is relative to both the level of urgency required and 
the difficulty in getting rid of the asset, to attain the liquid funds.   
The liquidity transformation process has been proposed measured through the 
transformation of maturities, by calculating the scaled gap between liquid liabilities and 
illiquid assets (Schaefer and Deep, 2004). However, more recent literature suggests that a 
better way to look at the transformation process is to consider the change in ease, time and 
cost required for both client and investor to engage with each other through the 
intermediary (Berger and Bouwman, 2009).  Berger and Bouwman argue that a change in 
the length of maturities is not a sufficient way to measure the level of illiquidity of a loan, as 
short-term loans without traditional security may be significantly harder to get rid of, and 
come with higher levels of risk, than well-secured long-term investments (Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009; Berger et. al, 2011; Horvath et al, 2013).   
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A good example of this is the lending activity of microfinance institutions. The maturities of 
microfinance loans is typically quite short (usually 3 to 12 months), due to the very small 
loan sizes provided. However, the transformation of liquidity still takes place: the MFIs 
facilitate loans to clients that would otherwise not have had access to capital, or at best be 
subject to the usury lending activities of loan sharks.  The liquidity transformation, or 
creation, happens through a shift in the ease, time and cost required of both clients and 
investors.  
Prior empirical banking literature has found positive relationships between capital and the 
liquidity created and for large banks, while significant negative relationships are observed 
for smaller banks (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Horváth et al., 2013). In addition, deposit 
insurance was found in one study to be significant for banks with large ratios of household 
deposits, while insignificant to the level of liquidity transformed in another (Fungacova et al. 
2016, Schaefer and Deep, 2004).  However, evidence is still sparse, and so far, the literature 
has focused primarily on commercial banks in developed markets.  Financial markets in 
developing and emerging economic regions face a number of additional and unique 
challenges, which are likely to have impact on the levels of liquidity created by its 
intermediaries.  Access to credit registries is rare, and levels of consistent regulation and 
supervision vary significantly across regions.25  In addition, the organisational structure of 
microfinance institutions is a lot less homogenous than that of commercial banks in stable 
financial markets.   
This chapter expands the existing literature by investigating liquidity creation (LC) and its 
main drivers in a cross-country study of the microfinance industry. Understanding the 
microfinance sector, and its ability to create liquidity for the market it operates in, is an 
important part of grasping the nature and state of the financial markets in developing and 
emerging economies.26 This is especially true for economies where microfinance has 
become the primary, and in many cases the only, alternative source of capital to usury 
                                                          
25
 While I do control for both regional and regulatory effects in the estimations here, please see chapter 5 for 
an in-depth study of regulation in microfinance. 
26
 Microfinance is an umbrella term for a range of financial services, traditionally aimed at poorer segments of 
society, of which the best known and most developed is microcredit. For a detailed definition of microfinance, 
please see Appendix B. 
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moneylenders for small, often informal enterprises.27 By increasing access to capital for 
sections of the market otherwise left unserved, successful microfinance institutions have 
proven a viable and often financially self-sustainable tool in the efforts to reduce poverty in 
developing countries. The MFIs mediate investments in illiquid assets previously thought too 
risky and troublesome, thereby expanding the market and level of liquidity created. 
The dataset used has been pulled from the MIX database, comprises 1121 MFIs, from 98 
countries in 6 regions, and spans the period 2004 – 2015. In this chapter, I adapt the 
methodology used in previous banking literature to the unique conditions of microfinance. I 
attempt to compare the ratio levels of liquidity created by MFIs, to that found in more 
traditional financial intermediaries.28 I use panel data from the microfinance institutions to 
study the effects of traditional impact measurements on liquidity creation. The chapter 
offers insight into the ability of MFIs to produce liquidity on par with more traditional banks. 
Because of the unique development conditions that MFIs typically operate under, I also 
control for profit-status of the MFI, its organisational type, regulatory status, the presence 
of deposit insurance and geography.   
I observe a strong negative relationship between capital and liquidity creation, which 
corresponds with the findings among of other traditional banking studies (e.g. Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009; Horváth et al., 2013). The high levels of cash and cash equivalents typically 
held by MFIs does not seem to hinder the MFIs in extending microfinance loans to its 
customers, on par with the lending activity in traditional banks.  
Also in line with previous literature, I find a negative correlation between the size of the MFI 
and ratios of liquidity created for the market, when LC is scaled by size, though with weaker 
consistent significant than in previous studies (e.g. Fungacova et al., 2017; Berger and 
Bouwman, 2009; Horvath et al., 2013). In addition, I observe a significant and consistently 
positive relationship between regulation and the levels of LC, and relatively uniform ratios 
for liquidity creation across most geographical regions.  
                                                          
27
 The extent to which it still is, has been the cause of heated debate over the past few years. Please see 
previous chapters for details. 
28
 I refer here primarily to the empirical framework proposed by Berger and Bouwman to measure liquidity 
creation, which uses liquidity categories based measurements  instead of just maturity (Berger and Bouwman, 
2009).  
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While the impact of risk taken by the bank is negative as expected, I find inconclusive 
significant correlation between levels of bank risk and levels of liquidity creation.  In 
addition, the presence of deposit insurance appears to have insignificant impact on the level 
of liquidity created, thus rejecting the financial fragility hypothesis for MFIs, in which a bank 
withholds effort unless worried about potential bank runs29. Thus, the results suggest that 
other stress parameters such as conditions unique to the development context may impact 
MFI output higher than the fear of bank runs and capital risk. 
The study contributes to existing literature in two ways. First, it provides additional 
empirical evidence to a fledgling body of literature on the measurement of liquidity creation 
within traditional banking research. Second, unlike previous studies, this research looks at 
the ability to create liquidity in developing markets. Where the previous literature studies 
commercial banking operating in stable, well-developed financial markets, the microfinance 
institutions studied here operate in riskier environments, where unstable and less-
developed regulatory and macroeconomic frameworks could be expected make the ability 
to create liquidity significantly harder.   
Thus, the study provides a first insight into the ability of microfinance institutions to create 
liquidity for the market. The results indicate that institutions which engage in microfinancial 
lending, are able to create liquidity for the markets they operate in, on par with and 
sometimes in excess of, that of traditional intermediaries.  This ability appears to be 
consistent across geographical regions. In addition, the status as NGO appears to be 
positively correlated with levels of LC, when values are scaled. This may be the result of the 
unique lending practices employed to a higher extent by less formal institutions, an issue 
explored further in chapter 5.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 provides a brief discussion of key 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 4.2 presents my research question and formed 
hypotheses. Section 4.3 discusses the methodology used to measure liquidity creation, as 
well as the fixed effects model used to estimate the impact of a number of traditional and 
microfinance-specific drivers of LC. Section 4.4 details my dataset, and section 4.5 presents 
                                                          
29 For in-depth discussion of the financial fragility hypothesis, please see Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
and Diamond and Rajan (2001). 
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my results and a discussion of them.  Finally, section 4.6 provides a summary of the findings, 
their practical and academic implications as well as propositions for future research.  
 
4.1. Literature 
In the following section, I provide a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the creation of liquidity.30 I place my research question in the outlined debate, and draw 
my hypotheses from the presented literature.  
 
4.1.1. Financial Intermediation 
In a perfect economic system, financial intermediaries would not be needed. If the 
behaviour of agents was purely rational, and markets were perfect, the agents would be 
able to correctly interpret the risk relevant to an investment, and could price a planned 
transaction adequately. However, due to imperfect financial markets and issues arising from 
asymmetric information, a mediating agency is required to reduce risk and transform 
liquidity (Manchev, 2009).  From a macroeconomic perspective, financial intermediaries are 
thus necessary institutions for two key reasons - they transform and reduce risk and create 
liquidity for the market (Greenbaum and Thakor, 2015). By allocating capital from the lender 
to the borrower, the intermediary reduces the risk otherwise associated with long-term 
investments, which are necessary to maintain a strong macroeconomic environment 
(Manchev, 2009).  
 
4.1.2. Liquidity Creation 
Through the activities of the financial intermediary, an illiquid claim is held by the 
intermediary against the borrower, while the depositor holds a liquid claim against the 
intermediary (Gurley and Shaw, 1960).  Deposit-taking financial intermediaries allow their 
customers to withdraw saved funds when a liquidity need arises. The provision of liquidity 
                                                          
30
 For an in-depth discussion of current trends in microfinance research overall, please see chapter 3. 
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lets the intermediary accumulate funds, which enable it to invest in long-term activities.   
The allocation of capital between lender and borrower reduces the riskiness and cost of the 
transaction, as well as allowing the intermediary to take advantage of economies of scale 
(Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). 
Some research suggests that the creation of liquidity becomes especially important in times 
of crises, and in regions and markets where alternative sources of funding are harder to 
come by, such as those of developing nations and financially challenged regions of 
developed economies. When the creation of liquidity by financial intermediaries is reduced, 
profitable investment and production activities will be limited, resulting in a misallocation of 
resources (Rajan et. al, 2002; Acharya et al, 2010). Acharya et al. suggest that bank liquidity 
may be counter-cyclically relative to the general health of the economy, and that the 
‘pledgability’ of risky activities is key to determining whether the intermediary holds the 
right level of liquidity from the viewpoint of the general economy (Acharya et al., 2010:4).  
Note that ‘bank liquidity’ here is different from the liquidity creation measured in this study: 
a high level of bank liquidity means that the financial intermediary is holding on to its liquid 
assets, and thus create less liquidity for the general market.  Particularly relevant to 
microfinance, Acharya et al. find that financial intermediaries hold larger amounts of liquid 
assets in countries which have less developed accounting standards, lower market 
capitalization relative to GDP and lower liquidity in stock markets (Acharya et al., 2010). 
Bryant (1980), as well as Diamond and Dybvig (1983), have developed models of traditional 
banks as creators of liquidity. The models show how investors can be exposed to temporary 
liquidity shocks, which creates the demand for access to non-time deposits at par value, in 
order to meet sudden variations in liquidity needs. A deposit contract helps insure against 
shocks due to the non-convexity of separate, individual insurances, needed to address the 
myriad of risks facing an agent.31 However, the variance in withdrawals of deposits exposes 
                                                          
31
 Non-convexity is abnormal or extreme behaviour in economics, which fall outside traditional in-between 
values and thus is hard to predict. Non-convexity is often associated with market failure and market 
inefficiencies (Starrett, 1972). 
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the bank to risk, especially if there is the fear that other depositors may withdraw their 
funds before you, and cause a potential run on the bank (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).32 
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) explain that as long as no-envy conditions are in place, a 
“good” Nash equilibrium holds true across different patterns of preference. However, a 
“bad” Nash equilibrium may also exist, in which the allocation of asset liquidation is 
different from that which would be optimal for the established deposit contract.33 Because 
the deposit contract must adhere to the constraints imposed by sequential service 
constraints (SSC), the financial intermediary is unable to adapt its deposit payments to fit 
the new situation.34 The presence of SSC causes the depositor in question to decide whether 
to withdraw or not based on the supposed behaviour of other depositors. If the agent trusts 
that other agents will not withdraw prematurely, the ‘good equilibrium’ remains. However, 
if the depositor believes that his investment is threatened by the premature withdrawals of 
other agents, a ‘bad equilibrium’ comes to be, and the presence of SSC can cause a bank run 
(Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). The risk of a bank run provides a strong incentive for the 
depositors to monitor the actions of the bank, which in turn helps discipline the actions of 
the bank, and keeps it from withholding effort (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, Diamond and 
Rajan, 2001, Calomaris and Kahn, 1991). 
Financial intermediaries can hold liquid assets to minimise some of the risk associated with 
liquidity creation. However, unless the deposits are bound for a specific time period, or 
covered by deposit insurance, the intermediary still faces the risk of a bank run from 
depositors, if customers lose trust in the intermediary (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). The risk 
can also be addressed through access to state- or donor-financed emergency capital, though 
access to such capital may reduce the intermediary’s incentive to hold enough liquid assets 
                                                          
32
 The Diamond-Dybvig model does not distinguish between bank runs, in which just one bank is involved, and 
bank panics, which involves simultaneous runs across the sector. Gorton (1988) develops a model in which 
correlation between runs come from systemic risk information. Unlike Diamond and Dybvig, Gorton does not 
see bank runs as sunspot phenomena, but as an economic event caused by the initial run and subsequent 
spread of information.  
33
 Nash equilibrium is a concept borrowed from game theory, in which two or more players engaged in a non-
cooperative game, are assumed to know the gaming strategies of their competitors, and no player stands to 
gain from changing their own strategy.  In this situation, the strategy choices and payoffs from these constitute 
a Nash equilibrium (Vives, 1990). 
34
 Sequential serving constraints happen if more people wish to withdraw their deposits than the bank holds 
capital to cover (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  
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to meet day to day liquidity demands (Song and Thakor, 2007). The financial intermediary 
will consider the costs and benefits of holding a certain amount of liquid assets, when 
serving the demands of both borrowers and depositors, but like deposit insurance, the 
presence of easy grants or loans available at discount, may reduce the intermediary’s efforts 
to prevent bank runs and meet daily liquidity demands. 
If donor or state-financed capital is not available to the financial intermediary engaged in 
microfinance, the option of short-term borrowing from larger, more traditional banks is an 
option. However, unlike state or donor-sponsored loans, these loans are typically not at 
discount rate, and will often end up being expensive and detrimental to the financial well-
being of the MFI. Additionally, unless the funds are accessible through a form of risk-free 
guarantee, given by donor or state for political or social reasons, the loans are associated 
with significant costs both in the form of collateral, and interest.  Bouwman (2013) notes 
that borrowing from the discount window for traditional US banks may also be associated 
with perceived weakness. While the same may be true for MFIs, the lack of transparency 
and strong financial regulation in most regions where MFIs operate is likely to reduce the 
effect.   
 
Maturity and Liquidity Transformation  
Echoing the findings of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), it is noted by Bhattacharya and Thakor 
(1993) that liquidity transformation takes place in economic environments where shocks 
disturb the ability to time consumption based on preference, and that maturity 
transformation happens as a consequence of the intermediary’s provision of liquidity.  The 
authors argue that asymmetric information and friction can make it beneficial for the bank 
to fund long-term, illiquid assets with short-term, liquid liabilities and to have its liabilities 
repriced frequently (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993).  
Financial intermediaries gain from the transformation of maturities through a positive term 
premium in the yield curve, and by increasing the creation of liquidity through maturity 
mismatching.  The intermediary’s incentive to adequately screen and monitor its loan 
quality is increased if the liability term is shorter than the loan term, due to the noise that 
repeated price evaluations of deposits would create in the same term period (Calomaris and 
Kahn, 1991). Additionally, evaluations from agents mean that the intermediaries can be 
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exposed to increased liquidation costs at the time of refinancing regardless of their 
solvency. Diamond suggests that maturity transformation can increase the accuracy and 
frequency of the information relayed from intermediary to depositors, and thus reduces 
liquidation cost and risk (Diamond, 1997).  
 
 
4.1.3. Liquidity in Microfinance 
Very few studies focus on liquidity in microfinance in general, and what does exist is almost 
entirely practical in nature, and is primarily aimed at improving the management of liquidity 
amongst practitioners (e.g. Ledgerwood et al., 2013; Jansson and Taborga, 2000; Brom, 
2009) . In addition, while no previous research has looked at the role of MFIs as liquidity 
creators specifically, the few that have looked at liquidity in microfinance, have done so 
from either a liquidity management or liquidity risk perspective ( Brom, 2009). Brom notes 
that liquidity risk for MFIs is one of the primary risk factors for the intermediaries,  and that 
institutions tend to think appropriate liquidity management equals avoidance of ‘idle cash’. 
Instead, she recommends measuring liquidity risk through a matching of maturities of the 
MFI assets and liabilities, having a plan for refinancing and having adequate emergency 
funds (Brom, 2009). Brom also notes that it is important for MFIs to match re-pricing terms 
for its assets and liabilities, in order to avoid the potential risk of re-pricing, and potential 
negative impact on profitability.  This is done by ensuring that a loan portfolio, which is long-
term and fixed rate, is funded by long-term and fixed-rate liabilities (Brom, 2009).  However, 
given the small size of microfinance loans, they tend to have very short maturities, and are 
funded by deposits, donations or longer-term liabilities. Thus, maturity length becomes less 
important in microfinance, than the ease, time and cost for client and investor, as defined 
by Berger and Bouwman below (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). 
It is worth noting here that holding on to liquid assets, while keeping the institution liquid, 
also lowers the ability of the MFI to create adequate levels of liquidity for the market.  Too 
much liquidity creation is indeed risky for the solvency of the microfinance institution, if 
undue risk is taken. However, too little liquidity creation hinders adequate access to capital 
for the intended clients, seen from the perspective of society as a whole. Berger and 
Bouwman describe the balance act between the two, and shows how too much liquidity 
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creation can create a financial crisis, while too little can make an existing crisis much worse 
for the intended customer (Berger et al., 2011; Bouwman, 2013). This is supported by the 
findings of Fungacova et al., who show that high levels of liquidity creation in Russia are 
associated with higher levels of bank failure (Fungacova, et al., 2015) 
 
4.1.4. Empirical Studies 
Most empirical studies attempting to measure the level of liquidity created in traditional 
financial intermediaries have surfaced in the past 5 years.  An earlier attempt to measure 
levels of liquidity was introduced by Deep and Schaefer, in 2004.  The authors used loan 
maturity data from the largest US banks in the time period 1997 to 2001, to calculate the 
‘liquidity gap’ between illiquid liabilities and working capital. In the study, Deep and 
Schaefer propose measuring the distribution of liquidity in financial intermediaries, by 
calculating the ‘liquidity gap’ between total liquid liabilities and assets, scaled by total 
assets. The values are from -1 to 1, with higher values denoting a higher level of liquidity 
creation. A positive value indicates that the financial intermediary finances illiquid assets 
with liquid liabilities, and through it, creates liquidity.  They classify liabilities and assets 
solely based on the lengths of their maturity, and specifically exclude off-balance sheet 
activities such as loan commitments, citing their contingent nature (Schaefer and Deep, 
2004). 
The authors find that the liquidity gap on average is small, approximately 20% for large US 
banks. They conclude that the low level of liquidity created is not due to the presence of 
deposit insurance, since the deposit insurance tends to replace uninsured liabilities instead 
of expanding the existing loans or deposit base. Instead, the authors argue that the 
dampening of liquidity transformation should be found in credit risk (Schaefer and Deep, 
2004).  
A more recent attempt at calculating liquidity produced for the market, is done in a study by 
Berger and Bouwman (2009), who use data from US banks with assets over $1 million, in the 
time period 1993 to 2003. The authors find that as much as 80% of all liquidity created in 
the US market, is created by banks with assets over $1 billion, lending credence to the 
notion ‘too big to fail’.  
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Berger and Bouwman propose a way to measure liquidity creation, based on four distinct 
calculation measures: cat fat, cat non-fat, mat fat and mat-non-fat. Mat denotes a 
classification based on maturity, where the cat methodology classifies assets and liabilities 
by product.  Fat and non-fat defines whether or not the methodology includes off-balance 
sheet activities. The preferred measure for Berger and Bouwman is category-based 
classification including off-balance sheet activities (cat fat). Their mat non-fat measurement, 
in which the classification of liabilities and assets is based entirely on maturity and off-
balance sheet activities are not included, is conceptually identical to Deep and Schaefer’s 
approach. Unlike Deep and Schaefer, Berger and Bouwman include most commercial banks, 
as opposed to focusing strictly on the largest intermediaries. They do, however, exclude 
banks that do not take deposits, as well as banks with negative equity. 
Berger and Bouwman specifically include off-balance sheet activities, arguing that findings 
by Holmström and Tirole (1998) and  Rajan et al. (2002) suggest that liquidity creation also 
can be accomplished through off-balance sheet activities such as loan commitments and 
other claims to liquid funds (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). 
The study shows how the liquidity created by the US banks almost doubled between 1993 
and 2003, increasing incrementally every year. The banks created €2843 trillion liquidity in 
2003, which was 4.56 times the level of overall bank capital, and 39% of their total assets 
(Berger and Bouwman 2009). Looking specifically at the relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation, Berger and Bouwman find that the relationship is positive for large and 
medium banks, while negative for smaller banks (Berger and Bouwman 2009). 
A number of empirical studies have since used the Berger and Bouwman measurement of 
liquidity creation, including the work by Fidrmuc, et al. (2015). Here, the authors look at the 
impact of deposit insurance on bank capital and liquidity creation in Russian banks, where 
deposit insurance was introduced in 2004. The study finds a negative correlation between 
bank capital and the creation of liquidity, both before and after the introduction of deposit 
insurance. Additionally, they find that the strength of the impact varies with size and 
ownership: they observe no significant correlation for large, foreign or state-owned banks, 
while they find a significant negative relationship for private, small and medium domestic 
banks (Fidrmuc et al., 2015).  
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Another recent study using the Berger and Bouwman measurement of liquidity creation, is a 
2014 study of Czech banks from 2002 to 2010, by Horvath, Seidler and Weill (Horvath et al., 
2013).  The authors study the causal relationship between capital and liquidity creation, by 
running a series of Granger-causality tests. Like Berger and Bouwman, they find a consistent 
increase of liquidity creation through the observed period, and note negative impact on 
liquidity creation by capital in the Czech banks, which fall within the ‘small’ category of 
Berger and Bouwman. (Horvath et al., 2013).  
While Fidrmuc et al. (2015) and Horvath et al. (2013) found a negative relationship between 
bank capital and liquidity creation for small financial intermediaries, Rauch et al. find no 
relationship between the size and liquidity creation in German savings banks (Rauch et al., 
2009).35 Employing data from 457 savings banks between 1997 and 2006, the authors use 
Deep and Schaefer’s LT Gap, as well as the Berger-Bouwman measurement of absolute 
amounts of liquidity created for the market. They find a significant positive correlation 
between liquidity creation and the general health of the economy, as well as a positive and 
significant effect of the yield curve spread, suggesting that a lower ECB refinancing rate 
positively impacts liquidity creation (Rauch et al., 2009:21). The authors argue that, due to a 
strict regulatory framework, the German savings banks do not have to hold large buffers of 
liquid capital for risk management reasons, but instead that the use of relationship lending 
increases the quality and scope of their monitoring abilities, and enables the intermediaries 
to better anticipate loan defaults (Rauch et al., 2009:22). 
As can be seen from the discussion above, previous studies of liquidity creation have 
focused entirely on the banking sector in developed and emerging markets. In the field of 
microfinance, there exists very literature discussing liquidity at all, and to my knowledge, no 
previous research has attempted to evaluate the ability of MFIs to function as traditional 
liquidity creators. Further insight into this will help policymakers and practitioners 
determine the best use of microfinance from a macroeconomic point of view, and help 
                                                          
35
 Most empirical studies of liquidity (e.g. Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Fungacova et al. 2017 and Horvath et 
al., 2013) find a negative correlation between small banks and LC, and use assets as their determinant of size. 
However, Rauch et al. use the number of borrowers, which might explain the conflicting results. 
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expand the understanding of the liquidity transformation processes in microfinance, as well 
as its drivers.36   
 
4.2. Research Question and Hypotheses 
To address the gap in literature identified above, I seek to answer the following in this 
chapter: 
How do deposit-taking microfinance institutions perform as liquidity creators for their 
surrounding markets and are the process driven by the same financial factors as in more 
traditional intermediaries? 
a) How do deposit insurance and capital impact the level of liquidity created by 
deposit-taking MFIs?? 
b) To what extent are levels of liquidity created in microfinance impacted by 
traditional bank characteristics, such as size, capital, deposit insurance, 
performance and risk? 
 
4.2.1. Hypotheses 
Best practice accounting standards in microfinance follow the double-entry principle, in 
which the assets of the balance sheet equal liabilities plus equity. The same principle is used 
in the calculations provided by previous literature on traditional, to measure levels of 
liquidity. While it is clear that certain entries, such as donations, will be different for 
microfinance, the core principles remain the same.   
 
 
                                                          
36
 This chapter specifically looks at liquidity creation from a banking perspective. While I control for market 
conditions specific to developing and emerging financial markets, the characteristics studied here are similar to 
those found in more traditional studies. For an in-depth look at the impact of the unique lending strategies of 
MFIs, see chapter 4. 
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H1:  Due to an unstable economic and regulatory environment, levels of LC are expected to 
be lower than in traditional banking. 
Given the split focus of MFIs on both social and financial goals described in the previous 
literature chapter, it is entirely possible that MFIs are not able to produce liquidity for the 
market in the same way that traditional financial intermediaries do. However, that does not 
necessarily mean that they cannot produce similar ratio levels. Horvath, et al, found higher 
levels of liquidity creation in small Czech banks, which may suggest similar findings here 
(Horvath et al, 2013).  The lack of previous empirical studies in similar environments makes 
it difficult to gauge. However, given the general lack of strong regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks, and the subsequent need of MFIs to hold on to higher amounts of liquid capital 
to absorb shock, I expect both pure and ratio levels of LC to be lower in microfinance than in 
traditional banking.   
 
H2a:   Capital is expected to be negatively correlated with levels of LC. 
In literature, conflicting theories on the effect of capital on liquidity exist.  Some studies, 
such as Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), argue that higher levels of capital mitigates risk, 
and increases the risk-bearing capacity of the intermediary, thus increasing levels of liquidity 
creation. Other literature, however, finds that this is only true for very large banks, due to 
increased regulatory scrutiny (Berger and Bouwman, 2009).  In the 2006 study by Gatev and 
Strahan, the yielded results are inconclusive: they find that higher capital ratios are 
associated with higher loans and deposits, but also associated with more liquid assets and 
illiquid liabilities (Gatev and Strahan, 2006). Still other literature suggests that the 
relationship between capital and liquidity creation is negative. The lack of deposit insurance 
is suggested to cause a situation in which the intermediary needs to fear potential bank 
runs, but deposit contracts are able to mitigate the potential hold-up challenge (Diamond 
and Rajan, 2001). Because investors cannot run on the bank, they are less willing to provide 
funds, thus reducing levels of liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). 
The empirical findings of more recent studies support the latter theory, showing consistent 
and significant negative relationships between liquidity creation and capital, especially for 
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smaller banks (e.g. Berger and Bouwman 2009; Horvath et al. 2013; Fidrmuc et al. 2015; 
Genetay et al., 2015; Fungacova et al., 2017).  In line with these results, I therefore expect 
that capital is negatively correlated with LC in microfinance institutions. 
 
H2b: Size is expected to be negatively correlated with LC. 
Previous empirical literature has found a consistent negative relationship between size and 
liquidity creation, though significance levels have varied a good deal between studies.(e.g. 
Schaefer and Deep, 2004; Horvath, et al, 2013; Rauch et al., 2009;  Genetay et al, 2015). 
Microfinance institutions are generally in the lower end of ‘small banks’, and no studies of 
liquidity creation in the sector has yet been published. However, based on the findings in 
traditional banking, I expect the relationship between scaled LC and size to be negative and 
significant, while pure values are expected to be positive. 
 
H2c: Deposit insurance is expected to be negatively correlated with LC. 
In the theory described previously, I explain how it has been suggested that the relationship 
between capital and liquidity creation may be negative, due to the disciplining fear of bank 
runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). According to theory, the presence of deposit insurance 
removes the risk of a bank run, and with it, the incentive for the bank to not withhold effort 
(Diamond and Rajan, 2001). Based on this, I would expect the presence of deposit insurance 
to have negative and significant correlation to liquidity creation. 
However, while empirical evidence is sparse, the few studies that have included the effect 
of deposit insurance in their studies of liquidity creation, present varying relationships and 
degrees of significance. Deep and Schaefer (2004) find no significant effect from deposit 
insurance. They argue that deposit insurance does not impact levels of liquidity 
transformation because the insured deposits replace uninsured liabilities, rather than 
increase the ratio of deposits and loans extended. Instead, they propose that the main 
driver of liquidity transformation should be found in the bank response to credit risk.  The 
authors also point out that the theoretical models behind deposit contract theory 
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erroneously assumes that banks are financed solely by insured demand deposits, which is 
rarely the case (Schaefer and Deep, 2004).  Roulet (2011) expands on this, arguing that 
deposit insurance is only relevant when explicit in its use, and visible.  However, while 
Fungacova et al. also find no effect of deposit insurance amongst their full sample of Russian 
banks, they do detect a positive impact for under-capitalized banks with high household 
deposit ratios (Fungacova et al., 2016). 
Based on the empirical findings outlined above, and the fact that microfinance institutions 
generally are well capitalized relative to their size, I expect the impact of deposit insurance 
to be insignificant. 
 
H2d: Bank risk is expected to be negatively correlated with LC. 
Following the argument by Berger et al. (2011) that a financial intermediary can create too 
much liquidity, if it takes undue risk, the initial expectation would be that institutions with 
weak values for operational self-sustainability (OSS) would have risk values which are 
positive and significantly correlated with liquidity creation. In recent banking literature, 
liquidity creation is limited to what several studies as healthy commercial banks, which 
excludes banks with negative equity, no outstanding loans and assets below $25M (e.g. 
Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Pana, 2010; Pungacova, 2010; Horvath et al., 2014; Fungacova, 
2015). In the case of this study and the context of microfinance and developing financial 
markets, a similar definition is used, though only excluding financial institutions with GLPs 
below USD 1000. 
For standard intermediaries with reasonably healthy performance values, the empirical 
evidence so far seems to find significant, negative relationships between bank risk and LC, 
especially for small commercial bank (e.g. Schaefer and Deep, 2004, Berger and Bouwman, 
2009, Horvath et al., 2013).  Based on this, I expect to find a negative and significant 
relationship between bank risk and levels of liquidity creation. 
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H2e:  OSS is expected to be positively correlated with LC. 
Though most empirical studies on liquidity creation do not include controls for financial 
performance, it is nonetheless a key factor of concern to most of the literature found on 
microfinance. This is because the factor speaks to the heart of one of the most discussed 
questions raised in the first decades of modern microfinance; namely, is microfinance really 
capable of remaining self-sustainable, despite the high transaction costs associated with the 
extension of very small loans (e.g. Cull, et al., 2007 and 2009a, Morduch, 2000). In the few 
cases where it has been included in traditional literature discussing liquidity creation, the 
most common measures used is return on assets (ROA), or return on equity (ROE).  
However, in microfinance, both of these fall somewhat short of the mark, in that a 
significant portion of functioning, sustainable microfinance institutions are non-profit, and 
thus concern themselves more about long-term operational sustainability, than maximising 
profit. In addition, some recent literature suggests that profit-status may not be indicative 
of the institution’s ability to secure profit (e.g. Mersland, 2009; Hartarska and Mersland, 
2012; Nghiem, 2007; Lützenkirchen, 2012). For this reason, I use operational self-
sustainability to measure to control for MFI performance. 
Long-term sustainability is required to successfully continue to extend loans, since 
donations and grants are typically fickle and vary greatly in size from year to year. For this 
reason, especially given my focus on deposit-taking institutions, I expect OSS to be positively 
correlated with LC. 
 
4.3. Methodology 
In the following section, I present the measurement used to calculate levels of liquidity in 
microfinance, and discuss the choice of model. I present the regression framework used to 
estimate the impact of capital, size and deposit insurance upon liquidity creation, and 
explain the choice of covariates included. 
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4.3.1. Measuring Liquidity in Microfinance 
I adapt empirical models developed by previous literature to the unique conditions of the 
microfinance industry, using Berger and Bouwman’s ‘cat non-fat’ measurement of liquidity 
creation in US banks as outset (Berger and Bouwman, 2009).37  The measurement used to 
calculate liquidity creation, is as follows: 
Equation 4.1: Calculation of Liquidity Creation 
LC = 0.5 * illiquid assets + 0 * semi liquid assets - 0.5 * liquid assets + 0.5 * liquid liabilities 
+ 0 * semi liquid assets - 0.5 * illiquid liabilities 
 
Following the assumption that liquidity is created when liquid liabilities are transformed into 
illiquid assets, the model for liquidity calculation classifies assets and liabilities based on 
their levels of liquidity, and assigns weights according to the Berger and Bouwman model 
for calculating LC in traditional banks. This includes calculating the compound values for the 
3 levels of liquidity (liquid, semi-liquid and illiquid), on both sides of the balance sheet, and 
assigning weights to each. The Berger-Bouwman methodology used in this study calculates 
liquidity creation by classifying the level of liquidity according to the ease, time and cost for 
a customer to obtain liquid funds, as well as the ease, time and cost for the bank to dispose 
of their obligations to meet demands.38 
 
Asset Classifications 
On the asset side of the balance sheet, business loans and micro-business loans are thus 
classified as illiquid regardless of maturity, due to the difficulty that the institution will have 
in disposing of the loans.  
                                                          
37
 Ideally, I would have liked to control this with an alternative maturity measure, derived from the empirical 
model for measurement of liquidity gap by Deep and Schaefer (2004) as well, but the data available on loan 
maturities in microfinance is still too sparse and unreliable to derive any meaningful results from them.  
38
 Berger and Bouwman’s alternative model, mat non-fat, classifies loan categories entirely based on their 
maturity. This has, for example, importance for the majority of the micro-business loans, which would be 
classified as semi-liquid, due to their relatively short maturities. However, in terms of the ease, time and cost 
for the MFI to reclaim their funds in cases of default, I choose to categorise the loans as illiquid, due to the 
high level of complexity involved in retrieving collateral-free loans (Berger and Bouwman, 2009).   
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Agricultural loans are also classified as illiquid, because microfinance loans in agriculture are 
almost entirely seasonal, which, when lending without collateral, makes the institution 
entirely dependent on a successful harvest.  If the harvest fails, it is near-impossible for the 
institution to ensure repayment. 
 
Table 4.1: Asset Classification  
Illiquid assets (weight = ½) Semi-liquid (weight = 0) Liquid assets (weight -½) 
Loans to micro-businesses 
Agricultural loans 
Fixed assets 
Loans to Corporations 
- Loans to SME 
- Loans to large  
corporations 
Education  loans 
Intangible assets 
Other assets 
Retail loans, including: 
- Household Financing 
loans 
-  Consumption loans 
- Retail/Mortgage loans 
 
Loans to governmental 
institutions 
Loans to financial institutions 
Cash and equivalents 
Securities 
 
 
 
Educational loans are also classified as illiquid, due to their difficulty in reclaiming the 
payment in case of default, as well as because of their relatively long maturities. 
Finally, fixed and intangible assets are also listed as illiquid, due to the level of ‘ease, time 
and cost’ for the institution to dispose of these to meet potential liquidity demands. 
The semi-liquid asset compound contains assets in which the level of liquidity is considered 
neutral in terms of its creation or destruction of liquidity for the market. This category 
includes household financing, consumption and mortgage loans, which have a lower ease, 
time and cost value for the institution, since the purchases can be repossessed. Similarly, 
loans to other financial and governmental institutions, while very rare in MFIs, are classified 
as semi-liquid, due to the relative ease with which the institution can reclaim the funds. 
Liquid assets include cash and cash equivalents and what few securities the MFI may have, 
since these can be used to immediately meet potential liquidity demands. 
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Liabilities Classification 
On the liabilities side, ordinary deposits are classified as liquid, due to the relative ease and 
low cost for the customer to retrieve their funds. Time deposits, however, are classified as 
semi-liquid, since they are harder and often more costly to retrieve for the customer.  MFI 
borrowings, which are loans taken by the MFI, with short or medium term maturities, are 
also considered semi-liquid. Illiquid liabilities cover any form of liabilities which cannot easily 
be withdrawn. This includes subordinated debt, following the classification of Berger and 
Bouwman (2009). Also classified with illiquid liabilities is equity, due to the inability of 
investors to demand liquid funds against it. Due to lack of available data, off-balance sheet 
guarantees are not defined. 
 
Table 4.2: Liabilities Classification  
Liquid liabilities (weight ½) Semi-liquid (weight = 0) Illiquid liabilities (weight -½) 
Deposits 
 
Time deposits 
Borrowings 
Subordinated debt 
Equity incl. donations 
 
 
Donations are included on both sides of the balance sheet, though not defined as a post by 
itself. On the asset side, donations are embedded into cash and cash equivalents, while they 
are listed as part of equity on the liabilities side. 
 
 
4.3.2. Determinants of Liquidity Creation 
In addition to studying the ratio levels of liquidity creation in microfinance, I estimate the 
impact of traditional bank characteristics upon levels of liquidity created in MFIs.  I am 
interested to know whether the drivers of liquidity found measured in traditional banking 
literature, such as capital, size, deposit insurance and bank risk, yield similar results for the 
microfinance sector.  However, due to the unique conditions under which the MFIs operate, 
I also control for certain special development characteristics, such as non-governmental 
status (NGO) and country-level human development index (HDI) values. 
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All estimations use panel data to run fixed effects estimations, in which the independent 
variables have been lagged one-period to minimize endogeneity concerns. In addition, I use 
a robust clustering methodology at MFI level with my estimations, to address both concerns 
of heteroscedasticity, as well as possible serial correlation across observations from same 
microfinance intermediary. Variance inflation factor (vif) values are all between 1.05 and 
2.4, with a mean of 1.46, indicating no significant presence of multicollinearity39. 
Observations from same MFI are likely to be correlated, and for this reason, OLS regressions 
carry the risk of overestimating levels of significance, by underestimating errors. I include 
fixed effects for time and country.    
The choice of the fixed effects model was made based on results of the Hausman 
specification test, which returned values between 0.000 and 0.024. The Hausman test is 
conducted to test for significant differences in coefficiency between fixed and random 
models (Dougherty, 2011). The approach is particularly appropriate when exogenous and 
time-invariant variables may be correlated (Woolridge, 2002; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 
2007).  In addition, Prob < F returned values below 0.05 as well, suggesting that a fixed 
effects model, including time fixed effects, is appropriate.40   
To investigate the relationship between capital, size, deposit insurance and levels of liquidity 
created by the MFI, I estimate the following fixed effects model: 
 
Equation 4.2: Liquidity Creation and Deposit Insurance, DV I-III 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑖𝑡 − 1+𝛿3𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿6𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛿7𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿9𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿10𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿11𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑓𝑗 + 𝛿12𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝑓𝑗 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
, where 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 captures the effect of capital on levels of liquidity creation in MFI i for 
period t. Capital is measured as the one-period-lagged proportion of equity to assets, 
                                                          
39
 In addition to the vif test, correlation matrices were created for all regressions in the dissertation, with 
upper limits set to 0.4. As can be seen in Appendix E, no correlation among the independent variables 
breaches this limit. 
40
 However, results are statistically significant and qualitatively the same, using either random GLS or fixed 
effects estimations. 
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referencing a substantial body of research (e.g. Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Diamond and 
Rajan, 2001; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Horvath and Seidler, 2013). 
 LIQ measures of liquidity creation of MFI i in period t, and comprises of the following 4 
measurements: pure, absolute liquidity creation (LC), LC scaled by total assets (LC_GTA), LC 
to equity (LC_E) and LC as a proportion of total loans (LC_GLP). Pure LC has been deflated 
using the World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
I include a time trend (𝑇𝑖) to capture any banking-related methodological changes over the 
time. ε is a stochastic error term. 𝛼 is a constant term. 𝛽 and 𝛿 are the unknown coefficients 
to be estimated. The subscripts i and t refer to MFI and time, respectively.  
In the model, 𝑖𝑡 − 1 is included to capture effect of MFI size across institutional types and 
ages, for MFI i in period t. Size is measured as the one-period-lagged log of total assets.41  
I control for the age of the MFI, calculated as a log of year t minus the years of 
establishment (AGE).  The level of bank risk present in the MFI, is measured as the one-
period-lagged ratio of portfolio at risk > 30 days to the MFI’s gross loan portfolio (RISK).   
 To measure the financial self-sufficiency of the MFI as an indicator of financial performance, 
I control for the level of operational self-sufficiency (OSS). OSS is calculated as 
 
Equation 4.3: Operational Self-Sufficiency 
 
Financial revenue 
(financial expense + impairment loss +operating expense) 
 
 
In addition, 4 dummy variables are included. The values indicate whether the MFI is a non-
profit organisation (NGO), and whether the MFI is regulated by a state banking supervisory 
                                                          
41
 Ideally, I would have liked to measure size as number of active borrowers as well, but this was not possible 
due to data limitations. 
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agency (REG).42 Finally, to control for the presence of whether deposit insurance (DEPINS),  I 
use values from Barth et al.'s Index, developed using 4 World Bank surveys from 1999, 2003, 
2007 and 2011 (Barth et al, 2013).43   DEPINS is a dummy, measured as “…whether there is 
an explicit deposit insurance scheme and whether depositors were fully compensated the 
last time a bank failed.” (Barth et al, 2013:14).44 
 
Table 4.3: Variables and Definitions  
Variable Definition 
Liquidity creation (log) Log of the pure liquidity creation value, deflated using the CPI Index. 
LC/GTA  Liquidity creation scaled by size. 
LC/E Liquidity creation scaled by equity. 
LC/GLP Liquidity creation scaled by total loans. 
  
Capital Measured as the ratio of equity to total assets. 
Regulation (dummy) Dummy indicating whether the individual MFI is regulated. 
Size (log) Measured as a log of the MFI’s total assets. 
Age  Age of MFI, measured a number of years since year of 
establishment.45 
NGO (dummy) Dummy variable taking the value 1, if the MFI is registered as an NGO. 
Bank risk Bank risk, measured as the ratio of portfolio at risk, 30 days. 
Operational self-sufficiency Ratio of financial revenue divided by financial and operating expense, 
and impairment loss. 
Deposit insurance (dummy) Dummy denoting whether the country has explicit deposit insurance. 
(source: Bath et al, 2013) 
GDP growth per capita Measure of GDP growth per capita (source: World Bank) 
Inflation % change of the GDP deflator (source: World Bank) 
HDI Human Development Index, measured by the UN. Source: UNDP 
 
 
                                                          
42
 The impact of non-governmental status and strategy has also been measured using profit-status instead. 
Results yielded qualitatively similar results, though with lower R-square. 
43
 Deposit insurance was also measured with a ratio value, from same index. Both variables returned results 
rejecting the financial fragility hypothesis, returning results which were either insignificant or inconsistently 
positive. 
44
 In the original index, the value measures NODEPINS, giving values of 1 when there is no explicit deposit 
scheme. In this study, the values have been reversed, so 1 denotes the presence of deposit schemes, instead 
of the absence. 
45
 While not included here, I have run estimations including age-squared, to test for a non-linear relationship. 
The results are qualitatively the same; negative with weak and inconsistent significance.  
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Three additional macroeconomic variables are introduced, to control for the local economic 
market conditions of the MFIs.  I include GDP growth per capita (GDPP) and inflation (INFL).  
Some literature has argued that in the context of development countries, GDP is inadequate 
to measure the macroeconomic conditions on its own (Cull et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
Gorton and Winton suggest that the development of institutions and legal framework is 
important to the state of financial institutions in development regions (Gorton and Winton, 
2002). For this reason I also include the UN’s human development index (HDI).  The HDI 
index is calculated using a number of development-specific values, including life expectancy, 
education and income per capita.  
I measure liquidity creation using a cross-country approach, but recognise that there is likely 
to be major differences in the creation of liquidity between regions. For this reason, I 
include a fixed effect to control for the impact of differences between key regions. 𝑓𝑗 is a 
vector of regional dummies, included to capture unobserved geographical characteristics 
over time:  Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA),  Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia  (EECA),  East Asia and Pacific (EAP),  South Asia (SA) and Latin America 
(LAC).  
Correlation matrices were created to check for autocorrelation and multicollinearity 
between the independent variables (please see Appendix E).  
 
4.4. Data 
My sample data has been collected from the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) 
database, which is maintained by a non-profit private organisation, aiming to increase the 
quality of information on microfinance institutions for the industry.  My database covers 
3800 MFIs, with observations from 2004 to 2012, in 118 countries. The coverage in 2012 is 
about 12.5% of the estimated 10,000 MFIs currently in existence, and about 50% of all 
borrowers. While 12.5% of the full population of microfinance institutions can seem low, it 
should be noted that the top 10% MFIs hold 86.2% of all assets, so coverage in terms of 
assets is estimated to be well over 90% (MIX, 2013).  
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The initial cleaning of duplicates, empty data points and faulty data resulted in a combined 
data pool of 10441 usable observations, of which 3672 observations from 1121 MFIs are 
from deposit-takers with diamond ratings 4-5.46  The data includes traditional balance sheet 
items on both asset and liability categories, as well as data on group lending methodologies 
and profit-status. All values are winsorized at 1 and 99% to eliminate outliers47.   
The data available has varying levels of reliability, depending on the levels of regulation and 
quality of audit performed on the specific MFI. To address this, a large number of studies 
using the MIX database only use relatively small samples (often just 2-300 observations) of 
the full database, and often limit that sample to only include large, well-established 
institutions. 
This study excludes MFIs with less than 1000 USD in assets, and attempts to increase the 
quality and validity of the data employed, by limiting the data sample to MFIs with diamond 
ratings 3 to 5. The diamond rating reflects the quality of data received, as well as the 
underlying degree of audit and documentation. Diamond rating 3 denotes documented 
financial data, while 4 and 5 are fully audited. Because liquidity creation specifically happens 
through the transformation of liquid liabilities to illiquid assets, the sample is limited to 
deposit-taking institutions. Finally, I eliminate any microfinance institution with negative 
equity, on the basis that a near-insolvent institution is likely to focus on securing short-term 
capital, and is likely to change its behaviour and investment strategies accordingly. 
The data available in MIX is provided on a voluntary basis from the microfinance providers, 
which is bound to skew the data toward institutions with stronger performance than the 
average. It is unknown whether the same skewing also affects the type of institutions 
primarily represented in the database. However, one could argue that for-profit institutions 
with poor performance may be less incentivised to participate than institutions with strong 
performance, or those with a social agenda in which financial performance is considered 
less of a priority than levels of poverty alleviation achieved (Cull et al., 2009).   
                                                          
46
 This refers, for example, to cases where 0 is not a true 0, but has been set in a category not used, instead of 
left blank. It also includes cases where sub- and super categories do not add up. 
47 All data treatment and regression work has been done using Stata, version 11 and 15.  
 
 
 
Table 4.4: MFI Summary Statistics 
 
2004 - 2012 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 5
th
 Percentile Median 95
th
 Percentile Maximum 
Dependent Variables:         
Liquidity Creation (Deflated) 3672 14.45 M 30.75 M 0.00 M 0.08 M 2.62 M 78.76 M 293.22 M 
Liquidity Creation (Deflated) SML 1880 1.09 M 1.17 M 0.00 M 0.03 M 0.67 M 3.49 M 9.35 M 
Liquidity Creation (Deflated) MED 1487 14.92 M 15.45 M 0.05 M 1.70 M 9.00 M 47.41 M 116.00 M 
Liquidity Creation (Deflated) LGR 305 94.53 M 53.01 M 1.49 M 19.57 M 86.71 M 195.74 M 293.22 M 
Liquidity Creation / Gross Total Assets 3672 0.33 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.33 0.61 0.75 
Liquidity Creation / Gross Loan Portfolio 3672 0.47 0.26 0.02 0.10 0.44 0.94 1.45 
Liquidity Creation / Equity 3672 2.09 1.77 0.03 0.16 1.66 5.85 8.39 
Independent Variables:         
Capital 3672 0.25 0.17 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.61 0.97 
Deposit Insurance 3053 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Risk 3194 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.23 1.00 
Size 3672 15.96 1.90 7.17 12.96 15.87 19.25 19.97 
Age 3672 5.83 3.05 1.00 2.00 6.00 11.00 14.00 
Regulation 3672 0.74 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Profit Status 3672 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
GDP Growth per capita 3368 5.56 2.84 -7.07 1.05 5.57 10.26 17.29 
Inflation 3323 8.12 5.55 -2.60 1.62 6.65 19.41 33.54 
 
 
However, the introduction of common reporting in 2013 is meant to streamline the 
reporting process for MFIs and auditing companies around the world (MIX, 2013). The 
review and validation process has deepened especially the last few years, and now includes 
135 quality checks, as well as perform routine internal auditing of the data, using 150 audit 
factors (MIX, 2013).48  
 
4.5. Results 
The levels of liquidity created by microfinance institutions have increased continuously in 
the recorded period, from $USD1.4Bn in 2004, to 6.5Bn in 2012, after deflation.49 The 
overall amount of liquidity observed for 2012 is slightly lower than in 2011, but average 
amounts created per MFI continues to increase, from 9.07M in 2004, to 16.8M in 2011 and 
17.26M in 2012. The total amount of liquidity created since 2004 is $US 50Bn. (table 4.7). 
   
Table 4.5: Liquidity Creation, Across Years 
 
Total Liquidity Created Average Liquidity Created 
Average Liquidity/Gross 
Total Assets 
2004 $1,396.70 M $9.07 M 0.33 
2005 $2,759.68 M $10.15 M 0.31 
2006 $3,921.66 M $10.27 M 0.34 
2007 $5,202.22 M $11.93 M 0.35 
2008 $6,132.79 M $12.14 M 0.31 
2009 $6,441.72 M $12.91 M 0.32 
2010 $8,090.01 M $15.83 M 0.32 
2011 $8,987.34 M $16.80 M 0.34 
2012 $6,524.26 M $17.26 M 0.36 
 
The absolute amounts of liquidity created by the MFIs vary greatly from institution to 
institution, which, given both organizational and size differences between established 
commercial banks and local non-profit initiatives, is to be expected. However, when liquidity 
is scaled by total assets, most institutions in the past 10 years fall within a ratio bracket 
between 0,3 and 0,4 (table 4.5 and 4.6).  
                                                          
48
 The audit rules used by MIX include factors such as checking the balance of financial statements, and 
whether ratios are particularly high or low compared to its competitors. 
49
 All pure values are in USD, and are deflated across the years using the CPI Index. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics by Type, 2004-2012 
2004 - 2012 Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum 5
th
 Percentile Median 95
th
 Percentile Maximum 
Dependent Variables:         
Liquidity Creation (Deflated) 3672 13.25 M 28.01 M 0.00 M 0.00 M 2.25 M 73.68 M 157.95 M 
Liquidity Creation / Gross Total Assets 3672 0.33 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.33 0.61 0.75 
Liquidity Creation / Gross Loan Portfolio 3672 0.47 0.26 0.02 0.10 0.44 0.94 1.45 
Liquidity Creation / Equity 3672 2.09 1.77 0.03 0.16 1.66 5.85 8.39 
Liquidity Creation by Type:         
Bank 492 45.55 M 52.71 M 0.00 M 0.13 M 23.26 M 152.70 M 293.22 M 
Credit Union / Cooperative 846 9.74 M 21.19 M 0.00 M 0.06 M 2.03 M 49.74 M 174.80 M 
NBFI 898 17.11 M 30.09 M 0.00 M 0.12 M 4.09 M 81.46 M 205.83 M 
NGO 923 5.16 M 16.63 M 0.00 M 0.05 M 1.14 M 18.91 M 250.65 M 
Rural Bank 454 4.62 M 6.93 M 0.00 M 0.15 M 2.02 M 18.17 M 49.40 M 
Other 27 1.84 M 3.33 M 0.01 M 0 04 M 0.46 M 11.85 M 11.92 M 
 
 
 
These values are generally higher for MFIs than for traditional banks: Berger and Bouwman 
found average ratios for LC/GTA of just 0.19 for US banks using their corresponding cat non-
fat measure, while Horvath et al. observed averages from 0.16 in the mid-2000s, to 0.36 in 
mid-2010, for their sample of Czech banks (Berger and Bouwman, 2009: 3800; Horvath et al. 
2013:352).  
Across all institutional types, the larger institutions create the largest amounts of liquidity, 
and liquidity creation scaled by size shows average ratio values falling between 0.28 and 
0.34 (table 4.7).   
The growth rate of liquidity created to the growth rate of total assets is significantly higher 
in smaller MFIs than in medium-sized and larger institutions (table 4.7).  Similarly, the 
control variable for size generally appears to be negatively correlated with levels of liquidity 
created by the MFIs across different models and measurements for scaled LC. 
  
Table 4.7: Average Liquidity Creation by MFI Size, 2004-2012 
 Average LC/GTA GTA Growth LC growth LC/GTA Growth 
Small 0.33 4.36 5.40 1.24 
Medium 0.28 3.74 4.11 1.10 
Large 0.34 8.12 9.01 1.11 
 
The same appears to be true when taking a closer look at organizational types: while 
commercial banks, which hold 42.58% of all MFI assets, create 31.30% liquidity to total 
assets, credit unions and rural banks, which hold just 15.78% and 3.4% of all assets 
respectively, create 36.6% and 36.48% liquidity to total assets held (table 4.8).  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8: MFI Characteristics by Type, all Years 
2004 - 2012 Bank Credit Union / Cooperative NBFI NGO Rural Bank Other 
Unique MFIs 145 291 258 280 135 12 
Observations 492 846 898 923 454 27 
% of Total Assets 42.58% 15.74% 29.34% 8.62% 3.40% 0.12% 
% of Total Branches 13.52% 23.24% 24.67% 25.36% 12.47% 0.74% 
Average Size of Total Assets $126.52 M $27.20 M $47.77 M $13.66 M $10.94 M $6.68 M 
Average Size of Equity $18.81 M $5.10 M $8.15 M $3.82 M $1.55 M $1.74 M 
Total Loan Volume $42,933.48 M $16,946.14 M $33,497.68 M $9.821.92 M $3,278.16 M $117.43 M 
Total Deposit Volume $32,419.17 M $14,254.36 M $21,552.31 M $3.355.46 M $2.880.68 M $84.58 M 
Average Liquidity Created $42.09 M $9.43 M $16.0614 $4.63 M $4.16 M $2.01 M  
Change in Liquidity 47.77% 64.63% 43.25% 125.88% 11.61% 0.00% 
Liquidity as % of Assets 31.30% 36.60% 30.77% 31.82% 36.48% 30.79% 
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Table 4.9: Top Liquidity Creators, by Country 
Top 5 (by LC) Mean Ranking Percentage of Population  
Country Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross 
Total 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross 
Loan 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Equity 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Deposits 
Assets Deposits LC / GTA Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
LC / GTA 
Ukraine $294.80 M $137.50 M $117.00 M 0.36 0.43 4.08 1.08 2 3 16 6.45% 5.98% 8.01% 1.51% 
Romania $324.90 M $170.60 M $95.60 M 0.28 0.38 3.28 0.59 1 1 45 7.11% 7.42% 6.54% 1.18% 
Azerbaijan $221.60 M $90.67 M $75.10 M 0.37 0.53 2.40 1.60 4 6 15 4.85% 3.95% 5.14% 1.53% 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
$248.60 M $124.10 M $66.20 M 0.28 0.37 2.70 0.58 3 4 48 5.44% 5.40% 4.53% 1.16% 
Brazil $216.40 M $69.94 M $59.50 M 0.26 0.54 1.55 1.23 5 10 54 4.74% 3.04% 4.07% 1.09% 
 
 
 
Table 4.10: Bottom Liquidity Creators, by Country 
Bottom 5 (by LC) Mean Ranking Percentage of Population   
Country Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross 
Total 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross 
Loan 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Equity 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Deposits 
Assets Deposits LC / GTA Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
LC / GTA 
Sierra Leone S0.92 M $0.19 M $0.18 M 0.20 0.27 1.02 1.12 79 78 71 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.85% 
Yemen $1.26 M $0.18 M $0.24 M 0.19 0.25 0.79 3.55 77 79 72 0.03% 0.01% 0.02% 0.80% 
Zambia $3.24 M $0.52 M $0.43 M 0.13 0.22 0.34 0.99 75 75 77 0.07% 0.02% 0.03% 0.54% 
Namibia $1.00 M $0.26 M $0.47 M 0.31 0.46 1.58 3.89 78 77 36 0.02% 0.01% 0.03% 1.30% 
Egypt $3.01 M $0.28 M $0.61 M 0.21 0.29 1.40 11.24 76 76 70 0.07% 0.01% 0.04% 0.86% 
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Table 4.11: Top LC Creators (Scaled by Size), by Country 
Top 5 (by LC / GTA) Mean Ranking Percentage of Population 
Country Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross 
Total 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross 
Loan 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Equity 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Deposits 
Assets Deposits LC / GTA Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
LC / GTA 
Chile $21.84 M $7.96 M $7.88 M 0.59 0.68 1.38 2.77 45 46 45 0.48% 0.35% 0.54% 2.48% 
Togo $24.70 M $18.96 M $14.30 M 0.59 0.79 4.73 0.97 43 38 32 0.54% 0.83% 0.98% 2.46% 
South Sudan $65.45 M $48.54 M $51.80 M 0.53 2.32 4.49 1.96 23 16 8 1.43% 2.11% 3.54% 2.21% 
Venezuela $79.47 M $39.38 M $41.80 M 0.51 0.62 4.24 1.20 18 19 12 1.74% 1.71% 2.86% 2.14% 
Gambia $4.62 M $3.41 M $2.24 M 0.41 1.01 3.28 0.75 69 60 64 0.10% 0.15% 0.15% 1.72% 
 
 
Table 4.12: Bottom LC Creators (Scaled by Size), by Country 
Bottom 5 (LC / GTA) Mean Ranking Percentage of Population 
Country Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross 
Total 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross 
Loan 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Equity 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Deposits 
Assets Deposits LC / GTA Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
LC / GTA 
Papua New Guinea $15.16 M $12.39 M $2.34 M 0.12 0.54 1.57 0.14 51 42 61 0.33% 0.54% 0.16% 0.50% 
Syria $11.71 M $0.75 M $1.43 M 0.13 0.14 0.24 6.45 56 74 70 0.26% 0.03% 0.10% 0.54% 
Zambia $3.24 M $0.52 M $0.43 M 0.13 0.22 0.34 0.99 75 75 77 0.07% 0.02% 0.03% 0.54% 
Serbia $96.39 M $38.16 M $23.10 M 0.16 0.23 1.05 0.61 16 21 21 2.11% 1.66% 1.58% 0.66% 
Palestine $69.96 M $49.40 M $13.70 M 0.16 0.41 0.62 8.08 20 15 36 1.53% 2.15% 0.94% 0.67% 
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Table 4.13: Liquidity Creation by Region 
LC by Region Mean Ranking 
Country Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross Total 
Assets 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Equity 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Deposits 
Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
$95.28 M $44.97 M $25.50 M 0.28 0.37 2.02 4.18 1 1 1 
Latin America 
and The 
Caribbean 
$68.69 M $39.48 M $24.70 M 0.34 0.44 2.08 8.69 2 2 2 
South Asia $28.14 M $9.84 M $9.87 M 0.36 0.46 3.02 22.25 3 5 3 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
$22.76 M $12.77 M $9.50 M 0.33 0.60 1.87 1.26 4 3 4 
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
$14.31 M $5.48 M $4.44 M 0.34 0.47 1.87 205.65 6 6 5 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
$22.59 M $12.48 M $0.65 M 0.18 0.28 0.82 8.85 5 4 6 
 
Table 4.14: Liquidity Creation by Region, Scaled by Size 
LC / GTA by Region Mean Ranking 
Country Assets Deposits 
Liquidity 
Creation 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross Total 
Assets 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Equity 
Liquidity 
Creation / 
Deposits 
Assets Deposits LC / GTA 
South Asia $28.14 M $9.84 M $9.87 M 0.36 0.46 3.02 22.25 3 S 1 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
$14.31 M $5.48 M $4.44 M 0.34 0.47 1.87 205.65 6 6 2 
Latin America and 
The Caribbean 
$68.69 M $39.48 M $24.70 M 0.34 0.44 2.08 8.69 2 2 3 
Sub-Saharan Africa $22.76 M $12.77 M $9.50 M 0.33 0.60 1.87 1.26 4 3 4 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
$95.28 M $44.97 M $25.50 M 0.28 0.37 2.02 4.18 1 1 5 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
$22.59 M $12.48 M $0.65 M 0.18 0.28 0.82 8.85 5 4 6 
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4.5.1. LC by Country and Region 
With a dataset reaching across regional and national borders, there are bound to be 
significant differences in the amounts of liquidity created by the institutions in each region, 
given the varying levels of financial infrastructure, development and regulation. As tables 
4.9 and 4.10 show, the top countries in terms of absolute deflated liquidity creation, are 
found almost exclusively in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) and Latin America (LAC), 
with an average of $USD25.5M and 24.7M per MFI/year for each region (table 4.9-4.14).  
Regionally, the mean value of LC, when scaled by assets, is stable across all regions with 
figures from 0.28 to 0.36, with only the Middle Eastern region lagging behind at 0.18 (Table 
4.13 and 4.14). With regard to the Middle East and North Africa, it is worth noting that the 
amount of observations available is significantly lower than for the other five regions, 
adding some uncertainty to the results.  In terms of pure LC, Latin America and Eastern 
Europe tops the list, producing between 2.5 and 5 times as much liquidity for the market as 
the remaining regions.   
While there appears to be little geographical divergence between regions when LC is scaled 
by size of the MFI (tables 4.07 and 4.9), there is a significant gap in the average amount of 
liquidity created between the individual countries at the top and bottom of the scale, a 
difference which remains prominent when the MFIs are scaled by size (tables 4.19 - 4.10). 
The difference may be explained by the positive and significant correlation found between 
state regulation and levels of LC, discussed in more detail in chapter 6. Both Latin America 
and Eastern Europe have better-developed regulatory systems, including functioning credit 
registries and meso-level institutions put in place to help the MFI sector prosper. While 
Eastern Europe and Latin America appear to be firmly placed in the top of both pure 
deflated LC and LC values scaled by assets, the picture is more muddled for Africa, where 
the microfinance industry is still finding its footing. Given the relative youth of the industry, 
and the relatively weak level of participation of formal, commercial banks and NBFIs, it is 
not a surprise that African nations dominate the list of bottom 5 nations, in terms of pure 
liquidity created. However, when the numbers are scaled by size, country-level differences 
begin to emerge, with Togo and Gambia showing in the top, while Zambia still remains in 
the bottom.  
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4.5.2. Estimation Results 
In general, the estimations show correlation patterns which are similar to those found in 
previous literature. However, there are a number of key differences, which both challenge 
the explanations typically put forth for the relationships, and suggest further study of 
drivers unique to the microfinance industry.  
 
Capital and Deposit Insurance 
The findings show a very strong and consistent negative relationship between capital and 
liquidity creation in microfinance. This is in line with findings from previous literature from 
traditional banking literature, which has suggested that smaller institutions are negatively 
correlated with capital, due to the financial fragility hypothesis (e.g. Berger and Bouwman 
2009, Horvath et al., 2013). Capital reduces the financial fragility of the MFI, which in turn 
reduces the level of liquidity created, due to enhancement of the bank’s bargaining power, 
and reduction in its depositor trust (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Diamond and Rajan, 2001). 
The resulting lack of effort on the part of the financial institution may be of particular 
importance to microfinance institutions, where capital may be made available to the 
institution for social reasons, in the form of either donations or heavily subsidized loans 
from state or donor agencies.  
However, my findings also show an insignificant (and consistently positive) correlation 
between LC and the presence of deposit insurance, which is in contradiction with Diamond 
and Rajan’s hypothesis (table 4.19). If the lack of effort from the bank’s side is to be 
explained by fear of bank run, I would expect deposit insurance to be highly significant and 
negatively correlated with liquidity creation.  
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Table 4.15: Estimation Results 
  LC (Log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GLP 
Capital -1.637*** -0.369*** -5.681*** -0.539*** 
(0.17) (0.03) (0.37) (0.05) 
Size 0.932*** -0.007*** -0.001* -0.002* 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) 
Regulation (Dummy) 0.153*** 0.035*** 0.225*** 0.039* 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.12) (0.02) 
NGO (Dummy) -0.064 0.035** 0.496** 0.014* 
(0.09) (0.01) (0.21) (0.03) 
Bank Risk -1.103** -0.047 -0.31 -0.102 
(0.30) (0.06) (0.50) (0.13) 
Operational self-sufficiency -0.036 -0.019 -0.474** -0.056* 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.21) (0.03) 
Deposit Insurance (dummy) 0.012 0.015 -0.103 -0.021 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02) 
Age -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.002** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP Growth per Capita -0.014** -0.002 0.001 -0.007** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Inflation -0.002 -0.001** -0.008* 0.001 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
HDI Index 0.109 0.152 0.394 0.154 
(0.42) (0.10) (0.86) (0.19) 
          
Constant -0.932** 0.434*** 3.644*** 0.544*** 
(0.39) (0.07) (0.71) (-0.15) 
R2 0.87 0.22 0.41 0.24 
RD Adjusted 0.86 0.21 0.4 0.23 
Probability F > 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Root MSE 0.68 0.14 1.30 0.22 
dfres 607 607 607 607 
BIC 3955.0 -2022.9 6395.0 -295.7 
Number of Observations 1860 1860 1860 1860 
Stars *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Country-level fixed effects estimations with clustering at firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  LC is pure values of liquidity creation, deflated 
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  LC/GTA is LC scaled by total assets. LC/E is LC divided by equity.  LC/GLP is LC divided by gross loan portfolio. Capital is measured as equity ratio, size and age are logs of assets and years since establishment, 
bank risk the portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30).  Regulation, NGO and deposit insurance are dummies, indicating whether the MFI is formally regulated, and is for-profit and operates in a market with existing deposit insurance. Operational self-
sufficiency (OSS)  is the ratio of financial revenue divided by financial and operating expense, and impairment loss. Finally, GDP growth per capita is GDP growth per capita, Inflation is the % change in the GDP deflator, and HDI is the UN’s Human 
Development Index.  
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These findings suggest that it is not the presence of deposit insurance, which cause a 
negative relationship between capital and liquidity creation in MFIs, but rather the tendency 
in microfinance for institutions to generally hold on to larger sums of capital, to ensure 
ability to absorb unexpected shock.  The MFIs do not hold on to the capital because they are 
required to by regulatory legislation, but because it is the safest way to ensure against 
short-term financial instability, and based on the ratio levels of LC produced per asset, they 
do not appear to do so to the detriment of their lending activity. 
 
Regulation 
The effect of regulation, both for pure LC and scaled LC, is generally strongly significant and 
positive. In line with the ‘risk absorption’ hypothesis, regulation helps absorb some of the 
risk facing the MFIs, in financial markets which are generally both unstable and 
unpredictable. Instead of withholding effort, as has been suggested with traditional 
intermediaries, the MFI simply pushes harder when facing less risk, due to the presence of 
strong, social and developmental goals present within the organisation. That risk is lowered 
simply means that even more marginalised and previously unbanked customers may be 
reached, without taking undue risk in the process.50 
Regulation is positively correlated with scaled LC across both regions and years, suggesting 
that a well-developed regulatory framework enables microfinance institutions to extend 
more illiquid loans to their clients. A strong regulatory framework may indicate a better 
developed financial framework, in which some of the key risks to loans extended in 
developing regions, such as lack of decent credit registries, may have been reduced.  
This result is contrary to previous empirical study by Berger et al. (2011), who found that 
regulation is negatively correlated to levels of liquidity creation among US banks, due to its 
impact on bank risk taking. The difference is likely to be found in the very different macro-
environments in which the institutions operate in: while the primary function of regulatory 
frameworks in developed financial systems is to prevent undue risk-taking, the regulatory 
framework in development contexts may often be to provide an enabling environment for 
MFIs, to increase the access to and outreach of microfinance.  A stronger regulatory 
                                                          
50
 The relationship between liquidity, performance and regulation is explored further in chapter 6.  
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framework may not necessarily hinder the activities of the MFI, as much as it helps create a 
framework of security and stability within which to act.  
 
The Macro-Environment 
While GDP per capita growth is generally negatively correlated with levels of liquidity 
creation, the Human Development Index (HDI) is positive, though both are largely 
insignificant in their relationship with liquidity creation. GDP per capita has before been 
criticised as an inadequate measuring stick in development contexts (Cull et al, 2007). This is 
partly because the economic disparity between social groups in most development nations 
is large, which causes significant disparities in the impact of GDP growth across population 
divides. However, the consistent negative impact of GDP per capita could be found in the 
nature of the microfinance industry.51 If high GDP growth is reflected amongst the poorest 
segments of society (which in itself is far from a certainty), high growth may indicate a move 
out of immediate poverty, away from microfinance lending, and toward more traditional 
banking. 
Instead of GDP per capita, the UN’s Human Development Index may be a better measuring 
tool for the state of the overall macro-environment, seen from a development perspective. 
However, with regard to levels of liquidity created by microfinance institutions, the effect of 
the HDI Index is insignificant, suggesting that the primary drivers, negative and positive, are 
likely to be found elsewhere. The regulatory framework, for example, seems to have a much 
stronger correlation with liquidity creation in microfinance, possibly due to its potential for 
direct impact on day to behaviour within the individual institution.  
Finally, a high inflation rate can make it difficult for borrower and investor to reach one 
another, which is why inflation generally would be expected to have a negative impact on 
liquidity creation. However, while negative, my findings here suggest a muted relationship 
between inflation and liquidity creation in MFIs, which is in line with previous literature in 
microfinance (see, for example, Ahlin and Lin, 2007).   
                                                          
51
 Estimations were also run with real GDP values, which returned insignificant. 
116 
 
Size, Age and NGO-status 
I find that the size of MFIs is consistently significant and negatively correlated with liquidity 
creation, when absolute deflated liquidity is scaled by total assets, equity or GLP. These 
results echo the findings in traditional banking literature, which also observed consistent 
negative relationships between levels of scaled LC, and the size of the intermediary.   In 
addition, I find that the age of the MFI is only weakly correlated with liquidity creation, 
though results are consistently negative. The results seem to suggest that more so than age 
itself, the organizational structure, size and external environment has a larger impact on 
levels of liquidity created by the MFI. 
A sort of ‘reverse life-cycle’ is observed for the creation of liquidity in MFIs. It may still be 
true, as the life-cycle theory states that MFIs tend to start out as pure NGOs in infant and 
young stages, but move toward more formal and developed financial institutions as they 
age (e.g. Helms 2006; Farrington and Abrams 2002; Bogan, 2012a). However, this shift does 
not come with increased levels of liquidity creation, when values are scaled by assets, equity 
or loan volume. Rather, size seems to be negatively correlated with LC, while NGOs seem to 
produce comparatively more LC than non-NGOs.  
The explanation for this may be similar to that presented in the discussion of the lack of 
impact by deposit insurance.  For non-commercial institutions, the presence of deposit 
insurance does not limit effort on behalf of the bank, because of the social mission 
associated with the successful extension of microfinance loans. Increased security means 
less risk for bank run for deposit-taking MFIs yes, but the aim to reduce poverty reduction 
encourages the institution to increase rather than decrease lending, as risk is reduced. 
 
Bank Risk 
Previous literature has suggested that there may be such a thing as an optimal level of 
liquidity creation, since little LC means the intermediary is not fulfilling its role as mediator 
between investor and loan taker, while too much LC may result in default and insolvency 
(Berger et al., 2011; Horvath et al, 2013). In this study, however, bank risk does not seem to 
significantly impact levels of scaled liquidity created by the MFI. The findings suggest a 
negative but generally weak or insignificant correlation between the portion of the GLP at 
117 
 
risk of default, and levels of liquidity creation. The weak impact may be found in 
contradicting effects from increased risk-taking: While undue risk results in an increase in 
the ratio of portfolio at risk, and with it risk of defaulting loans, higher risk also means 
increased LC for loans that are successful.  
When frameworks and strategies are implemented which decrease risk for the MFI, 
portfolio at risk may be kept steady, while still increasing levels of liquidity created for the 
market.  Some of the strategies employed by MFIs as ways to reduce risk, such as joint 
lending strategies, are unique to the industry, and are studied in further detail in chapter 5. 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
As microfinance becomes an ever-growing part of the financial market in developing and 
emerging regions, as well seeing increased use in both the EU and the US, it becomes 
increasingly important to understand the financial impact of microfinance institutions, and 
not just on the client level. The macroeconomic impact of microfinance, and the role which 
MFIs may play in established financial systems, is still only poorly understood. 
The findings of this study show that, like traditional financial intermediaries, microfinance 
institutions do contribute to the creation of liquidity to the markets they operate in, on par 
with and in some cases exceeding, that of regular banking institutions (tables 4.5 and 4.7). 
Microfinance institutions have proven themselves to be not just a viable tool in the ongoing 
struggle to reduce poverty but also, though the use of innovative lending technologies, as a 
legitimate financial intermediary, capable of producing liquidity for the market and reaching 
previously unbanked customers, where traditional banking may not.  
The fact that microfinance is not just a tool for poverty reduction and a way to reach socially 
and financially excluded segments of society, is an important revelation, especially as 
microfinance begins to spread beyond traditional development contexts and into more 
developed markets, on both sides of the Atlantic.   
Since MFIs contribute to the creation of liquidity for the market (and, when scaled to size, 
appear to do so quite well), an appropriate level of regulation is needed to ensure a positive 
impact on the markets concerned.  Given the numerous unique traits of microfinance 
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institutions, along with the multitude of organizational structures and funding  schemes, the 
regulatory framework required is likely to be quite complex. However, it would be a mistake 
if policymakers and practitioners alike were to forget the financial impact of MFIs upon the 
market, and solely focus on its social virtues. As Berger notes that banks can create both too 
much and too little liquidity compared to the social optimum, MFIs can either help ease or 
worsen the financial climate, depending on how they are run and regulated (Berger et al, 
2013). However, the relationship between regulation, liquidity and microfinance deserves 
further study, to understand what aspects of regulation and supervision impact LC the most, 
and in what ways.  Please see chapter 6 for insight into the relationship between liquidity 
creation and regulation in microfinance. 
Finally, the study also shows that the theoretical argument for why deposit insurance would 
cause the bank to potentially withhold effort does not seem to hold true with regard to 
microfinance institutions (Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Berger and Bouwman, 2009). The 
expected negative significant relationship between LC and the presence of deposit 
insurance was not found, and while significance varies, the relationship does appear to be 
consistently positive. The result supports the findings of Deep and Schaefer, who suggested 
that the main drivers of liquidity creation should be found elsewhere.  
Deep and Schaefer suggest capital risk as a potential driver instead, but while the impact of 
bank risk does appear to be consistently negative, the results are not significant. Rather, the 
level of liquidity creation appears to be linked to industry-specific and macroeconomic 
conditions, such as the state of the ‘enabling environment’ surrounding the MFI, as well as 
the presence of a social mission to keep bank efforts up. In addition to these, the following 
chapter takes a closer look at the drivers of LC in microfinance, and specifically evaluates the 
lending practices and methodology employed by MFIs, and their unique ability to reduce 
risk for the intermediaries. 
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5. Drivers of Liquidity Creation in Microfinance 
In the previous chapter, I showed how microfinance institutions are able to create liquidity 
for the markets they operate in, at levels on par with, and sometimes better than, more 
traditional financial intermediaries. I also observed similar correlations between standard 
drivers, such as capital and size, to that found in more traditional banking literature (e.g. 
Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Horvath et al., 2013). 
However, the successful operation of microfinance institutions relies on a unique set of 
lending approaches. These enable the institutions to extend loans to clients otherwise 
considered to be unsafe, due to their lack of adequate collateral, and the general lack of a 
strong ‘enabling environment’ in the markets they operate in. For that reason, it is plausible 
to expect that the main drivers of liquidity creation in microfinance include characteristics 
not normally considered in traditional banking.  
In microfinance literature, the ability of MFIs to successfully operate in areas which cannot 
be reached by the traditional financial market is often ascribed to the unique lending 
strategies employed by the institutions. Local MFIs often get around the lack of adequate 
collateral by extending group loans, in which peer pressure and monitoring take the place of 
collateral, to ensure timely repayment (e.g. Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).  
Based on this assumption, I am interested in examining the correlation between lending 
strategy and levels of liquidity creation. If microfinance institutions are able to reduce risk 
through the use of joint lending, this may explain their ability to produce levels of liquidity 
on par with that of traditional intermediaries, despite the unstable external environments, 
the absence of comprehensive credit registries and lack of adequate collateral. In addition 
to this, I wish to examine the general impact of diversification in lending strategies on levels 
of liquidity, to determine whether the act of specialisation or diversification alone is 
significantly correlated with LC. 
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I use panel data from the MIX database, to study the impact of specialisation and the unique 
lending methodologies employed by MFIs, while controlling for the impact of size, capital, 
profit-status, regulatory status, age, bank risk and region, as well as macroeconomic 
indicators, such as GDP and inflation. 
I find that a high degree of specialisation has strong, positive correlation with the creation of 
liquidity in MFIs, and equally observe significant positive relationships between the use of 
joint lending methodologies and liquidity creation when scaled for size, supporting the 
suggestion that joint lending strategies mitigate risk, by reducing the impact from 
asymmetric information. 
The study provides a first insight into the drivers of liquidity creation in microfinance, and 
also contributes to the general understanding of the relationship between diversification 
and liquidity creation. The results indicate that institutions, which specialise their lending 
methodologies, are the strongest liquidity creators, possibly because they are better able to 
navigate a market in which the needs and characteristics of the lender are keys to ensuring 
successful repayment. Additionally, my findings suggest that high engagement in joint 
lending practices have a positive effect on the level of liquidity created for the market.   
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 provides a brief discussion of key literature, 
discussing the impact of lending strategies and diversification in microfinance. The 
discussion here has primary focus on the findings in empirical literature. However, a more 
in-depth theoretical discussion on lending strategies and their impact can be found in the 
presentation of microfinance literature in chapter 3.  
Section 5.3 presents the models used to estimate the impact of specialisation and lending 
strategies on levels of liquidity created in microfinance. Section 5.4 discusses the dataset 
used, as well as the results of my estimable models. Finally, section 5.5 presents the 
findings, and discusses their implications for practitioners, policy-makers and researchers.   
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5.1. Literature 
In the following section, I provide a brief overview of key literature related to the joint 
lending strategies uniquely employed by microfinance institutions, and discuss their 
potential impact on levels of liquidity created by MFIs. Since chapter 3 already covers the 
theoretical discussion behind the strategic use, the following focuses primarily on existing 
empirical literature. In addition to this, I provide an overview of the literature on loan 
diversification and specialisation in financial intermediaries, and how this may relate to 
microfinance institutions.   
 
5.1.1. Lending Strategy in Microfinance 
As discussed in chapter 3, the use of joint lending strategies in microfinance is a way for 
intermediaries to reduce risk and overcome agency issues related to asymmetric 
information.52  In joint lending, borrowers form a group in which everyone is liable for the 
timely repayment of the loans taken. In addition, the MFIs use intensive monitoring and 
comprehensive evaluation schemes, whose cost are kept low through the use of inter-group 
peer monitoring, mitigating potential moral hazard issues. Finally, the institutions use the 
promise of access to future lending as a form of additional pressure, to ensure timely 
repayment, which also helps reduce adverse selection issues (Ghatak, 1999; Morduch, 
2000).   
According to the theory, microfinance institutions are able to reduce transaction costs, 
which would otherwise be too high given the small loans extended, through peer pressure 
and utilisation of social capital. Generally, the theory argues that kinship, knowledge and 
                                                          
52
 Joint lending refers to two unique types of lending, both of which use joint liability. Group lending is the 
most used form of joint liability lending. It refers to the use of groups for disbursement of funds and collection 
of repayment on loans to either the group as a whole or to the individual members of that group. Borrowers of 
such groups often bear joint liability for the repayment of all loans to the group and its members. This group 
liability may also determine credit decisions made by the institution. Groups vary in the degrees to which they 
use groups for credit decisions, disbursement, collection, or to reduce credit risk. Following the MIX definition, 
loans are here considered to be of the group methodology when some aspect of loan consideration depends 
on the group, including credit analysis, liability, guarantee, collateral, and loan size and conditions. In contrast, 
individual lending refers to any loan is extended to an individual, and where the liability is held entirely by the 
one client. Loans which are given with individual liability, but are disbursed and recollected through groups, 
are still considered individual lending. (MIX, 2013) 
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shared locality allows the MFIs to successfully employ credit contracts of a size and nature, 
which would have been too expensive and too risky for more traditional intermediaries 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).    
While the promise of future access to loans should work across different lending strategies, 
the joint lending approach allows for a form of social enforcing, which is near-impossible to 
implement without the joint-lending structure. Social enforcing fills the gap left for 
traditional intermediaries, who face severe challenges when trying to enforce financial 
sanctions against poor clients who default. Because the clients have little to begin with, the 
available array of traditional sanctions is rarely useable (Ghatak, 1999).  In the case of social 
enforcing, the pressure to repay on time comes from the client’s neighbours and group 
peers, which is both more effective and less costly for the institution than traditional means 
of enforcement. 
 
Empirical Studies 
Empirically, the existing literature largely confirms the theoretical assumptions made 
above.53  Work by Wenner, as well as Wydick, show evidence that joint liability lending 
facilitates better information flows, which in return correlate to better repayment rates 
(Wenner, 1995; Wydick, 1999). However, the studies have been criticised for not being able 
to assess the impact of institutional monitoring (Morduch, 2000).   
Sharma and Zeller (1997), who studied 128 MFIs in Bangladesh using group lending, found 
empirical support for the argument above. They showed that if prudent banking practices 
are present, repayment rates are strong - stronger than those of nationalised commercial 
banks, especially if members are allowed to pick their own group participants.  
However, relationships can also get too close. Same study found that family members had a 
negative effect on repayment rates, suggesting a weakening of the ability of the group to 
adequately monitor and enforce repayment due to the complications of close and more 
complicated social ties (Sharma and Zeller, 1997:1740). The study also found that diversity 
in asset size and business activity had a positive impact on repayment rates. The finding that 
                                                          
53
 For a detailed discussion of the mechanisms behind the impact of joint lending, please see chapter 2. 
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social ties and increased information about group members have a positive impact on 
repayment rates is also found in studies by Zeller and Sharma (1998), Wydick (2001) and 
Hermes et al. (2005). 
The client-level impact of joint liability lending has been called into question by some 
research, causing heated exchanges back and forth between groups of academics. This is 
especially evident in the decade-long exchange between Pitt and Khandker, who observed 
increased consumption in poor-households obtaining group loans, and Morduch and 
Roodman, who has argued that the study shows the impact of program selection, rather 
than that of group lending (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Morduch, 1999a and 1999b; Khandker, 
2005; Roodman and Morduch, 2014; Pitt, 2012 ). 
In addition, some academics argue that most studies looking at the impact of joint lending 
have ignored the impact of other institutional procedures, such as peer monitoring (de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2000). While it is true that peer monitoring almost certainly has a 
positive impact on repayment rates (and with that, levels of liquidity created), I would 
suggest that one is invariably linked with the other. Individual loans are different in the very 
fact that they are not naturally subject to the same form of local monitoring. The point, 
however, is still relevant, since it may help explain the difference in the impact of village and 
group lending, respectively: Tribal communities are closer and may impose better 
monitoring than traditional intermediaries.  
However, it may not be as intense or as effective as that found within joint liability groups, 
where the consequences of default have more direct and dire consequences for the monitor 
as well. Some empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of group lending relates 
directly to the strength of the social connections between group members, which may 
explain why group lending may be seen as more efficient than village banking by some 
(Karlan, 2007). Newer studies have found clear and consistent impact on income levels and 
household expenditures from village loan lending initiatives (e.g. Ksoll et al., 2016). These 
findings are generally supported by previous research, observing positive impacts on short 
term capital, consumption and household income (Kaboski and Townsend, 2012; Brannen, 
2010; Sibomana and Shukla, 2016). 
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Armendáriz and Gollier (1996), show that MFIs, which use joint lending strategies, are able 
to reduce the presence of credit rationing and enable conditions for lower interest rates, 
under conditions with asymmetric information. They argue that this happens because cross-
subsidisation amongst borrowers replaces the traditional need for collateral.  This ‘collateral 
effect’ functions as a risk-pooling function, which allows the microfinance intermediaries to 
maximise their efficiency, in spite of incomplete information (Armendáriz and Gollier, 1996).  
Similar results are found by Besley and Coate (1995), who show that joint lending gives 
successful group members incentive to help the repayment efforts of less successful 
members of same group. They argue that the negative effect on successful clients in 
defaulting groups could be negated by the presence of social collateral, but that this 
requires that the social sanctions imposed by the group are strong enough. Studies done by 
Bhole and Ogden (2010) challenge this notion, arguing that even in situations where the 
presence of social collateral is weak, the use of joint lending can under certain conditions 
still be preferable to individual lending. They show that the use of a flexible contract can 
increase borrower welfare compared to individual lending, and crucially, that joint lending is 
financially viable for a wider range of opportunity cost of capital.  The authors suggest that 
this is due to the conditions of the contract, in which the amount owed for fellow group 
member is ‘...optimally determined’, and that penalty imposed for default is allowed to vary 
across group members (Bhole and Ogden, 2010: 349).  
Armendáriz and Morduch demonstrate how, when employing a traditional lending contract, 
a financial intermediary is not able to extend loans at an interest rate which covers its cost, 
while still keeping it worthwhile for ‘safe’, risk-averse borrowers (Armendáriz and Morduch, 
2010). The lack of collateral among the poorest segment of society, along with market 
inefficiencies brought about by asymmetric information, would cause challenges for the 
bank in the form of both moral hazard and adverse selection.54   
The lack of information available to the intermediary means that it would not be able to 
prevent its customers from taking undue risk as well as increasing the chance of their 
                                                          
54
 Moral hazard is an event which incurs when an individual engages in excessively risky behaviour, knowing 
that they will be covered from the risk and potential cost by a third party.   Adverse selection happens when 
two parties are in possession of imperfect and unequal information (asymmetric information), which leads to 
decisions made with undesired effects. Please chapter 2 for further detail. 
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defaulting on the loan. At the same time, asymmetrical information would cause the 
financial intermediary to treat ‘safe’ and risky’ borrowers the same, charging same interest 
rates, thus causing the bank to drive away ‘safe’ borrowers. This would in turn leave the 
intermediary with the risky borrowers and an increased chance of default (Armendáriz and 
Morduch, 2010). 
Finding similar positive impact from joint lending strategies, Ghatak shows how banks are 
able to screen clients by ‘the company they keep’. He argues that risky borrowers are less 
likely to accept an increase in the extent of joint liability, compared to risk-averse clients. A 
bank that offers two contracts, one with high joint liability but low interest, and one with 
low joint liability and high interest, the risk-adverse clients will choose the high joint liability 
option, while risky clients will choose the other. Because of this, the author finds higher 
levels of repayment and efficiency, under conditions of high joint liability, compared to 
more traditional individual-liability lending contracts (Ghatak, 1999). 
However, not all studies of the impact of joint lending strategies are positive. In their 2010 
study, Giné et al. find that the joint lending methodology, intended to strengthen the 
individual client’s incentive for repayment, is vulnerable to both collusion and free-riding. 
They argue that in cases where clients are not part of a homogenous group, the risk taken 
by the individual member increases due to the presence of adverse selection and moral 
hazard (Giné et al., 2010).  
 
5.1.2. The Institutional Development of Joint Liability Lending 
Joint liability lending is not a new invention. As was seen in chapter 2, versions of the 
approach have been seen successfully applied to lending as far back as the Irish Loan System 
in the 1700s, and were widely used by German credit unions in the 1800s as well.55 In 
modern microfinance, the most well-known example of joint liability use is that of the 
Grameen bank in Bangladesh. 
In German credit unions, a screening of potential members was typically performed, in 
which not all members were admitted into the cooperative, and loans could be denied to 
                                                          
55
 For a more detailed discussion of the historical development of microfinance, please see chapter 2. 
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members (Ghatak, 1999).  Similarly the cooperatives would eject members who broke the 
rules of the credit union. If a member could not keep up with the repayment schedule, the 
cooperatives would audit the borrower, and take one of a number of possible actions.  
Enforcement would sometimes happen through the formal legal system, but more often 
than not, it relied on social capital, pressure and sanctions to ensure against moral hazard. 
Often, co-signatures were required as well, to ensure repayment in case of default.  
The procedures applied by the Grameen Bank follow similar patterns to that observed in the 
German credit union sector. However, here some cautionary tales point out that what in 
praxis happens ‘on the ground’ is not always in line with the impression held by the Bank’s 
management (Todd, 1996).   
This may for example be expressed in disparity between what the stated purpose of a loan 
is, and how it is actually used. Often, this takes place if the loan taker wishes to use the 
funds for forbidden or controversial purposes, and the loan taker is unsure if they would 
receive the Bank’s approval (Todd, 1996). The author notes that group members typically 
are aware of what other members in reality use the funds for, even if the intermediary is 
not.  
Joint liability lending has also been applied to modern, developed markets, though with 
mixed results. In the US, efforts to implement group lending, similar to that of Grameen 
bank, faced a number of difficulties. The biggest of these is if members engaging in group 
loans typically do not know each other beforehand, and because of this, successful groups 
often take between 6 and 8 months to form, and develop the necessary trust (Balkin, 1993). 
In the case of Grameen, members are required to meet regularly and participate in 
activities, which are directly related to the development of trust, solidarity and knowledge 
within the group (Yunus, 2003). 
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5.1.3. Group vs. Village Banking56 
Theoretically, the size of groups in joint liability lending can have two opposing impacts.  If 
we assume that the returns of individual projects are not correlated, then a larger group size 
should increase the effectiveness of joint liability lending, since it raises the total number of 
possible outcomes, in which the group as a unit is able to repay its total loans.  
However, if we accept that joint liability lending is likely to work due to increased quality of 
information between group members, we must assume that behaviour, and with it returns, 
is correlated. The increased quality of information enables the group to impose social 
sanctions and engage in peer monitoring, but both of these effects are likely to be 
weakened, if the group becomes too large. In addition, an increase of group sizes also 
increases the risk of free riders, and with increased complexity in coordination, the 
advantages outlined above may disappear or be significantly weakened. 
Empirically, the optimal group size has typically been found through trial and error. For 
Grameen, the typical group size is five. For others, they may be much larger, sometimes up 
to 100 members (Mosley and Dahal, 1985; Owusu and Tetteh, 1982), though the larger 
groups often face challenges ensuring adequate monitoring and collection.  Some empirical 
literature argues that the use of small groups is essential to the success of joint liability 
lending (e.g. Devereux and Fishe, 1993). 
Armendáriz and Murdoch suggest that group lending methodologies may also have an 
effect on ‘village banking’ type loans, where the loan is granted to a larger group of people, 
who do not usually know the risk-willingness of the other group members. In this scenario, 
risky borrowers will gain from being matched with safe borrowers, but safe borrowers may 
gain as well, if the lending structure allows for higher returns for risky borrowers than safe, 
when they succeed. The village lending contract will in this case draw more from the risky 
borrowers when they succeed, but not draw as much from the safe borrower when the risky 
customer fails, due to what Armendáriz and Murdoch defines as ‘limited liability’, where 
                                                          
56
 Village banking refers to methodologies that provide access to credit and savings services through group or 
community managed associations. Loans from MFIs are considered of this type when the MFI lends to the 
group, which in turn uses this money to lend to its members. Village banking loans are typically made under 
the collective guarantee of the group. Loans may also be made from the retained profits of the group or from 
group members' savings. These loans are considered internal to the village community (MIX, 2013). 
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borrowers cannot repay more than their current income flow. The methodology causes the 
risky borrower to positively affect the safe borrower, enabling the safe borrower to lend at 
lower rates. The lower interest rates resolve credit rationing issues, by increasing the 
number of safe borrowers taking out loans (Armendáriz and Murdoch, 2010).  
The empirical evidence here appears to be more ambivalent, particularly due to the 
observed importance of close social ties. Karlan (2007) studied the presence and role of 
social ties in relation to group lending methodology, using data on 2000 individual group 
members. The study finds stronger repayment rates in groups with higher social ties. The 
author argues that the increased repayment rates are due to higher levels of monitoring and 
enforcement of punishments tailored to the specific context (Karlan, 2007).  In a similar 
study on social capital, Cassar et al. (2007) used 98 groups with 498 borrowers from two 
separate geographical locations, and found that social and cultural homogeneity, trust and 
past positive experiences improve repayment rates. However, superficial knowledge of one 
another does not, if not accompanied by one of the other indicators (Cassar et al., 2007). 
 
Overall, the reduction of risk through elimination of asymmetric information allows the MFI 
to extend illiquid loans to borrowers which would otherwise have been too risky for the 
intermediary. Because of that, the level of liquidity created by the MFI is likely to increase, 
though no empirical work has yet been done to confirm this assumption, something this 
thesis seeks to rectify. 
 
5.1.4. Product Diversification and Specialisation 
Current literature lists two primary areas where diversification may be of interest to smaller 
financial intermediaries: the discussion of potential diversification benefits in banking, as 
well as its impact on small business lending, both of which are potentially relevant for the 
microfinance industry. Smaller banks are suggested to have an advantage in extending loans 
to smaller business firms, because they are able to process soft information better and draw 
on informational advantages compared to larger companies. Some studies observe 
organizational diseconomies of scale, as well as increased expertise in locally scattered 
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markets amongst smaller institutions, and with consumers that will often prefer 
organisations with stronger local ties (see, for example, Stiroh, 2004; Pilloff and Rhoades, 
1996;  deYoung, 1999;  Berger and Humphrey, 1997; and Jensen, 2009).   
While looking at the traditional banking sector, DeYoung notes that the share of assets in 
small business lending is negatively correlated with the size of the banks studied, and Berger 
et al. suggests that smaller financial intermediaries make use of fundamentally different 
lending methodologies than larger intermediaries do (DeYoung et al., 1999; Berger et al., 
1993). Additionally Pilloff and Rhoades find that larger financial intermediaries do not have 
net competitive advantages when compared with smaller banks (Pilloff and Rhoades, 2002).  
All of these findings are in line with what is generally observed within the microfinance 
sector, where unique lending methodologies are employed to reach customers otherwise 
left unserved by larger financial intermediaries (see, for example, Armendáriz and Morduch, 
2005; Hermes and Lesink, 2007). 
With regulation being weak and often poorly implemented in much of the main market for 
microfinance, it may be assumed that microfinance institutions might take advantage of 
diversification to reduce risk and increase their revenue stream (Stiroh, 2004; Morgan and 
Samolyk, 2003). However, the empirical evidence from traditional banking literature of the 
correlation between bank risk and diversification is not conclusive. Some empirical literature 
finds a negative relationship between an expansion of business activities and risk reduction, 
while some observe positive correlations between risk and diversification (DeYoung and 
Roland, 2001; Templeton and Severiens, 1992).57 Stiroh finds that diversification for small 
businesses into new business activities and operations do not create diversification benefits 
for the small financial intermediaries. Specifically, the study finds negative correlations 
between risk-adjusted performance and diversification in commercial and industrial lending. 
Stiroh notes that concentrated loan portfolios are associated with lower risk-adjusted 
profits, but finds that this only happens if the intermediary expands within already existing 
                                                          
57
 An area in which literature within traditional banking has found evidence of diversification gains, is the 
expansion of business revenue streams of banks into non-bank activities such as insurance (see, for example, 
Saunders and Walter, 1994; Boyd and Runkle, 1993). For the microfinance sector, in which some established 
institutions are currently expanding into micro-insurance, this is interesting, but not the focus of this particular 
study.  
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areas of expertise and methodology (Stiroh, 2004). In a microfinancial context, it thus may 
be of benefit for the MFI to expand its loan product range within an area and using a 
methodology that they are already familiar with, but steer clear of expansion into unfamiliar 
areas and methodologies, in which the wants and needs of the client base is fundamentally 
different from their previous lending activities.   
 
The use of alternative lending strategies to address the weak information available on 
borrowers, as well as the lack of adequate collateral as security, are both key traits which 
set microfinance apart from traditional banking. Far from just being a development tool to 
address poverty concerns in developing and emerging markets, it is today also finding 
increased use in more developed environments. Microfinance initiatives are used to reach 
parts of the population which are considered too risky to be served by more traditional 
financial intermediaries, and because of this, are left without access to capital. 
If we want to understand the potential impact of MFIs as banking institutions, we need to 
understand what factors carry significant influence on its ability to function as a financial 
intermediary. We need to look closer at the traits which make MFIs unique, and understand 
their impact on MFIs’ ability to create liquidity for the market.  
 
5.2. Research Question and Hypotheses 
This chapter therefore takes a closer look at the impact of lending strategies upon the levels 
of liquidity created by the MFI. In particular, I am interested in the effect of diversification of 
lending approaches upon liquidity creation, and especially whether this applies across all 
lending strategies or for only joint lending methodologies in particular. The results will help 
shed light on how and to what extent MFIs are able to help funnel liquidity into their 
surrounding financial markets.  
As seen in the previous chapter, MFIs appear to be able to create liquidity on par with 
traditional intermediaries, despite the increased risk from collateral-less lending, and 
unstable external environments.  Based on this, and the gap in existing literature identified 
earlier in this chapter, this chapter seeks to answer the following question: 
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How do microfinance institutions successfully create liquidity for the market, without taking 
undue risk? 
a) What is the impact of specialisation and joint lending strategies on levels of liquidity 
creation? 
b) What are other unique characteristics of MFIs, which may drive liquidity creation in 
microfinance? 
 
5.2.1. Hypotheses 
Based on the existing literature, it is clear that microfinance institutions are able to 
successfully navigate around the obstacles usually facing financial institutions in developing 
regions. The MFIs manage to address issues arising from high transaction cost, the threat of 
adverse selection, moral hazard as well as the cost and time of adequate monitoring and 
enforcement. The primary tool used to address these, is the use of joint lending strategies 
to lower both transaction and auditing costs, as well addressing the challenges associated 
with a weak financial market into strength, by using access to future loans as both carrot 
and stick (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010; Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). 
The ability of MFIs to successfully ensure repayment and reduce risk is likely to be directly 
related to their ability to produce liquidity for the market. However, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, not all of the traditional impact variables have equally consistent impact 
in microfinance. While the impact of capital remains significant and negative, size is less 
consistent across years and measurements, though still with consistent negative correlation 
to LC. Deposit insurance does not appear to be correlated with levels of liquidity creation, 
lending credence to Schaefer and Deep’s proposal that the impact of liquidity creation is not 
explained by the threat of bank runs as Diamond and Dybvig proposed, but rather through 
the level of capital risk (Schaefer and Deep, 2004; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Diamond and 
Rajan, 2001). 
Traditional bank risk, here measured as the level of portfolio at risk, is negatively correlated 
with LC, and largely insignificant, suggesting that the drivers of liquidity creation in 
microfinance should be found elsewhere. The macro-environment, in particular variables 
132 
 
impacting the regulatory framework, is studied in further detail in chapter 6, while this 
chapter is particularly interested in institutional characteristics driving liquidity creation. 
 
H1a: Specialised lending is expected to be positively correlated with LC. 
While existing literature on specialisation in microfinance is limited, newer research in 
diversification amongst smaller financial institutions suggest that smaller institutions may 
not receive the same diversification benefits as larger institutions do, and find this to be true 
especially for commercial and industrial lending (Stiroh, 2004). For this reason, I expect 
diversification gains to be either weak or absent for microfinance institutions in general. 
Specialisation of lending methodologies is therefore likely to be positively correlated with 
levels of liquidity created by the MFIs. 
 
H1b:  Joint lending is expected to be positively correlated with LC. 
Based on the theory and empirical findings outlined above, as well as in chapter 2, joint 
lending appears to have a mitigating impact on risk, as well as a general positive relationship 
on repayment rates, especially for group loans, where members know each other well, but 
are not directly related.  
The previous chapter showed no significant impact from deposit insurance, and capital risk 
appeared to be negatively correlated with LC in microfinance.  I thus expect joint lending to 
be positively correlated with levels of LC, due to the risk reducing effect of joint lending 
strategies proposed in chapter 2 (e.g. Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010; Ghatak, 1999). 
 
H2: other unique characteristics driving liquidity in microfinance are organisational type 
and the presence regulatory framework. Both are expected to be positively correlated 
with LC. 
Based on the consistent results observed in the previous chapter, I expect the relationship 
between LC and regulation to be strongly positive. Unless significant diversions from 
133 
 
previous results are observed, it is not something I discuss in detail in this chapter. Instead, I 
take a much closer look at aspects of the regulatory framework and microfinance in the 
following chapter. 
With regard to organisational type, I expect to see similar positive correlations between 
NGOs and levels of liquidity creation. The life-cycle theory outlined in chapter 2 states that 
MFIs often display a tendency to change over time, from NGOs to more commercial 
institutions as they mature.  As smaller institutions and NGOs tend to create more liquidity, 
the correlation between age and LC should be negative and significant, as should OSS.  So 
far however, neither has displayed convincing levels of significance. 
 
5.3. Methodology 
To answer the research question and sub-questions stated above, I have run 3 fixed effects 
models, in which a number of characteristics unique to microfinance are estimated. 
Following a similar methodology to the previous chapter, I use panel data from MIX here 
specifically to estimate the institutional impact of specialisation and lending strategies on 
levels of liquidity created by MFIs. 
While I control for general traits which traditional banking literature suggests are relevant 
for the creation of liquidity in financial institutions, I am here particularly interested in the 
MFI characteristics which are unique to the microfinance sector.58   
One of the key traits setting MFIs apart from other financial institutions, and which 
literature highlights as a way to mitigate risk in the face of lacking collateral, is the 
innovative lending strategies employed in MFIs. I am both interested in the impact of 
diversification in chosen lending strategies, as well as the impact of the individual approach.  
For this reason, my key independent variables measure the effect of diversification in the 
MFI loan practices, as well as measuring the specific impact of joint liability, group and 
individual lending on the creation of liquidity. 
 
                                                          
58
 For a more detailed discussion of the impact of traditional bank traits, please see discussion in chapter 4. 
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5.3.1. Model 1:  Diversification and Specialisation in Microfinance 
To study the impact of lending strategy on liquidity creation, I first need to know whether 
the level of diversification of lending activities on its own has an impact on liquidity creation. 
For this purpose, I measure the degree of specialisation across MFIs, by computing a 
normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of lending methodologies. The HHI Index was 
traditionally developed to measure the level of market concentration, by taking the square 
of each market share, and adding the numbers for the final sum. In this study, I adapt the 
same approach, to calculate the concentration of a particular type of loan (individual, group 
and village), as a share of the overall loan pool of each MFI. 
 
I thus calculate the following:  
Equation 5.1: Loan Type as Share of Total Loans 
𝑆𝑆
𝑖𝑡=(
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
)
2
+(
𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
)
2
+(
𝑉𝐵𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
)
2 
 
Where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 comprises the sum of the squared lending methodologies for MFI i in year t. IND 
refers to individual loans, VB is village bank loans, GR is group loans and finally TLEND is 
total loans. I then find: 
 
Equation 5.2: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for Specialisation 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 =
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 −
1
3
1 −
1
3
 
 
where MFIs that only provide one type of lending will obtain an HHI score of 1, while MFIs 
which engage equally in all lending strategies will gain scores closer to 0. Higher HHI values 
will thus indicate the MFI’s degree of product specialisation. 
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Estimations for Specialisation 
To investigate the relationship between the degree of specialisation and levels of liquidity 
created by the MFI, I estimate the following fixed effects model: 
 
Equation 5.3: Liquidity Creation and Specialisation, DV I-III 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑘𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑖𝑡 − 1 + 𝛿3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿5𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿6𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿7𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑗 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
 
where 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 captures the effect of specialisation on levels of liquidity creation in MFI i for 
period t. As in the previous chapter, LIQ represents one of the following measures of 
liquidity creation of MFI i in period t: pure, absolute liquidity creation (LC), LC scaled by total 
assets (LC_GTA), liquidity to equity (LC_E) and liquidity creation to total loans (LC_GLP). In all 
3 models, the pure LC values have been deflated using the World Bank Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). 
Table 5.1: Variables and Definitions (Model 1) 
Variable Definition 
Liquidity creation (log) Log of the pure liquidity creation value, deflated using the CPI Index. 
LC/GTA  Liquidity creation scaled by size. 
LC/E Liquidity creation scaled by equity. 
LC/GLP Liquidity creation scaled by total loans. 
  
HHI Specialisation HHI Index indicating level of lending specialization. The higher the 
value, the higher the level of specialization. 
Capital Measured as the ratio of equity to total assets. 
Regulation (dummy) Dummy indicating whether the individual MFI is regulated. 
Size (log) Measured as a log of the MFI’s total assets. 
Age  Age of MFI, measured a number of years since year of establishment. 
NGO (dummy) Dummy variable taking the value 1, if the MFI is registered as an NGO. 
Bank risk Bank risk, measured as the ratio of portfolio at risk, 30 days. 
Operational self-sufficiency Ratio of financial revenue divided by financial and operating expense, 
and impairment loss. 
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The HHI model includes a set of variables, which estimate the impact of MFI characteristics, 
as well as control for more general traits.59 These are the age of the MFI, calculated as year 
y minus the year of establishment (AGE), as well as the size of the MFI, measured as the 
one-period-lagged log of total assets (SIZE). I also control for the impact of capital (CAPITAL), 
measured as the one-period-lagged proportion of equity to assets (Diamond and Rajan, 
2001; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Horvath and Seidler, 2013).   
The level of bank risk present in the MFI is measured as the one-period-lagged ratio of 
portfolio at risk > 30 days to the MFI’s gross loan portfolio (RISK). Finally, two dummy 
variables are included, indicating whether the MFI is employing a non-profit organisation 
(NGO), and whether the MFI is regulated by a state banking supervisory agency 
(REGULATION).60 
Aside from regulation, macro-economic variables are not included in the main regressions 
presented here. The addition of the variables, while insignificant themselves, reduced the 
adjusted r-squared from 20.3 to 18.1. The relationship between the remaining variables 
remains qualitatively the same.  
All right-hand side variables in the estimation are lagged one period, to account for 
potential endogeneity problems and robust standard errors are clustered at MFI level. This 
is done to address possible serial correlation of residuals between the observations, and the 
dispersion of coefficient estimates across clusters61. 
As in the previous chapter, I measure liquidity creation using a cross-country approach, but 
recognise that there is likely to be regional differences in the creation of liquidity. For this 
reason, I include a fixed effect to capture the unobserved geographical traits over time. 
                                                          
59
 I do not include deposit insurance or capital requirements in the main regressions for two reasons. First, 
including them reduces the sample with over 20%. Given the reduced data on loan strategy from our main 
dataset, the loss of observations has significant impact on reliability. Second, while results remain qualitatively 
the same, the inclusion of the two significantly reduces the explanatory power (adjusted r-squared) of the 
model.  
60
 Deposit insurance is not included in the results presented here. Including the dummy variable provided by 
the Barth index is positive but insignificant, and lowers the r-squared value significantly.  The relationship 
between variables remains the same. 
61 In addition to the vif test, correlation matrices were created for all regressions in the dissertation, with 
upper limits set to 0.4. As can be seen in Appendix E, no correlation among the independent variables 
breaches this limit. 
137 
 
62 𝑓𝑗 is therefore a vector of regional dummies, using the six MIX regional category for 
division:  Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA),  Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia  (EECA),  East Asia and Pacific (EAP),  South Asia (SA) and Latin America 
(LAC).  
Finally, I include a time trend (𝑇𝑖) to capture any banking-related methodological changes 
over the time. ε is a stochastic error term. 𝛼 is a constant term. 𝛽 and 𝛿 are the unknown 
coefficients to be estimated. The subscripts i and t refer to MFI and time, respectively.  
 
5.3.2. Models 1 and 2: Measuring the Impact of Joint Liability Loans 
Models 1 and 2 describe two empirical models, used to estimate the relationship between 
liquidity creation and the lending strategies employed by microfinance institutions. 
As above, these models also use panel data to run fixed effects estimations, in which the 
independent variables have been lagged one-period to minimize endogeneity concerns, and 
results are clustered at MFI level, to address issues of heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation.63  In addition, with variance inflation factor (vif) values all well below 2 (1.10 to 
1.89), there should be no significant concern about multicollinearity64.  
 
Equation 5.4: Model 1: Liquidity Creation and Lending Methodology (ratio), DV I-III 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑘𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑖𝑡 − 1 + 𝛿3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿5𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿6𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿7𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑗 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (Model 1)  
 
                                                          
62
 I do not include fixed effects at country level here, because I do not have sufficient observations to do so.  
63
 The Hausman specification test returned values between 0.000 and 0.034, suggesting best fit with fixed 
effects. However, estimations using a random effects model with robust standard errors returned similar 
qualitative results. 
64 In addition to the vif test, correlation matrices were created for all regressions in the dissertation, with 
upper limits set to 0.4. As can be seen in Appendix E, no correlation among the independent variables 
breaches this limit.  
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Equation 5.5:  Model 2: Liquidity Creation and Lending Methodology (dummy), DV 
I-III 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑘𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑖𝑡 − 1 + 𝛿3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛿5𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿7𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑗 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (Model 2) 
 
In the estimations above, 𝐿𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 captures different indicators of lending methodology. 
In particular, it is the share of lending type k over total lending of MFI i (lagged one-period), 
where k = joint liability (group + village banking loans), group and individual loans.  Because 
there are not enough village loans to observe reliable results for village loans alone, I only 
include these as part of the joint liability category. 
Since most of the MFIs offer both joint lending and individual loans, it is possible that the 
negative or insignificant effect of one type of loan may crowd out the positive relationship 
of another. To address this, I estimate a third model, designed to capture the effect of joint 
lending in MFIs with high specialisation in either joint, group or individual lending. Model 3 
includes a set of dummy variables which identify MFIs with high levels of lending of a 
particular type (LEND_HIGH). It takes the value of 1, if the share of loans using lending type 
k by MFI i is higher than the median value of the sample distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
As above, I include controls for the age of the MFI, calculated as tear t minus the years of 
establishment (AGE), as well as the size of the MFI, measured as the one-period-lagged log 
of total assets (SIZE). Capital is also included, still measured as the one-period-lagged 
proportion of equity to assets (CAPITAL).  Like before, I control for bank risk, still measured 
as the one-period-lagged ratio of portfolio at risk > 30 days to the MFI’s gross loan portfolio 
(RISK).  Finally, the two dummy variables previously found correlated are included, 
indicating organisational type (NGO), as well as the MFI’s regulatory status (REGULATION).65 
                                                          
65
 Deposit insurance is not included in the results presented here. Including the dummy variable provided by 
the Barth index is positive but insignificant, and lowers the r-squared value significantly, likely to a drop in 
available data points. Relationships between other variables remain the same.  
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As before, I use the cross-country approach, but include fixed effects to control for 
unobserved regional effects over time.66 𝑓𝑗 is still the vector of regional dummies used, with 
regional categories following the division used in the MIX database: Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA),  Eastern Europe and Central Asia  (EECA),  East 
Asia and Pacific (EAP),  South Asia (SA) and Latin America (LAC).  
Finally, I still include a time trend (𝑇𝑖) to capture any banking-related methodological 
changes over the time. ε is the stochastic error term. 𝛼 is the constant term, and 𝛽 and 𝛿 are 
the unknown coefficients to be estimated. The subscripts i and t refer to MFI and time, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.2: Variables and Definitions (Models 2 and 3) 
Variable Definition 
Liquidity creation (log) Log of the pure liquidity creation value, deflated using the CPI Index. 
LC/GTA  Liquidity creation scaled by size. 
LC/E Liquidity creation scaled by equity. 
LC/GLP Liquidity creation scaled by total loans. 
  
Lending strategy (ratio) Ratio of a particular type of lending practice (joint, group, individual) 
to total loans. 
Lending strategy (dummy) Dummy indicating whether the MFI has a high degree of a particular 
type of lending. Yes takes value of 1, no 0. 
Capital Measured as the ratio of equity to total assets. 
Regulation (dummy) Dummy indicating whether the individual MFI is regulated. 
Size (log) Measured as a log of the MFI’s total assets. 
Age  Age of MFI, measured a number of years since year of 
establishment.67 
NGO (dummy) Dummy variable taking the value 1, if the MFI is registered as an NGO. 
Bank risk Bank risk, measured as the ratio of portfolio at risk, 30 days. 
Operational self-sufficiency Ratio of financial revenue divided by financial and operating expense, 
and impairment loss. 
 
 
                                                          
66
 As before, I do not include fixed effects at country level, because I do not have sufficient observations to do 
so. For many of the countries I only have one or two observations. 
67
 While not included here, I have run estimations including age-squared, to test for a non-linear relationship. 
The results are qualitatively the same. 
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5.4. Data 
As in the previous chapter, the sample data has been collected from the Microfinance 
Information eXchange (MIX) database.  However, while I still use data from 2004 to 2012, 
the available amount of observations is significantly smaller, when only MFIs who have 
specified their lending strategy can be used. Out of the original database, 1163 observations 
have the necessary values to be used in the estimations on the impact of specialisation, 
while the total number of available observations for group and joint lending range between 
700 and 1200, depending on lending strategy68.  
As before, the original database has gone through extensive cleaning. Duplicates, ‘false’ 
zeros and any cases where the balance sheet values do not add up correctly have been 
removed.69 In addition, all time-variant values have been winsorized at 1 and 99%, to 
address potential outliers.  
As in the previous chapter, I do not limit MFIs based on size, but instead increase the validity 
of the data by only using data from MFIs with a diamond rating above 3.70  The drop in 
available observations for lending strategy makes it legitimate to consider whether 
increasing the range of diamond ratings to increase observation count is a valid scientific 
approach. However, due to the large amount of data errors and unbalanced data, I have 
decided to still only use ratings above 3. The trade-off in the reliability of my findings is not 
worth the increase in data points. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68
 All data treatment and regression work has been done using Stata, version 11 and 15. 
69
 This refers, for example, to cases where 0 is not a true 0, but has been set in a category not used, instead of 
left blank. It also includes cases where sub- and super categories do not add up. 
70
 The diamond rating reflects the quality of data received, as well as its degree of audit and documentation.  
Diamond rating 3 denotes documented financial data, while 4 and 5 are fully audited. 
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Table 5.3: MFI Summary Statistics, for Measures of LC 
2004 - 2012 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
5th 
Percentile 
Median 
95th 
Percentile 
Maximum 
Dependent Variables                 
Liquidity Creation (Deflated) 3518 13.25 M 280.1 M 0.00 M 0.00 M 2.25 M 73.68 M 157.95 M 
Liquidity Creation / Gross Total Assets 3672 0.33 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.33 0.61 0.75 
 Liquidity Creation / Gross Loan Portfolio 3672 0.47 0.26 0.02 0.10 0.44 0.94 1.45 
Liquidity Creation / Equity 3672 2.09 1.71 0.03 0.16 1.66 5.85 8.39 
Key Independent Variables                 
Lending Model 1 Specialisation (HHI) 1822 0.83 0.26 0.02 0.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Lending Model 2 Individual 1035 0.72 0.36 0.00 0.03 0.93 1.00 1.00 
Lending Model 2 Group 627 0.52 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 
Lending Model 2 Village 170 0.46 0.38 0.00 0.01 0.46 1.00 1.00 
Lending Model 2 Joint 703 0.58 0.40 0.00 0.01 0.68 1.00 1.00 
Lending Model 3 Individual (Dummy) 1568 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.0D 1.00 1.00 
Lending Model 3 Group (Dummy) 940 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Lending Model 3 Village (Dummy) 257 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Lending Model 3 Joint (Dummy) 1058 0.47 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Control Variables                 
Capital 3672 0.25 0.17 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.61 0.97 
Size 3672 15.96 1.90 7.17 12.96 15.87 19.25  19.97 
Age 3671 5.83 3.05 1.00 2.00 6.00 11.00, 14.00 
PAR30 3194 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.23 1.00 
Regulated 3672 0.74 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Profit Status 3672 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Because the liquidity creation specifically happens through the transformation of liquid 
liabilities to illiquid assets, the sample is still limited to deposit-taking institutions. In 
addition, I eliminate any microfinance institution with negative equity, on the basis that a 
near-insolvent institution is likely to focus on securing short-term capital, and is likely to 
change its behaviour and investment strategies accordingly. 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the data provided to the MIX database, is largely 
submitted on a voluntary basis, from the microfinance providers themselves. This remains a 
serious concern and limitation to the reliability of the findings presented here. However, 
while data in microfinance is slowly getting better as the industry matures, there is still a 
long way to go, before the quality of data available for research, is on par with more 
traditional financial markets.  
Given the development context and uneven quality of regulatory frameworks, it is not 
surprising that the data used to evaluate microfinance is less robust than what is found for 
more developed financial markets. However, a continuous increase in understanding and 
research is necessary to formulate and implement the best possible policies and regulatory 
guidelines, to ensure the continued growth of the sector. While the data used here is far 
from perfect, it is nonetheless better than nothing, and continues to improve with every 
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year. The introduction of common reporting and increased auditing of data by MIX has 
certainly helped, and will continue to increase the reliability of the dataset over time.71  
 
5.5. Results 
Overall, the estimation results show similar and consistent positive correlation between 
liquidity creation and both the HHI index for specialisation as well as the use of joint lending 
strategies in microfinance. The sections below discuss each of the estimations in detail. 
 
5.5.1. The Impact of Specialisation 
The results of my main regressions indicate that microfinance institutions which specialise 
their lending practices appear to create more liquidity for the market, than those who 
diversify their loan strategies (table 4.13). The estimations show very strong and positive 
correlation between my HHI Index for lending methodologies (in which higher values 
indicate a higher degree of specialisation) and liquidity creation, across all four 
measurements of LC used (table 4.8).  Using fixed effects models clustered at MFI level, the 
results are statistically significant at 1%, when controlling for levels of capital, size, age, 
levels of bank risk and regulation, whether the MFI is an NGO, as well fixed effects 
accounting for regional differences. This is true both before and after the results were 
lagged to account for endogeneity. 
The results suggest, perhaps due to the high level of complexity in successfully extending 
collateral-free loans, that specialisation allows the institution to extend larger amounts of 
illiquid loans, thus creating more liquidity for the market. It is possible that the intricacy of 
developing adequate monitoring and evaluation systems for a particular type of loan 
requires more resources than a diversified MFI might be able to cover. By doing this, the 
MFI becomes better suited to minimise the potential barrier to lending presented by 
asymmetric information concerns. 
                                                          
71
 The audit rules used by MIX include factors such as checking the balance of financial statements, and 
whether ratios are particularly high or low compared to its competitors. 
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Table 5.4: The Impact of Lending Specialisation on Liquidity Creation 
 
 LC(log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GLP 
Lending Specialisation HHI  0.302*** 
(0.09) 
 0.059*** 
(0.02) 
 0.506*** 
(0.16) 
 0.070*** 
(0.03) 
Capital 
 
Size (log) 
 
Age 
 
OSS 
 
Bank risk  
 
NGO (dummy) 
 
Regulation (dummy) 
 
 
Constant 
 
-1.306*** 
(0.18) 
0.959*** 
(0.01)  
 -0.004** 
(0.00) 
-0.086 
(0.08) 
-1.007** 
(0.29) 
 -0.348*** 
(0.03) 
 -0.008** 
(0.00) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
 -0.035 
(0.02) 
-0.111* 
(0.06) 
-5.786*** 
(0.35) 
-0.018 
(0.04) 
 -0.011** 
(0.00) 
-0.359** 
(0.17) 
-0.249 
(0.47) 
 -0.452*** 
(0.04) 
 -0.002 
(0.01) 
 -0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.084** 
(0.04) 
-0.116 
(0.07) 
-0.011 
(0.06) 
0.025** 
(0.01) 
0.537*** 
(0.14) 
0.009* 
(0.02) 
0.155*** 
(0.06) 
 
0.429 
(0.34) 
0.028** 
(0.01) 
 
0.554*** 
(0.08) 
0.478*** 
(0.13) 
 
4.492*** 
(0.84) 
0.014* 
(0.02) 
 
 0.614*** 
(0.10) 
R2  
R2 Adjusted 
Probability F > 0 
Root MSE 
dfres 
BIC 
Number of observations 
0.88 
0.88 
0.00 
0.63 
527 
2315.4 
1163 
0.22 
0.20 
0.00 
0.14 
527 
-1248.6 
1163 
0.43 
0.42 
0.00 
1.25 
527 
3915.9 
1163 
0.21 
0.20 
0.00 
0.20 
527 
-383.9 
1163 
Stars indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Country-level fixed effects estimations with clustering at firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  LC is pure values of liquidity 
creation, deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  LC/GTA is LC scaled by total assets. LC/E is LC divided by equity.  LC/GLP is LC divided by gross loan portfolio. HHI is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,  indicating 
level of lending specialization. Capital is measured as equity ratio, size and age are logs of assets and years since establishment, bank risk the portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30).  Regulation and NGO and deposit 
insurance are dummies, indicating whether the MFI is formally regulated, and is for-profit. Operational self-sufficiency (OSS)  is the ratio of financial revenue divided by financial and operating expense, and 
impairment loss.  
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The results follow a similar trend to those observed in smaller traditional banks, where risk-
adjusted performance and diversification appear to be negatively correlated (e.g. DeYoung 
and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004).  
In a similar fashion, the smaller microfinancial intermediaries may better develop the 
expertise, methodological savvy and local understanding, which is required to successfully 
extend microfinancial loans, especially in rural markets, where larger institutions are 
typically too remote to understand the complex nuances in the client profiles. This 
argument becomes especially convincing, when backed by findings which suggest that an 
especially high level of joint lending is strongly and positively correlated with the level of 
liquidity creation in microfinance institutions (tables 4.14 and 4.15). 
I find that, when controlling for size, age and location, a high level of specialisation in the 
lending methodologies employed has a positive impact on the amount of liquidity created. 
This could be due to the level of complexity in microfinance lending, involving high levels of 
monitoring and evaluation, and that success in reaching as large a client base as possible 
without taking undue risk, requires a specialised knowledge that an institution offering too 
many lending constellations may have a harder time developing. 
The suggestion that more specialised institutions create more liquidity for the market has a 
number of potential implications on broader economic policy, as well as MFI strategy. If the 
mission statement of the MFI is concerned with contributing to the financial health of the 
region, my findings suggest that the MFI should concentrate on one loan strategy, as 
opposed to attempting to follow the client for a longer period of time. This may be in 
conflict with strategies of some commercial microfinance institutions, which otherwise have 
less incentive to let go of clients that, once they reach a certain size, technically no longer 
need microfinance assistance.  
From a public policy standpoint, two important findings emerge from my results. First, while 
microfinance institutions appear to create liquidity for the market along the same lines as 
traditional intermediaries, the amount is impacted by the level of specialisation evident in 
the MFI, when controlling for region, age, size, organisational structure and regulatory 
framework.   
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This suggests that strategies encouraging larger financial intermediaries to ‘dabble’ in 
microfinance on the side, for social as much as financial reasons, may not be the best 
strategy from a macroeconomic policy standpoint, unless the primary goal is social rather 
than financial.  
It should be noted, that less liquidity creation does not necessarily mean that the 
microfinance initiatives are unsuccessful in reaching their social goals. Rather, the 
measurement of liquidity creation serves as an indicator of the extent to which the MFIs 
perform as traditional financial intermediaries, and to what extent they help transform 
liquidity and funnel it to the market, thus having a possible impact on the general financial 
climate in their immediate region that goes beyond the individual lenders. 
It is possible that the benefits of diversification are more closely related to the range of loan 
products offered, than to the strategy employed to ensure repayment. The strong 
correlation between levels of liquidity creation and specialisation in methodological 
approach does not exclude the possibility that MFIs may successfully gain diversification 
benefits by expanding the range of loan products made available to their clients. Indeed, the 
findings in previous literature would suggest that this may well be the case (e.g. Stiroh, 
2004).  
However, what the results do suggest is that the financial intermediaries seeking to add 
microfinance to their lending practices as a way to either appease donor or state-level policy 
requirements may well find themselves performing worse than their competitors. 
Overcoming the asymmetrical information constraints so strongly present in microfinance is 
likely to require a higher degree of specialisation and local understanding than a financial 
intermediary primarily concerned with traditional individual loans may be able to devote to 
the sector.  
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5.5.2. Model 1:  Impact of Lending Methodologies on LC (Ratio) 
As was discussed earlier in the chapter, some research suggests  that  microfinance should 
not be able to function according to traditional economic wisdom, due to its high 
transaction cost and risk associated with collateral-free lending (e.g. De Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005; Conning and Morduch, 2011). The authors propose that the reason it does 
so anyhow, is due to its ability to address the problems arising from asymmetrical 
information, thus lowering the cost and risk associated with microfinancial activity. 
MFIs address issues of adverse selection and asymmetrical information by using innovative 
lending strategies, in which a group or a community is mutually liable for the loans of other 
members in the group. The strategy enables the MFI to gain access to more detailed 
information on the lending behaviour of group members, and pushes a large chunk of the 
time and cost associated with the monitoring of repayments, onto the group or community 
itself, since it is in their own interest to ensure prompt and adequate repayment from 
everyone. 
In model 1, I estimate a simple ratio of the particular lending strategy to the total loan 
portfolio (table 4.14). The results are positive and strongly significant for all 4 measurements 
of liquidity creation, with regard to both total joint lending and group lending alone. 
Individual lending, however, is either insignificant or negative.  
These results support the theoretical suggestion that lending strategy helps increase 
liquidity creation for the market, by mitigating risk and reducing auditing and transaction 
cost for the intermediary. Also, in support of this, the insignificant and negative results for 
individual lending suggests that this strategy does not have the same effect, due to the lack 
of peer monitoring and social capital.72 
 
 
 
                                                          
72
 I do not include a variable for village baking on its own, because the dataset does not provide enough 
observations to estimate any reliable results.  The regressions run return positive but insignificant results, with 
low adjusted r-squared (below 0.10), and no values for P > F. 
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Table 5.5: The Impact of Lending Strategy on Liquidity Creation 
 
  
 
  LC (log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GPL 
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Lending strategy: 
Joint lending (ratio) 0.204**      0.054***     0.244*     0.108***     
-0.08     -0.02     -0.1     -0.03     
Group lending (ratio)   0.244***      0.061***     0.363**     0.131***   
  -0.08     -0.02     -0.17     -0.04   
Individual lending (ratio)     0.05     -0.008     -0.12     -0.039* 
    -0.07     -0.02     -0.14     -0.02 
Capital -1.235*** -1.318*** -1.527*** -0.337*** -0.371*** -0.370*** -4.920*** -4.887*** -5.572*** -0.458*** -0.485*** -0.495*** 
-0.2 -0.21 -0.21 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.43 -0.44 -0.42 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Size (log) 0.934*** 0.941*** 0.969*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.005 -0.061* -0.051* 0.029 -0.001 0.006 0.002 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Age 0.003 0.003 0.006***  0.001*  0.002** -0.001 0.008 0.011 -0.014** 0.002 0.002 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bank risk  -0.874** -0.942** -1.231*** 0.024 0.045 -0.092 0.321 0.741 -0.05 0.393* 0.460* 0.001 
-0.42 -0.44 -0.37 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.61 -0.65 -0.43 -0.22 -0.24 -0.1 
OSS -0.015 -0.012 -0.038 -0.011 0.006 -0.025* -0.133 -0.039 -0.304* -0.054 -0.033 -0.071* 
-0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.1 -0.1 -0.16 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
NGO -0.072 -0.067 -0.082 0.016* 0.014* 0.012 0.344** 0.323** 0.402*** 0.035* 0.037* 0.032* 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Regulation 0.227*** 0.212*** 0.074 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.020*  0.467*** 0.598*** 0.378*** 0.057** 0.067*** 0.019 
-0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
  
Constant 0.289 0.277 0.294  0.521*** 0.485*** 0.448*** 4.329*** 3.877*** 3.263*** 0.406*** 0.338** 0.471*** 
-0.38 -0.38 -0.28 -0.09 -0.09 -0.1 -0.98 -1.03 -0.8 -0.1 -0.14 -0.13 
R2  0.86 0.87 0.88 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.44 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.28 0.24 
R2 Adjusted 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.2 0.26 0.21 0.42 0.44 0.38 0.21 0.25 0.22 
Probability F > 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Root MSE 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.13 0.12 0.12 1.19 1.15 1.18 0.22 0.21 0.19 
dfres 361 331 511 361 331 511 361 331 511 361 331 511 
BIC 1599.6 1405.9 2422.4 -865.3 -867.1 -1489.5 2633.9 2283.8 3876 -92.6 -111.5 -503.5 
Number of observations 797 705 1195 797 705 1195 797 705 1195 797 705 1195 
Stars *, **, and ***indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.  Country-level fixed effects estimations with clustering at firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  LC is pure values of liquidity creation, 
deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  LC/GTA is LC scaled by total assets. LC/E is LC divided by equity.  LC/GLP is LC divided by gross loan portfolio. Joint, Group and Individual lending (ratio) are  the ratios of that particular type 
of lending practice (joint, group, individual) to total loans. Capital is measured as equity ratio, size and age are logs of assets and years since establishment, bank risk the portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30). Regulation and NGO are 
dummies, indicating whether the MFI is formally regulated and is for-profit. Operational self-sufficiency (OSS)  is the ratio of financial revenue divided by financial and operating expense, and impairment loss. 
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The results of model 1 present a positive relationship between scaled levels of liquidity 
created for the market, and the use of joint lending practices. This is especially true for the 
group loan methodology, where my estimations are significant at the 1 or 5% for all 4 
measurements of LC.  Group loans are believed to help increase repayment rates and 
address adverse selection issues, by allowing the MFI access to reliable information on the 
risk-willingness of the group members. Because the members are reliant on the timely 
repayment of the other group members, it is in their own interest to screen, monitor and 
enforce the deadlines set forth by the MFI, lest they risk being subject to sanctions 
themselves, and be barred from future loans (Morduch, 1998; The World Bank, 2006). 
Unlike the group loan estimations, the results for joint lending, while positive and 
significant, are less consistent. Although this may be due to the noise described above, it is 
likely be increased insignificance from village loans, which are included in the variable for 
joint lending.  Due to the low amount of available observations for village loans however, I 
am unable to confirm this with village-only estimations.  
Theoretically, while some literature suggests that village banking could help reduce agency 
issues and solve asymmetrical information constraints; other authors differ, and find results 
supporting the tentative results above. De Aghion and Morduch (2005), for example, argue 
that village banking should act like other forms of joint lending, due to its ability to reduce 
credit rationing issues, but the empirical evidence suggests that it may not be that 
straightforward.73  In their 2007 study, Cassar et al. found that superficial social information 
was not enough to increase repayment rates amongst group lenders (Cassar et al., 2007).  
In the case of village banking, it is possible that the social ties present in the community are 
not always strong enough to increase repayment rates, and with it, lower the risk for the 
MFI. If the screening and monitoring abilities of the community are not strong enough, the 
cost associated with the village loans may not always be enough to cause a significant 
increase in the amount of liquidity created for the market, by the MFIs. This may be because 
users of village banking feel less directly responsible to each other than a group lending set-
up. 
                                                          
73
 See section 4.2 on salient literature for further details. 
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5.5.3. Model 2: Impact of Lending Methodologies on LC (Dummies) 
In model 1, I investigate the impact of lending strategies, by defining 3 separate dummies 
for MFIs which hold a high level of individual, group and joint liability loans (table 4.15). As 
with model 1, I find very strong and consistently positive correlations between levels of 
liquidity creation and MFIs specialised in joint lending and group loans, while controlling for 
size, age, capital, bank risk, profit-status and regulation, and regional differences constant 
over time.  The results here are significant at 1% for all scaled values of LC. Individual loans 
are consistently insignificant and at times negative, except for pure, deflated LC values. This 
is unsurprising, as individual loans are much more prevalent with larger MFI institutions, 
while joint lending practices are more often found in small and medium MFIs. 
My results confirm the findings of previous empirical work, which found better repayment 
rates for MFIs using group lending methodologies.74 The reduction of asymmetrical 
information and risk of adverse selection, through increased access to reliable information 
on the risk profile of the individual group members, helps decrease the risk associated with 
collateral-free microloans. Additionally, the delegation of some of the screening and 
monitoring activities needed to ensure timely repayment reduces the cost for the MFI. The 
decreased risk means that the MFI is able to facilitate illiquid loans to its clients, which 
would previously have been too risky and too costly for the institution.   
                                                          
74
 See, for example, Sharma and Zeller, 1997; Wydick, 2001 and Hermes et. al, 2005. 
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Table 5.6: The Impact of Lending Technology on Liquidity Creation 
 
  LC (log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GPL 
Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C Model A Model B Model C 
Lending technology 
Joint lending (dummy) 0.200*** 
    
0.038*** 
    
0.145** 
    
0.064*** 
    
-0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 
Group lending (dummy) 
  
0.191*** 
    
0.037*** 
    
 0.149* 
    
0.081*** 
  
-0.07 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 
Individual lending (dummy) 
    
0.094 
    
0.013 
    
0.148 
    
-0.002 
-0.06 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 
Control Variables 
Capital -1.246*** -1.320*** -1.466*** -0.325*** -0.336*** -0.358*** -4.915*** -4.482*** -5.423*** -0.455*** -0.484*** -0.480*** 
-0.19 -0.21 -0.21 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.43 -0.45 -0.42 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
Size (log) 0.933*** 0.937*** 0.973*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.004 -0.065 -0.061 0.038 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0 0 0 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Age 0.003 0.004 -0.006*** 0.001* 0.002** -0.001 0.008 0.011 -0.014*** 0.001 0.002 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.01 0 0 0 0 
Bank risk -0.857** -0.986** -1.257** 0.021 0.032 -0.098 0.294 0.659 -0.128 0.381* 0.433* 0.009 
-0.4 -0.44 -0.37 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.62 -0.66 -0.45 -0.22 -0.24 -0.1 
OSS -0.012 -0.011 -0.038 0.011 0.06 -0.025* -0.133 -0.043 -0.308* -0.054 -0.035 -0.072* 
-0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.1 -0.1 -0.16 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
NGO (dummy) 0.071 0.075 -0.081 0.018* 0.013* 0.012 0.350** 0.33 0.405*** 0.001 0.003 0.035 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Regulation (dummy) 0.238*** 0.211*** 0.071 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.019 0.459*** 0.571*** 0.359*** 0.053** 0.061** 0.015 
-0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  
Constant 0.263 0.357 0.169 0.540*** 0.519*** 0.421*** 4.461*** 4.133*** 2.924*** 0.465*** 0.410*** 0.430*** 
-0.39 -0.39 -0.28 -0.09 -0.09 -0.1 -0.98 -1.02 -0.84 -0.14 -0.15 -0.13 
R2  0.86 0.87 0.88 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.44 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.27 0.23 
R2 Adjusted 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.2 0.25 0.21 0.42 0.44 0.38 0.21 0.24 0.22 
Probability F > 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Root MSE 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.13 0.12 0.12 1.19 1.15 1.17 0.22 0.21 0.19 
dfres 361 331 511 361 331 511 361 331 511 361 331 511 
BIC 1594.1 1406.1 2416.8 -863.1 -860 -1491.8 3625.2 2288 3873.2 2635.2 -100.7 -497.8 
Number of observations 797 705 1195 797 705 1195 797 705 1195 797 705 1195 
Stars *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.  Country-level fixed effects estimations with clustering at firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  LC is pure values of liquidity creation, 
deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  LC/GTA is LC scaled by total assets. LC/E is LC divided by equity.  LC/GLP is LC divided by gross loan portfolio. Joint, Group and Individual lending (ratio) are dummies of that particular type of 
lending practice (joint, group, individual). Capital is measured as equity ratio, size and age are logs of assets and years since establishment, bank risk the portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30). Regulation and NGO are dummies, indicating 
whether the MFI is formally regulatedand is for.. Operational self-sufficiency (OSS)  is the ratio of financial revenue divided by financial and operating expense, and impairment loss. 
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I propose that group loans can help increase the amount of liquidity created for the market, 
by addressing the increased costs and risks arising from a lack of strong financial systems, 
absence of adequate credit registries, as well as the lack of the traditional protection given 
by collateral in regular banks (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The unique lending methodologies 
employed by microfinance institutions thus enable the MFIs to not just function as a social 
tool for poverty reduction in development regions, but perform a key financial function in 
areas and for clients usually unreachable by traditional financial intermediaries. 
The types of services required by individual clients and groups differ in significant ways, one 
of the more prevalent being the type and intensity of monitoring and evaluation required by 
the MFI.  In the case of joint lending, the microfinance institution is able to save costs on the 
intensive monitoring of the individual client, but due to the higher levels of poverty amongst 
its clients, may face higher costs for the training of both staff and clientele. My findings also 
suggest that it may be problematic if an MFI refuses let go of a profitable client, once they 
have grown too a certain size, if the institution primarily handles group and village loans. If 
the potential strain on limited capital that would come from trying to sustain a client grown 
too large is ignored, the set of requirements needed to service individual customers could 
hurt the MFI in the long run.  
The results of both model 1 and 2 support the suggestion by Morduch and others, that joint 
lending methodologies help the MFIs to successfully extend microloans to the previously 
unbanked. It increases the amount of liquidity created for the market, by addressing issues 
related to asymmetrical information and high transaction costs (De Aghion and Morduch, 
2005). A reduction of asymmetrical information issues within the MFIs enables the bank to 
extend additional loans to client previously considered too risky, thus raising the levels of 
liquidity created (Nghiem, 2007).  Equally, my findings are in line with  research by Ngo 
(2012), which suggests that the use of joint lending practices have a significant impact on 
lending cost, capital held by the MFI and amount of loans extended.  
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5.6. Conclusions 
Summing up my main findings, the main results suggest that, when controlling for size, age 
and location, a high level of specialisation in the lending methodologies employed, has a 
positive impact on the amount of liquidity created. This could be due to the level of 
complexity in microfinance lending, involving high levels of monitoring and evaluation, and 
that success in reaching as large a client base as possible without taking undue risk, requires 
a specialised knowledge that an institution offering too many lending constellations may 
have a harder time developing. 
The suggestion that more specialised institutions create more liquidity for the market has a 
number of potential implications on broader economic policy, as well as MFI strategy. If the 
mission statement of the MFI is concerned with contributing to the financial health of the 
region, my findings suggest that the MFI should concentrate on one loan strategy, as 
opposed to attempting to follow the client for a longer period of time. This may be in 
conflict with strategies of some commercial microfinance institutions, which otherwise have 
less incentive to let go of clients that, once they reach a certain size, technically no longer 
need microfinance assistance.  
From a public policy standpoint, two important findings emerge from my results. First, while 
microfinance institutions appear to create liquidity for the market along the same lines as 
traditional intermediaries, the amount is impacted by the level of specialisation evident in 
the MFI, when controlling for region, age, size, for-profit strategy and regulatory context.  
This suggests that strategies encouraging larger financial intermediaries to ‘dabble’ in 
microfinance on the side, for social as much as financial reasons, may not be the best 
strategy from a macroeconomic policy standpoint, unless the primary goal is social rather 
than financial.  
 
It should be noted, that less liquidity creation does not necessarily mean that the 
microfinance initiatives are unsuccessful in reaching their social goals. Rather, the 
measurement of liquidity creation serves as an indicator of the extent to which the MFIs 
perform as traditional financial intermediaries, and to what extent they help transform 
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liquidity and funnel it to the market, thus having a possible impact on the general financial 
climate in their immediate region that goes beyond the individual lenders. 
  
5.6.1. The impact of Lending Methodology on LC 
My estimations show a significant and positive relationship between joint lending 
methodologies and levels of liquidity created by the MFIs. The results support the 
theoretical suggestion that microfinance manages to operate successfully despite lack of 
collateral and in spite of high transaction costs, by the diminishing of asymmetrical 
information as a direct effect of group lending in particular, and joint liability lending in 
general.  The risk of adverse selection is significantly reduced, at least for group 
constellations in which members of the group share/have access to reliable information on 
the risk profiles of their fellow group members. Because it is in their own immediate interest 
to ensure timely repayment, the cost of screening and monitoring for the MFI is drastically 
reduced, as is the level of risk involved in the loan process. With the diminished risk, comes 
the ability of the MFI to extend illiquid loans to customers, who would have been deemed 
too risky and too costly by traditional financial intermediaries, resulting in increased levels 
of liquidity being created for the market. 
There are a number of policy implications following this finding. First and foremost is the 
fact that from a market perspective, the true strength of microfinance is found in the 
smaller joint lending schemes, and not necessarily larger individual customers.   
Second, because joint liability lending is often a specialty trait of smaller MFIs, it may also be 
important to take a second look at the type of institutions, both in terms of size and type. 
Both type and size are primary characteristics regularly considered by policymakers, when 
trying to decipher how financial organisations may provide positive impact upon the meso- 
and macro environment, to encourage growth in the sector. 
Finally, due to correlation between liquidity creation and specialisation in MFIs, the push for 
ever-larger and more formalised microfinance actors may not be the way to go.  Larger 
financial institutions will not necessarily have the specialised knowledge of local clientele 
and best lending approaches in a specific context, and therefore not be able to address the 
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issues arising from asymmetric information and adverse selection the way smaller and more 
localised institutions can.75 Given the finite amount of capital available for investment in 
MFIs and MFI activities, increased investment in specialised MFIs, local and non-profit, may 
prove to have a bigger impact on the financial level of liquidity created for the market, than 
trying to persuade more traditional intermediaries to move into the sector.  
The push toward commercialization in general in microfinance is also somewhat concerning, 
given the results found here. Recent studies have found that the continued 
commercialization of the microfinance sector has caused a marked decline in joint lending 
methodologies being employed by MFIs (de Quidt et al., 2016). Given their consistent and 
highly significant impact on levels liquidity creation, the move beyond non-profit 
microfinance may have severe and unintended impact, on both social welfare and the ability 
of MFIs to function as liquidity creators for their market.  
                                                          
75
 An example of this is the Danish aid agency DANIDA’s push for CRDB, a near-insolvent Tanzanian bank, to 
engage in microfinance in 2009, in the exchange for much needed capital. The bank became a first-mover in a 
young microfinance market, its sheer size and blanket guarantee from DANIDA causing a significant 
competitive distortion of the market (Jensen, 2009) 
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6. Regulation, Liquidity Creation and Capital Stringency 
in Microfinance 
 
The financial sector is a dynamic entity, which evolves and is reshaped as the requirements 
and degree of intervention from the external environment changes. Especially after the 
bank crisis of 2008, attention has returned to the discussion of how to ensure a prudent 
regulatory framework within which an efficient financial sector can work (e.g. Barth et al., 
2007; Cull et al., 2009; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Berger et al., 2011). The debate, in 
academic, practitioner and policymaker circles, ranges from the scale and scope of 
regulatory supervision, to the structure, cost and degree of independence afforded to the 
individual actor. 
The debate is no less important in the study of developing and emerging markets, where the 
macro-environment is often unstable and societies frequently have less power to ensure 
healthy behaviour from the financial institutions operating within their region. The debate, 
both in development and traditional banking literature, is often sensitive to the underlying 
political discourse, as the degree of state intervention in economic activity is one of the 
pillars of most political ideology. For this reason, it is little wonder that regulatory findings 
and recommendations are rarely cohesive or conclusive.  
As discussed in detail in chapter 2, the evidence of regulatory impact in microfinance is 
furthermore not clear. Some findings suggest that a stronger regulatory framework helps 
reduce risk, thus increasing the performance of the actors affected (Ly, 2013).  Others find 
that regulation curtails the efforts of institutions and is often poorly or inefficiently applied, 
ultimately having negative impact on the ability of institutions to operate efficiently 
(Hartarska and Mersland, 2012).  Still others argue that it depends on the type of 
organisation: deposit-taking institutions should be subject to regulatory guidelines and 
intervention, while institutions which rely strictly on donations and income from interest, 
should not (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). Regardless of the political disagreements on 
best practice, the issue and the debate are important. Policies that fail to provide a 
functioning and enabling environment for the financial sector may undermine activities 
within the sector or allow financial crises to develop, which could have been prevented with 
prudent regulatory systems in place. 
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While the body of existing literature has looked at the relationship between regulation and 
traditional financial performance, the impact of regulation and supervision on the ability of 
microfinance institutions to create liquidity for the financial markets in developing regions 
has yet to be studied. The context is particularly interesting, given that some studies suggest 
that MFIs still operate outside the traditional financial markets in their respective countries, 
and as such may be less vulnerable to financial shock (Gonzalez-Vega, 1995; Gonzalez, 2011; 
Chapra, 2009 and 2010; Krauss and Walter, 2009). However, at the same time, the current 
heated debate on the identity and future of microfinance suggests increased pressure on 
MFIs to adapt and merge with the traditional financial sector, thus becoming subject to the 
same regulatory framework. 
If regulation curtails the ability of MFIs to produce liquidity for the poorest in the market, it 
would be prudent for policymakers to treat the microfinance sector separately from the 
traditional financial market. However, if regulation helps reduce risk for MFIs and guide 
their growth and economic development in a way that is healthy for both institution and the 
macro-environment, the policymakers should take this into account, especially if MFIs 
appear to be less vulnerable to financial shock than larger, more traditional intermediaries. 
If they are consistently less affected, their presence could help extend some of the capital 
withheld by traditional banks, in a time of crisis. In either scenario, it is important to gain 
further insight into the relationship between regulation and liquidity creation in developing 
markets.   
The previous chapters in this thesis have used regulation as a control, while studying the 
impact of traditional bank characteristics and traits unique to MFI institutions, and both 
seemed to indicate a persistent positive correlation between regulatory status and liquidity 
creation.  In this chapter, however, I take a closer look at the regulatory framework, and 
attempt to identify exactly what mechanisms within it drive the positive correlation with LC.  
In addition, I used Barth’s updated index, based on World Bank surveys from 2003, 2007 and 
2011, to identify the specific mechanisms within the regulatory framework, which impacts 
levels of LC (Barth et al., 2013). The chapter thus contributes to the existing literature, by 
providing further insight into the impact of regulation on financial activity in general, and in 
the context of development research in particular. In addition, it provides a first insight into 
the dynamics between regulation and supervision of the microfinance sector, and its impact 
on MFI liquidity creation. 
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Because there are huge geographical differences in the scale and scope of applied 
regulation, I use a two-tiered approach to cast light on regulation from different angles.  
First, I estimate the impact of regulation and supervision, using a cross-country approach, 
with MIX panel data, similar to the models used in the previous 2 chapters. Second, I split 
the sample into regional pools, and look at the impact of regulation in Latin America, Africa 
and South Asia respectively.76  
Consistent with the findings presented in the previous two chapters, I observe a strong, 
positive correlation between regulated status and level of liquidity creation. Across all 4 
measurements for LC used, I find no negative correlation between the level of capital 
stringency imposed and levels of liquidity created by the individual MFI. In addition, LC 
measurements are negatively associated with increased risk-taking, if not consistently 
correlated. 
The findings suggest that improved regulatory frameworks may help reduce external risk for 
microfinance institutions, and increase their ability to extend liquidity to the surrounding 
market. From a policy point of view, this is important, because capital requirements and the 
imposition of supervisory standards often come under fire for curtailing the ability of 
financial institutions to act optimally to changing conditions in the financial market.  
However, based on the consistent results and strength of correlation, it appears that the 
benefits from increased stability and safety brought by better regulatory frameworks should 
outweigh the concerns about limited MFI movement. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 provides an overview of the key literature 
on regulation in general, and in development in particular. The section also provides a brief 
discussion of the particulars of the selected regions studied. Based on the discussion and 
identified gap in literature, the research question and hypothesis are discussed in 6.2. 6.3 
presents the empirical models, and 6.4 discusses the use and limitations of the data sample.  
I present my results in section 6.5 and offer some concluding remarks on the implications 
for policy and practice in 6.6. 
 
                                                          
76
 A country-level tier was considered as well, but ultimately rejected due to data sparsity.  
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6.1. Literature 
In the following, I briefly discuss the key literature on regulation, with particular focus on 
the impact of regulatory and supervisory systems in developing countries. While chapter 2 
also briefly discusses regulation as it pertains to macroeconomic impact research in 
microfinance, the following provides additional depth to the discussion, and by focusing on 
empirical findings. 
I define regulation here as the presence of a set of laws and rulesets, applicable to the 
banking sector in general, or the microfinance sector in particular, which is put in place to 
ensure prudential activity on the part of the MFIs, by restricting the behaviour of the 
industry.  Under the regulatory umbrella, supervision is further specified as the monitoring 
of bank activity by the regulatory agencies, as well as the enforcement of the regulatory 
framework.77  
 
Microfinance institutions are not homogenous in their organisational structure, and range 
from commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions, to credit unions and 
cooperatives, as well as non-profit non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The 
intermediaries can thus be both regulated and unregulated, and operate in countries which 
have very different levels of regulatory frameworks and supervisory mechanisms. 
 
 
6.1.1. Monopolies, Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard 
According to Freixas and Rochet, regulation is primarily needed to address the risk of market 
failure, due to asymmetric information, negative external influence and market powers 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008).78  Due to the lack of alternative financial providers in the rural 
areas within which MFIs often operate in, there can be cases where MFIs effectively end up 
operating as monopolies in their respective local environment (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 
2007). The presence of a limited number of actors in the microfinance market can be 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, some literature has suggested that the absence 
                                                          
77
 For further discussion of the definition of regulation and supervision, please see Llewellyn, 2001; Spong, 
2001 and Ly, 2013.  
78
 For further in-depth discussions on regulation in traditional banking, see Dowd (1996), Benston and Kaufman 
(1996), Goodhart et al. (2013) and Barth et al. (2004).  
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of competition is negatively correlated with financial performance of MFIs (Cull et al., 
2009b). Second, and equally important, competition is, especially for commercial MFIs, one 
of the primary incentives to keep interest rates from reaching usurious levels (Fernando, 
2006). 
Certain state interventions attempt to address this, by creating a regulatory framework 
which encourages competition and helps ease the entry-level barriers for new industry 
initiatives and pushes interest levels down. These have historically included the prevention 
of monopoly pricing through caps on interest levels. Critics of regulation have since argued 
that this form of intervention caused banks to focus their attention on richer clients to save 
on screening and monitoring costs, which resulted in a shift of resources from poor to rich 
clients.  Furthermore, the same rich clients often nevertheless defaulted on their subsidised 
credit loans, causing the entire system to fail over time (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; 
Gonzalez-Vega, 1999). 
In addition to the prevention of monopoly, regulation is often put in place to address issues 
arising from information asymmetry between the financial institutions and its depositors 
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008).  Depositors require a certain measure of protection because 
they as a unit have access to incomplete information and cannot effectively monitor the 
decision- making of the bank’s managers. Some literature argues that regulation is able to 
protect the depositors and their interests, by defining the framework for bank decision-
making, typically through regulation related to institutional solvency (Dewatripoint and 
Tirole, 1994; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). 
Voices critical of regulation caution against the risk of raising entry-level costs, especially in 
fledgling industries, and some argue that the presence of formal regulation may cause moral 
hazard. By reducing the risk for the financial institution, it is suggested that regulation may 
encourage rather than limit risky behaviour (Macey and O’Hara, 2003; Christen et al., 2004). 
In developing economies, the counter-argument is that regulation ultimately lowers cost by 
reducing external uncertainty and risk, and though findings cover the entire range of 
possible outcomes, there is general consensus that the external context and environment is 
important when studying the behaviour of financial institutions (Gorton and Winton, 2002; 
Mersland and Strøm, 2008)  
In the specific context of MFIs, the understanding of regulatory influence becomes 
increasingly important because of the diversity in institutional makeup, size and primary 
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mission objectives (Hartarska and Mersland, 2012). Furthermore, some literature argues 
that the increased push for formalisation and commercialisation of microfinance 
intermediaries may be a mistake. The argument is that formalised networks of microfinance 
institutions may hold an interest in promoting regulatory frameworks in order to reduce 
new competition by raising entry barriers into the market, and steering investments from 
state actors and donors toward a smaller number already well-established actors (McIntosh 
and Widyck, 2005; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007).  
Increasing our understanding of what constitutes satisfactory performance for the individual 
MFI will help inform the decision-making process for policy-makers, and help design 
prudential regulatory strategies, regardless of what that strategy may be.   
 
6.1.2. The Regulation of Capital Stringency 
Capital requirement is one of the most important areas of financial regulation, in that it is 
directly related to the intermediary’s risk management strategies, and its ability to absorb 
shock (Thakor, 2013). As link between lender and investor, the very function of banks and 
other financial intermediaries is to shoulder the worst of the risk associate with maturity 
and liquidity transformations (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Hellwig, 1994). However, 
while there is general agreement that the area is a key portion of the very reason to have 
banks in the first place, there is little consensus on what, if any, formal regulatory 
frameworks should be put in place to ensure prudent capital ratios. 
Recent literature, using the Berger and Bouwman measurement of liquidity creation, is a 
2013 study of Czech banks from 2002 to 2010, by Horvath, Seidler and Weill (Horvath et al., 
2013).  The authors look specifically at the causal relationship between capital and liquidity 
creation, by running a series of Granger-causality tests.  
Like Berger and Bouwman, they find a consistent increase of liquidity creation through the 
observed period, and note negative impact on liquidity creation by capital in the Czech 
banks, which fall within the ‘small’ category of Berger and Bouwman. They also find a 
negative impact of liquidity creation on capital, and argue that too high levels of liquidity 
creation can be detrimental to the financial health of the intermediary as well, suggesting a 
trade-off relationship between the liquidity created by the intermediary, and its financial 
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stability.  Tighter capital requirements appear to reduce the level of liquidity created, but 
alternatively, high levels of liquidity creation may impair the solvency of the intermediary 
(Horvath et al., 2013; Diamond and Rajan, 2001). 
However, other literature does not support the suggestion that tighter formal capital 
requirements necessarily affect the performance of financial intermediaries. Rather, in 
recent empirical studies it has been associated with higher levels of liquidity creation, higher 
resistance to shocks, higher bank values and higher lending (Holström and Tirole, 1998; 
Berger et al., 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2009; Mehran and Thakor, 2011). Since higher 
leverage is associated with higher systemic risk, Thakor argues that higher capital ratio 
requirements are necessary to reduce the potential for a sovereign debt crisis, by 
strengthening the ‘in-house’ deposit insurance with mandatory held capital (Thakor, 2013). 
 
6.1.3. Regulation and Liquidity Creation 
In 2011, the International Monetary Fund noted that banks typically failed in the 2008 
financial crisis due to poor liquidity management and too heavy reliance on short-term 
wholesale funding, which accelerated the failure of weakened banks and financial 
institutions (IMF, 2012). Previous research suggests that various regulatory and supervisory 
systems impacted the performance and risk profile of the affected financial intermediaries 
(e.g. Thakor, 2013; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Barth et al., 2013).   
Understanding the relationship between regulation and liquidity creation in a development 
context is important for two reasons. First, the cost associated with creating and enforcing 
prudent regulation and supervision is substantial, especially in a developing country. The 
literature evaluating the relative cost of regulatory systems against the impact of regulation 
does not, however, present conclusive results (e.g.  Barth et al., 2004). A 2003 study by Steel 
and Andah, examining the cost and impact of regulation in Ghana, found that the cost in 
fact can get so high that it may not be worth the resulting impact on financial behaviour 
(Steel and Andah, 2003). However, studies of regulation in Latin America found that the 
benefits of strong regulation well outweighed the associated cost (e.g. Gonzales-Vega, 1995; 
Theodore and Loubiere, 2002).  
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Second, the nature of the correlation regulation and performance parameters such as 
liquidity creation is a strong indicator to policymakers of how the most efficient regulatory 
framework should look and operate. In investigating the relationship between regulation 
and bank performance, Barth et al. found there does not appear to be correlation between 
bank performance and regulatory power (Barth et al., 2013). Echoing similar findings for the 
microfinance sector, Hartaska finds that regulation does not appear to have significant 
impact on the level of operational self-sustainability in MFIs (Hatarska and Nadolnyak, 
2007). However, Hartarska does note that regulation has an impact on outreach and deposit 
levels, a finding that is likely to influence the level of liquidity created by the MFI. 
Studies have observed a negative relationship between bank performance and traditional 
banking institutions holding large amounts of liquid assets (Ly, 2013; Arif and Nauman, 
2012; Bordeleau and Graham, 2010).  However, this does not mean that that the impact of 
prudent regulation and supervisory impact is necessarily negative. In fact, some of the same 
studies also found that regulatory and supervisory policies impacting the risk-taking 
behaviour of the intermediaries were positively related to bank performance (Ly, 2013). The 
same study finds a negative relationship between deposit-insurance and performance, 
though results from other studies appear to contradict this (e.g. Schaefer and Deep, 2004). 
 
The majority of studies seeking to evaluate the impact of regulation and supervision in 
microfinance focus on one particular country or cluster of countries, or one particular case. 
The limited focus follows the argument that because of the significant differences between 
regions and countries, it is questionable whether experience from one geographical region 
may be transferred to another.79  Because the state of the ‘enabling environment’ varies 
from region to region, and country to country, universal statements about regulation hold 
little value (Cuevas, 1996). However, other research argues that a cross-country approach 
can be used, because institutional quality has been shown to impact overall economic 
growth (Hatarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Assane and Grammy, 2003).  
Empirical literature studying the relationship between liquidity creation and the impact of 
regulatory frameworks is still extremely scarce. However, Berger et al. provided some first 
insights, using data from Germany over a 10 year period. The authors find that both 
                                                          
79
 For surveys of case study literature on regulation, see Brau and Woller (2004), and Arun and Hulme (2008). 
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regulation and capital support reduce the bank’s risk aversion, and argue that this in turn 
leads to lower levels of liquidity creation (Berger et al., 2016). 
However, other research suggests that results may vary significantly based on size and the 
external conditions that the intermediaries operate in. Distinguin et al. found that in US and 
European publicly traded commercial banks, smaller banks behaved significantly differently 
from larger banks when it came to liquidity creation and behaviour when facing increased 
illiquidity, thus requiring a nuanced regulatory framework (Distinguin et al., 2013). 
In other literature, the need for regulation of capital requirements is discussed.  Theoretical 
literature disagrees on the need for higher capital requirements in financial intermediaries, 
but the empirical evidence suggests that higher capital requirements are associated with 
higher levels of liquidity creation, as well as better ability to absorb shock (Thakor, 2014). 
Ultimately, however, the existing peer-reviewed literature has focused on intermediaries 
operating in well-developed financial markets, where the impact of regulation may take on 
a different role than in less-developed and riskier markets.   
The following expands the existing knowledge, by providing some first insights into the 
impact of regulation on small financial intermediaries, specifically in a developing and 
emerging market context. This study incorporates and tests the relationship between 
liquidity creation and regulation using cross-country results, as well as data subsets limited 
geographically to region (Latin America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa). 
 
6.1.4. Regulation in Latin America 
The Latin American region covers 41 countries, with fairly diverse levels of economic and 
financial market development. Compared to other emerging and developing regions, 
however, Latin America’s economic growth and development is generally considered strong. 
The region got through the 2008 financial crisis reasonably well, and has had consistent and 
stable economic growth over the last few decades (Lewis et al., 2015). In terms of financial 
infrastructure, mobile networks and regulatory meso-level institutions, the region generally 
fares well. 
The region is not without challenges, however. Latin America is, along with Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the region with the highest income inequality of the 6 developing regions defined by 
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the MIXMarket database80, a gap especially evident in Brazil and Chile, which also represent 
the stronger economies of the region (Martinez, 2015; Lewis et al., 2015). 
Latin America has one of the higher levels of financial access amongst developing and 
emerging markets, with 39.2% of adults having some form of account with a formal financial 
intermediary (Martinez, 2015).  However, according to CGAP it is still more common to take 
an informal loan with friends and family, than with a formal financial institution (27.2% vs 
8.6%), and mobile payments remain at just above 1% (Martinez, 2015; Faz and Breluff, 
2012). Nevertheless, while there is consensus that Latin America’s financial infrastructure is 
generally good and continues to improve, whether the regulatory systems put in place help 
or hinder the region’s microfinancial activities, is a matter of some debate.  
Some research and practitioner reports suggests that the benefits of regulation in the region 
may not outweigh its costs (e.g. Theodore and Loubiere, 2002; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 
2007), while others find regulation of especially deposit-taking institutions crucial, pointing 
out that its absence can become extremely costly (e.g. Wright, 2000; Chaves and Gonzalez-
Vega, 1994).  However, most academic and practitioner research find a wide array of both 
opportunities and challenges for microfinance in the region (e.g. Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 
2007; Lewis et al., 2015; Christen, 2002). The region has shown continuous growth of its 
financial sector and infrastructure. The number of formal bank accounts rose by 12% from 
2011 to 2014, and in 2014, Latin America grew its mobile financial accounts and 
infrastructure more than any other region globally (Crowther, 2015; GSMA, 2015). In 
addition, GSMA found that an impressive 27% of the mobile transfers were so-called “eco-
system transfers”, which involve a third party, such as a merchant or bill payment (GSMA, 
2015).  
This development has been supported by the implementation of a number of recent 
regulatory changes, developed to encouraged diversification of financial service providers 
(Lewis et al., 2015). However, despite this, there are still areas in need of increased 
transparency and strengthened enabling infrastructure, such as supporting meso-level 
institutions (Gonzalez and Rosenberg, 2006). 
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 These regions are: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (EECA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA) and East Asia and Pacific (EAP). 
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6.1.5. Regulation in East and South Asia 
Generally, both East and South Asia are considered some of the better developed regions in 
terms of microfinance infrastructure, access and regulatory framework (APF, 2017).  While 
the national actors are very diverse and come with unique perspectives on modern financial 
development, a common trait in microfinance is the evidence of a generally prosperous and 
innovative sector, despite tumultuous events at times disrupting the move forward 
(Demigüc-Kunt et al., 2017; APF, 2017).  
India houses one of the fastest growing microfinance industries globally, but has recently 
struggled to deal with examples of usurious lending practices deepening rather than 
relieving client debt, as well as cases of extensive state corruption in parts of the country 
(APF, 2017). 
In Bangladesh, the industry continues to do well, but has also experienced increased friction 
and struggles for control, especially between the state and the primary actor and first mover 
Grameen Bank (Kumar et al., 2015).  
In general, the South Asia region faces a microfinance market which is changing, and 
policymakers are being asked to adapt the current regulatory framework to new and 
increasingly complex realities. New products, technologies and methodologies are being 
introduced by the industry, and some parts of the region are adapting faster than others.  In 
Pakistan, the embrace of microfinance by mobile operators and the introduction of new 
commercial players have pushed industry growth forward (APF, 2017). 
Across the region, however, there is a continuous effort to improve the clarity and 
transparency of regulatory frameworks (Demigüc-Kunt et al., 2017; Kumar et al., 2015). 
Efforts to protect savings are quite well developed in South Asia, though recent 
recommendations to policymakers include cross-border streamlining of frameworks and 
data collection, as well as increased attention to the challenges and opportunities 
associated with a growing interest in and use of distributed ledger technology (DLT) in 
microfinance (APF, 2017). 
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6.1.6. Regulation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The Sub-Saharan region covers 41 countries on the African continent south of Sahara, and is 
the developing region which holds the highest levels of poverty; about 50% of the region’s 
inhabitants still live below $2 a day (UNDP, 2016). Poverty rates are in decline, but there is 
still a long way up to the average living standards of other emerging and developed markets 
around the globe. Despite the continuous struggles with deep poverty, and despite widely 
diverse tribal communities and culture, the region has, however, displayed continuous 
economic growth over the last decade (CGAP, 2016).  
Nevertheless, the list of challenges, both in terms of general economic development, and in 
relation to microfinance specifically, remains very long. The financial infrastructure in Sub-
Saharan Africa is weak, and there is an abject lack of registries and databases to help reduce 
institutional risk in lending (IMF, 2012). A significant portion of the adult population remains 
unbanked, with as few as approx. 34% holding a bank account with a formal financial 
intermediary; this is only half the amount of the global average (EIB, 2017).  
The institutions involved in microfinance in Sub-Saharan Africa are many and differ 
significantly in structure and objective. NGOs and rural banks operate in same environment 
as formal commercial banks, cooperatives and other for-profit financial intermediaries. The 
diversity in organisational makeup constitutes a significant challenge to policymakers, who 
are interested in streamlining regulatory and supervisory frameworks, both nationally and 
across the region. However, the (slow) rise of cross-country regional organisations may help 
over time, both in terms of highlighting the need for cross-national streamlining of 
regulatory frameworks and technological advance, but also with regional competition 
(World Bank, 2018).  
A large part of the reason for the high level of unbanked is the scattered markets and the 
lack of meso-level support in the financial system, which could help reduce the bank risk 
associated with lending activities. In the absence of traditional lending, microfinance 
institutions seek to reach the previously unbanked, especially in rural areas, and as was 
shown in the previous chapter, use innovative lending methodologies to reduce the risks 
traditionally associated with collateral-less loans.  In addition, international donor agencies 
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are focused on strengthening the macro- and meso-level environment to encourage 
industry growth (CGAP, 2013; IMF, 2012). 
 
6.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In existing literature, there appears to be a general consensus that the external environment 
has direct impact on the financial intermediaries operating in said environment, and that 
this impact increases with higher volatility and uncertainty (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; 
Barth et al., 2008; Agoraki et al., 2011; Aiyar et al., 2014).  
However, there is a lot less consensus regarding the impact of state intervention in the form 
of formal regulatory frameworks and requirements concerning capital stringency.  In 
addition, there exist very few studies looking at the relationship between regulation and 
liquidity creation in traditional banking literature, and so far, no previous study has looked 
at the relationship between regulation and liquidity creation in developing and emerging 
markets, or specifically focused on microfinance intermediaries.   
This study seeks therefore to add to the existing literature on regulation in developing 
countries in general, and offer a first insight into the impact of prudent regulation on 
liquidity creation in microfinance intermediaries, by answering the following research 
question and sub-questions: 
 
1: What is the cross-country and regional impact of regulation on the level of liquidity 
created by microfinance institutions? 
a) How does the stringency of capital regulation impact liquidity creation in 
microfinance? 
 
Due to the large differences in levels of development and financial regulation across 
geographical regions, I estimate both the cross-country impact of regulation as a whole, as 
well as run similar estimations in which the data pool is narrowed by region to 3 regions: 
Latin America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The regional estimations include similar variables, but will help inform the following sub-
questions: 
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b) What, if any, regional differences are evident in the impact of regulation on liquidity 
creation in microfinance? 
c) How does the external environment and developing market characteristics impact 
the regulatory framework and liquidity creation? 
 
6.2.1. Hypotheses 
While the findings concerning the effect of regulation in developing regions have been 
somewhat ambiguous in existing literature, the modest handful of studies examining the 
relationship between liquidity creation and traditional banking suggests that, at least in 
well-developed financial systems, regulation and capital stringency is associated with lower 
levels of liquidity creation (e.g. Thakor, 2013; Hartarska and Mersland, 2013; Sheremenk et 
al., 2017). 
While the risk profile of developing and emerging markets is significantly different, the 
findings in traditional intermediaries would suggest that a stronger regulatory framework is 
associated with lower levels of liquidity creation in microfinance institutions.81 However, the 
unique and highly volatile conditions under which microfinance institutions tend to operate, 
may well constitute a situation in which the impact of unique development conditions show 
positive effects from risk-minimising regulatory efforts.  
The additional cost associated with regulatory requirements may also cause the entry 
barrier for new players to become too high. Some literature has found that disclosure 
requirements are negatively correlated with efficiency and performance, due to the costs of 
preparing and releasing the documents, as well as the costs associated with making 
sensitive information available to competitors (Berger et al., 2004).  
Based on the results found so far between liquidity creation and regulation, I expect that 
H1. Regulation is likely to decrease liquidity creation. 
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 However, it should here be noted that other studies, such as Pasiouras et al., 2009, and Chortareaset et al., 
2011, find positive correlation between bank performance and the presence of formal regulatory frameworks. 
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Given the large economic and developmental differences between different regions 
engaged in microfinance and the findings in previous literature, expect to find differences in 
the impact of regulatory frameworks, based on the regional socio-economic status quo 
(Gorton and Winton, 2002).  Regulation may, for example, have a positive effect as risk-
reduction tool in regions with high uncertainty, while the impact may be adverse in regions 
where the added expense of additional monitoring and supervision creates undue costs for 
its actors (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Hartarska and Mersland, 2013).  
It is therefore expected that: 
H1a: The impact of formal regulatory frameworks on liquidity creation will differ from region 
to region, 
And that: 
H1b: The impact of regulation on liquidity creation is negatively correlated with HDI and GDP 
growth. 
 
6.3. Methodology 
Studies have found that the external macro-environment affects the performance and 
behaviour of the individual micro- and meso-level institution, as does the presence of an 
enabling environment (e.g. Barth et al., 2008; Hartarska and Mersland, 2013; Cull et al., 
2009). For these reasons, it is both relevant and important to study the cross-country and 
regional effects of regulation on liquidity created for the market. 
The estimations presented in this study all use panel data, and in accordance with most 
quantitative development research, the empirical analysis expresses the 4 liquidity creation 
measurements (LnLC, LC/GTA, LC/E and LC/GLP) as functions of a set of independent 
institutional, developmental and macroeconomic variables (e.g. Barth et al., 2004; Cull et al., 
2009; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). 
Prior to running the estimation models, a Hausman specification test was done to determine 
the most appropriate estimation model for the desired variables, and as in the previous 
chapters, the test’s statistical significance rejects the null hypothesis that a random model is 
appropriate.  
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In OLS estimations, there is an inherent risk of under-estimating errors, due to observations 
from same intermediary and geographical area being similar (Cull et al., 2009). To address 
this, I include country fixed effects to control for unobservable effects across countries that 
are not captured by the other independent variables and to reduce correlations across error 
terms.82 Similarly, I have included time fixed effects to account for average differences in 
liquidity creation across years (and are not captured by the rest of the exogenous variables), 
and to remove possible serial correlation problems.  
All estimations are run using robust standard errors, which are clustered by MFI, to account 
for heteroscedasticity, as well as possible correlation among observations of the same 
intermediary in different years.  
The variance inflation factor (vif) returns values between 1.04 and 1.46, which with the 
inclusion of 8 to 10 variables is well below the accepted threshold and indicates no concern 
for possible multicollinearity83. 
To answer the 3 research questions and sub-questions above, I run two-way fixed effects 
models, in which the correlation between levels of liquidity creation and a range of 
microfinance-, development and macro-specific variables are estimated. I am here 
particularly interested in the impact of regulation, supervision and capital stringency.  
Following a methodology similar to that used in the previous chapter, I use panel data from 
MIX, here specifically to estimate the institutional impact of formal regulation and capital 
stringency on levels of MFI liquidity creation. While I do include a number of general 
institutional traits which existing banking and microfinance literature suggests are relevant 
for the creation of liquidity in financial institutions, I am primarily interested in the micro-, 
                                                          
82
 A Hausman specification test was performed as well, in which the prob>chi2 was significant at 0.0000 for the 
cross-country dataset and between 0.000 and 0.0048 for the 3 include regions. The null hypothesis was 
therefore rejected in favour of fixed effects estimations. 
83 In addition to the vif test, correlation matrices were created for all regressions in the dissertation, with 
upper limits set to 0.4. As can be seen in Appendix E, no correlation among the independent variables 
breaches this limit.  
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meso- and macro characteristics which are either unique to or of particular importance to 
development research in general and the microfinance industry in particular.84   
 
6.3.1. Cross-Country and Regional Estimations 
To investigate the relationship between the regulatory status of the individual MFI i and 
levels of liquidity created by same intermediary, I run a series of estimations using the 
following fixed effects model: 
 
Equation 6.1: Liquidity Creation and Regulation (cross-country), DV I-III 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑘𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑖𝑡 − 1 + 𝛿3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐴𝐺𝐸2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛿6𝑁𝐺𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿7𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑗 + 𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 captures the effect of regulatory status in MFI I for period t. As in the 
previous empirical chapters, LIQ represents one of the following measures of liquidity 
creation of MFI i in period t: pure, absolute liquidity creation (LC), LC scaled by total assets 
(LC_GTA), liquidity to equity (LC_E) and liquidity creation to total loans (LC_GLP).  
In all estimations, the pure values of liquidity creation have been deflated using the World 
Bank’ Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
To address potential concerns of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, the robust 
standard errors are clustered at MFI level, in an effort to address possible serial correlation 
and heteroscedasticity concerns. In addition, all time-variant independent variables in the 
estimations are lagged one period, to account for potential endogeneity problems. 
As in the previous chapter, I measure liquidity creation using a cross-country approach, but 
recognise that especially in the case of the regulatory framework, there is likely to be 
significant country-level differences in the creation of liquidity. Some of these effects are 
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 For a more in-depth discussion of the impact of traditional bank on FI traits and conditions, please see the 
discussion presented in chapter 4. 
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captured by specific macroeconomic controls (GDP, HDI), but I also include country-level 
fixed effects to capture the unobserved geographical traits over time. 𝑓𝑗 is therefore a vector 
of country-level dummies, defined geographically using the specification for country defined 
by the MIX database. 
Finally, in addition to the fixed effects at country level, I have included a time trend (𝑇𝑖) to 
capture any unobserved changes over the time. ε is a stochastic error term. 𝛼 is a constant 
term. 𝛽 and 𝛿 are the unknown coefficients to be estimated. The subscripts i and t refer to 
MFI and time, respectively.  
  
Table 6.1: Variables and Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Liquidity creation (log) Log of the pure liquidity creation value, deflated using the CPI Index. 
LC/GTA  Liquidity creation scaled by size. 
LC/E Liquidity creation scaled by equity. 
LC/GLP Liquidity creation scaled by total loans. 
  
Regulated Regulation is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the specific 
MFI is subject to formal regulatory measures. The value is 1 if the MFI is 
formally regulated, 0 if not. 
Capital Measured as the ratio of equity to total assets. 
Size (log) Measured as a log of the MFI’s total assets. 
Age and Age2 Age of MFI, measured as year y minus the year of establishment. Age2 is 
age squared. 
Bank risk Bank risk, measured as the ratio of portfolio at risk, 30 days, to GLP. 
Capital stringency Index based on World Bank survey data, collected by Barth et al, 2013. 
Inflation Macroeconomic variable using IMF data. 
GDP Growth The percentage of change in the GDP deflator, using data from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
HDI Human Development Index. Index maintained by UN. 
 
 
In models 2, 3 and 4, the sample has been limited to only include one of the 3 geographical 
regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South Asia.  The selection of the 3 regions 
was based on the highest number of available observations. The results from 2 of the 
remaining 3 regions, East Asia and Eastern Europe, are qualitatively the same as the 3 
regions used in the chapter, and can be found in appendices C and D.  Please note that the 
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level of observations from Eastern Europe is below the recommended threshold of 
minimum 20 observations per predictor (Kling et al., 2007).85  
 
6.3.2. Independent Variables 
In the case of development research, there is, perhaps more so than in other financial sub-
sectors of research, a need to weigh the included controls against the consequent reduction 
in available data.  As before, all pure time-variant values have been deflated using the CPI, 
and all exogenous time-variant variables have been lagged one-period to address potential 
endogeneity concerns, and identify a causal relationship between the variables, beyond 
simple correlation. 
 
Regulatory status (REGULATED): The key independent variable tested is the regulatory 
status of the individual intermediary. The status is provided by MIX Market, and is relative 
to the individual MFI. This is important, because in microfinance, it is common to have both 
formal and informal actors, of extremely varying sizes and reach. This is for example the 
case in Tanzania, which regulates microfinance institutions differently depending on their 
asset and/or loan size (Jensen, 2009). 
In terms of MFI-specific variables, I include controls for age, size, capital and bank risk.   
 
Age (AGE and AGE2): The age of the individual intermediary is included, and is calculated as 
year t minus the years of establishment. Previous literature has suggested that microfinance 
goes through different organizational phases as they mature (Bogan, 2012a and 2012b; Ngo, 
2012; Helms, 2006; Farrington and Abrams, 2002). Based on this assertion, I have included 
both age and age-squared, to test for a non-linear relationship. 
 
Size (SIZE): Following common practice in financial research and bank performance 
specifically, the size variable is calculated using the one-period-lagged logarithm of the 
individual MFI’s total assets.86 Size is included because a number of studies, both in 
microfinance and related to liquidity creation, suggests that the size of the intermediary has 
                                                          
85
 I was not able to run results for the Middle East and North Africa, due to lack of usable observations. 
86
 See, for example Cull et al., 2009. 
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impact on the level of LC created, when scaled by size, equity and GLP, but that the nature 
of the impact may change depending on asset volume (e.g. Berger and Bouwman, 2009; 
Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Horvath et al., 2013). However, based on the inconsistency of 
previous findings in small financial intermediaries, I expect the relationship to be weakly 
negative or insignificant 
 
Capital (CAPITAL): Capital has also been included, and is defined at the MFI’s one-period-
lagged equity ratio, that is equity to total assets. Previous findings indicate a negative 
relationship between capital and liquidity creation in smaller intermediaries, a finding 
consistent with my own previous findings. Although some literature finds a positive 
correlation between capital and general profitability, I expect the relationship here to be 
negative (Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Berger et al., 2011; Horvath et al., 2014; Hartarska et 
al., 2013).   
 
Bank risk (RISK): I control for bank risk (RISK), which is measured as the one-period-lagged 
ratio of portfolio at risk > 30 days to the MFI’s gross loan portfolio.87 Both within and outside 
development research, a good amount of both theoretical and empirical work can be found, 
studying the relationship between regulation, bank risk, vulnerability to shock and 
intermediary performance.88 Bank risk is particularly relevant to control for, since the 
assumption of some literature is that MFIs may over-produce liquidity, by taking undue risk.  
If this is the case, it should be reflected in the portfolio at risk (Berger et al., 2011; Horvath 
et al., 2014). 
 
Capital stringency: The impact of the most recent financial crisis in 2008 has put the 
spotlight back on the role of the regulatory framework as a tool to secure financial stability, 
and in that debate the role of capital and capital stringency has taken centre stage (Thakor, 
2013; Naceur and Kandil, 2009). However, whether this has adverse effect on liquidity 
                                                          
87
 Portfolio at risk represents the value of the MFI’s loans outstanding, here with at least one instalment, which 
is more than 30 days past due. PAR30 includes the entire unpaid balance, but excludes loans which have been 
rescheduled or restructured (CGAP, 2003). 
88
 See, for example, Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Gorton and Pennachi, 1990; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; 
Agoraki et al., 2011. 
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creation is still a matter of some debate. Thakor argues that higher capital ratios are 
empirically associated higher levels of lending, and with it, higher levels of liquidity creation 
(Thakor, 2013). Supporting this, empirical work by Beltratti and Stulz found positive 
correlation between bank performance and higher levels of capital stringency (Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2009). 
On the other hand, Aiyar, Calomaris and Wieladek argue that regulated UK banks reduce 
lending in the face of stricter capital requirements, whereas unregulated foreign banks 
increase it (Aiyar et al., 2013). And similarly to this, VanHoose found that higher levels of 
capital stringency may induce intermediaries to replace lending activities with less risky 
asset alternatives (VanHoose, 2007).  
In this study, capital stringency is measured using Barth et al.’s capital regulatory index 
(Barth et al., 2013). The index uses data collected from 4 World Bank surveys with over 300 
questions, covering a period from 1999 to 2011. The index employs a scale from 0 to 9 to 
measure levels of capital stringency (where higher values indicate greater stringency). This is 
part of a larger dataset of regulatory and supervisory data points, collected by Barth from 
regulatory officials, economists and World Bank staff (Barth et al., 2013). 
GDP growth (GDP): A measure for annual GDP growth is used here, together with HDI, as a 
macroeconomic indicator of country-level development. The indicator is included to control 
for external macreconomic conditions, which could well influence the impact of regulation 
on LC (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).  The indicator uses data sourced from the 
IMF macroeconomic database. 
 
Inflation: Inflation is included as a macroeconomic control, to see if higher levels of inflation 
impact levels of liquidity creation, by contributing to the volatility and contextual 
uncertainty of the individual MFI’s external reality. Previous studies have found a positive 
correlation between levels of inflation and MFI performance, but I am not convinced that 
this will be the case here, given its contribution to overall market uncertainty.89 The data 
used on inflation is provide by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and is expressed in 
constant 1995 USD. 
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 See Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007. 
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Human Development Index (HDI): The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite 
index developed by the UNDP, designed to capture development beyond simple 
macroeconomic measures. The index combines scores for education, income (GNI per 
capita) and health (life expectancy), to express a measure of broader human development 
and well-being (UNDP, 2016). The measure is used in this study to capture external 
conditions, beyond economic growth, which are likely to impact institutional performance 
and liquidity creation. 
 
6.4. Data 
The study uses MIX data stretching over an 8 year period from 2004 to 2012.90  The data 
covers 1121 MFIs, from a total of 110 countries.91 The empirical model used specifies 
liquidity creation as a function of a combination of institutional, regulatory, macroeconomic 
and development variables at country level, and a range of financial variables specific to the 
individual MFI.92    
Time-variant values have been winsorized at 1 and 99%, to reduce the effect of spurious 
outliers.  In addition, duplicates, empty data points and faulty or ambiguous data have been 
removed, and the data includes deposit-takers, as well as institutions with a minimum asset 
pool of $100093.  
As liquidity creation is measured by looking at the transformation of liquid liabilities to 
illiquid assets, I use just deposit-taking institutions. In addition, I have removed microfinance 
institutions with negative equity, on the basis that a financial intermediary close to financial 
insolvency is likely to focus primarily on securing short-term capital, and is therefore likely 
to adapt and change its behaviour and investment strategies to the financial status quo. 
                                                          
90
 Earlier years were excluded due to high dispersion of data and very low levels of reliability, and newer years 
were excluded due to incompletion at the time of the data gathering. 
91
 The full database covers 3800 MFIs, with observations from 2004 to 2012, in 118 countries. The coverage in 
2012 is about 12.5% of the estimated 10,000 MFIs currently in existence, and about 50% of all borrowers. 
92
 MIX Market’s data is at risk of selection bias, given the lack of mandatory reporting. The database is 
nonetheless the primary data source for most peer-reviewed literature, given the general shortage of 
adequate industry alternatives.  
93 All data treatment and regression work has been done using Stata, version 11 and 15.  
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Table 6.2: MFI Summary Statistics, LC and Regulation 
2004 - 2012 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 5
th
 Percentile Median 95
th
 Percentile Maximum 
Dependent Variables:         
Liquidity Creation (Deflated) 3672 14.45 M 30.75 M 0.00 M 0.08 M 2.62 M 78.76 M 293.22 M 
Liquidity Creation / Gross Total Assets 3672 0.33 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.32 0.61 1.81 
Liquidity Creation / Gross Loan Portfolio 3672 0.48 0.53 0.00 0.10 0.44 0.93 21.85 
Liquidity Creation / Equity 3672 2.10 1.79 0.00 0.15 1.65 5.84 9.95 
Independent Variables:         
Regulation 3672 0.73 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Capital 3471 3.71 M 8.59 M 0.00 M 0.00 M 0.38 M 20.11 M 103.88 M 
Size 3672 15.95 1.89 7.17 12.96 15.86 19.25 19.96 
Age 3672 5.83 3.05 1.00 2.00 6.00 11.00 14.00 
Risk 3194 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.23 1.00 
Capital Stringency 3157 4.23 1.92 0.00 0.00 4.00 7.00 7.00 
Inflation 3323 8.12 5.55 -2.60 1.62 6.65 19.41 33.54 
GDP Growth per capita 3368 5.55 2.84 -7.06 1.04 5.57 10.26 17.29 
HDI 3227 0.58 0.11 0.28 0.37 0.59 0.73 0.83 
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The data used in the study has been drawn from 3 primary sources:  The Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX), regulatory and supervisory indices developed by Barth et al. 
(2013), based on 4 World Bank surveys, and macroeconomic data from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  
 
 
6.4.1. The Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) 
The primary financial data used in this study, including the individual MFI’s regulatory 
status, is collected from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX), the current, the 
current leading provider of microfinance data.  MiX is which is maintained by a non-profit 
private organisation, aiming to increase the quality of information on microfinance 
institutions for the industry (Khamar, 2017).  
Though the primary source of data used in most peer-reviewed articles on microfinance, the 
database often comes under fire for consisting of mostly voluntary and self-reported data. 
In the early 2000s when the MIX database was still young, the quality of the data was 
especially questionable, but as the organization has grown, the data has been cleaned 
extensively, and changed reporting procedures plus audited financial data has helped 
increase overall reliability.  The MIX financial data quality is rated with a 5-tier diamond 
system, where 5 denotes the strongest and most complete financial data available, while 1 
is the least.94 To address persisting concerns related to the quality of data, I use audited 
financial data, ranked 4 or 5 in the database, despite the reduction of the sample pool 
available.95 
 
6.4.2. The World Bank Regulatory Indices 
Barth et al. has collected data from 4 comprehensive World Bank surveys on regulation and 
supervision in 180 countries, over a 14-year period, from 1998 to 2012.  Based on 118 
questions posed to regulatory officials, World Bank staff members, academics and country 
                                                          
94
 The audit rules used by MIX include factors such as checking the balance of financial statements, and 
whether ratios are particularly high or low compared to its competitors. 
95
 The only exception to this is the group of MFIs ranked 3, where financial documentation could be found 
elsewhere for verification. 
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officials, Barth et al, develop indices for a number of regulatory and supervisory values 
(Barth et al., 2013).  These include the presence of state-level deposit insurance (used in 
chapter 4), and a regulatory index measuring levels of capital stringency, used in this 
chapter. In addition to deposit insurance and capital stringency, the dataset includes indices 
for external supervision and audit, transparency and governance (Barth et al., 2013). 
 
6.4.3. UN and IMF Data 
The macroeconomic variables used in the study are pulled from databases maintained by 
the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  The Human 
Development Index (HDI) is collected and maintained by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), and combined UN data on education, health and income. The Index, 
building on the work of economists Amartya Sen and Mahub ul Haq, is updated annually 
and draws on data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA),  
UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS), The World Bank and the IMF. The macroeconomic 
variables drawn from the IMF, which publishes regular time series data on a range of 
economic topics, including GDP and GDP growth, inflation and exchange rates. 
 
6.5. Results 
Across all regions, the level of regulated MFIs in microfinance remains reasonably steady, 
making up roughly about three quarters of all microfinance institutions on average (figure 
6.1).96  The global ratio of regulated MFIs to unregulated is quite steady across the years, 
with only a 6% variance in the percentages from 2004 to 2012.   
                                                          
96
 MENA has been included, but is less consistent than the other regions, primarily due to a smaller pool of 
observations (most years are < 20). 
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Figure 6.1: % Regulated MFIs by Region 
 
 
On average, the annual ratio regulated to unregulated deposit-taking MFIs lies consistently 
close to 3:1. Regionally, the largest concentration is found in Eastern Europe which, given 
the level of development and formalisation of the microfinancial market, is unsurprising.  
 
6.5.1. Regulation by Type and Gender 
While the portion of regulated to unregulated MFIs remains steady across years, there does 
appear to be a shift between types, with a consistent move towards a formalisation of 
existing MFIs.  
Table 6.3: % Regulation by Type, per Region97 
% Regulation by Type, per Region Bank Credit Union / Cooperative NBFI NGO Rural Bank 
Sub-Saharan Africa 96.88% 92.28% 80.74% 55.66% 87.32% 
East Asia and the Pacific 82.35% 46.81% 74.38% 17.54% 91.92% 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 94.04% 85.00% 83.78% 10.00% 0.00% 
Latin America and The Caribbean 98.63% 83.88% 80.64% 9.86% 0.00% 
Middle East and North Africa 100.00% 0.00% 50.00% 33.33% 0.00% 
South Asia 97.78% 69.44% 78.69% 65.81% 100.00% 
 
                                                          
97 Rural banks are missing from 3 regions, because the regulatory categories are slightly different. 
Formal banks, regardless of size and location, are included in the commercial bank category, while 
other financial institutions are added as NBFIs.  
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The ratio remains somewhat the same because the newly included institutions engaging in 
microfinance often start out as unregulated MFIs or NBFIs, but as time passes, they tend to 
change into for-profit institutions, typically submitted to higher levels of regulatory control 
(table 6.3). This trend is in line with observation found in the existing literature (e.g. Bogan, 
2012; Helms, 2006).   
 
Figure 6.2: MFI Regulatory Status by Organizational Type, 2004-2012 
 
 
Across regions and years, the largest group of regulated institutions are unsurprisingly the 
commercial banks, followed by rural banks (typically formal branches, for example in the 
form of rural savings and credit associations) and credit unions.  NGOs are by far the 
smallest category of regulated institutions, with only about 40% being covered by a formal 
regulatory framework (figure 6.2).  
Size-wise, the ratio of regulated to unregulated are as one might intuitively expect, given 
the large portion of regulated commercial banks, with the largest institutions (institutions 
with assets above $25M) having the highest percentage of regulated MFIs, at almost 90% 
(figure 6.3).   
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Figure 6.3: % Regulation by Size 
 
 
Conversely, the smallest portions (institutions with assets under $1M) of regulated 
institutions are found amongst the smallest institutions asset-wise, with only about 60% of 
these answering to a formal regulatory framework.  
Finally, the distribution of male and female clients confirms the findings of previous 
literature, with the majority of clients in small, unregulated MFIs being female, while the 
ratio between the genders is close to equal in larger, more formalised and regulated 
institutions98.  
 
Figure 6.4: % Regulation by Gender 
 
                                                          
98
 For literature further discussing the gender distribution in microfinance, see Agier and Szarfarz, 2013; 
Hartarska and Mersland, 2012; Lauretti, 2016;  Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Mayoux, 2010,. 
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Finding a similar change in distribution, some research suggests the existence of a ‘glass 
ceiling’ for women in microfinance, where female clients markedly dominate the small, 
informal lending, but seem to disappear in favour of more male clients, once the loans grow 
to a certain size (Agier and Szafarz, 2013). 
 
6.5.2. Cross-Country Estimations 
Across all 4 measurements for liquidity creation, the correlation between the individual 
MFI’s regulatory status and ability to produce liquidity for the surrounding market is 
consistently positive and highly significant at 1%.  In addition to this, capital stringency 
appears to be positively and significantly correlated with scaled liquidity creation.99 
These results are in line with the findings in my previous chapters, but contradict the 
literature which suggests that the presence of a regulatory framework reduces the 
performance of microfinance intermediaries (e.g. Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007).  Instead, 
my findings lend empirical support to the suggestion that prudent regulatory frameworks 
and sensible capital requirements may reduce the perceived risk associated with 
microfinancial lending in volatile and uncertain financial markets (e.g. Thakor, 2013; 
Theodore and Loubiere, 2002). 
                                                          
99
 Though I here use fixed effects estimations to account for unobserved geographical effects over time, some 
literature argues that a GLS model with robust clustered standard errors is more appropriate (e.g. Hartarska 
and Nadolnyak, 2007).  Running same regressions as random effects models return qualitatively same results, 
though generally with slightly higher significance.  
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 Table 6.4: Liquidity Creation and Regulation, Cross-Country 
 
 
 LC (log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GLP 
Regulatory status  0.146*** 
(0.06) 
0.032*** 
(0.01) 
0.309*** 
(0.12) 
0.053*** 
(0.02) 
Capital 
 
Size 
 
Bank risk 
 
Capital stringency 
 
Age 
 
Age2 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP Growth 
 
HDI 
 
 
Constant 
 
-1.513*** 
(0.19) 
 0.941*** 
(0.01) 
-0.816*** 
(0.29) 
-0.024* 
(0.01) 
-0.004* 
(0.00) 
-0.381*** 
(0.03) 
-0.011*** 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.05) 
0.007** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-5.675*** 
(0.32) 
-0.017 
(0.03) 
0.496 
(0.52) 
0.065** 
(0.03) 
-0.011** 
(0.00) 
-0.572*** 
(0.05) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.228** 
(0.11) 
 0.009* 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.022 
(0.06) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.138 
(0.13) 
-0.037* 
(0.02) 
-0.005* 
(0.00) 
 0.016** 
(0.01) 
-4.140 
(4.10) 
 
 3.008 
(2.39) 
-0.001** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
1.601* 
(0.85) 
 
-0.372 
(0.49) 
-0.010** 
(0.00) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
-8.962 
(8.45) 
 
 8.938* 
(4.93) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
 0.000 
(0.00) 
 1.611 
(1.27) 
 
-0.328 
(0.74) 
R-sqr 
Adj R-sqr 
Probability F > 0 
Dfres 
BIC 
Root MSE 
Observations 
0.882 
0.877 
0.000 
628 
3695.2 
0.639 
1875 
0.330 
0.300 
0.000 
628 
-2309.1 
0.129 
1875 
0.474 
0.451 
0.000 
628 
6197.1 
1.246 
1875 
0.340 
0.311 
0.000 
628 
-602.9 
0.203 
1875 
Stars *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.  Country-level fixed effects estimations with clustering at firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  LC is pure values 
of liquidity creation, deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  LC/GTA is LC scaled by total assets. LC/E is LC divided by equity.  LC/GLP is LC divided by gross loan portfolio. Capital is measured as equity ratio, 
size and age are logs of assets and years since establishment, age2 is age squared. Bank risk the portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30).  Regulation status  is a dummy, indicating whether the MFI is formally regulated,. 
Capital stringency is an index indicating the stringency of a country’s capital policies.. Finally, GDP growth per capita is GDP growth per capita, Inflation is the % change in the GDP deflator, and HDI is the UN’s Human 
Development Index. 
185 
 
The results remain qualitatively the same (positive and usually significant) across the 3 
regions included in this study, though state-level capital stringency requirements appear to 
be more important than regulatory status in EAP.100 
The results further lend support to the suggestion that microfinance intermediaries 
transforming from informal entities into formally regulated institutions do not have to do so 
at the expense of outreach and the level of capital extended. Rather, a formalized 
regulatory framework can help reduce the perceived risk associated with reaching the 
poorest segments of the potential client base, thereby increasing the levels of liquidity 
created for the market. It should be noted, however, that being transformed into a formally 
regulated institution is not necessarily the same as commercialization, and as the findings in 
chapter 4 demonstrated, for-profit status does not appear to be correlated with higher 
levels of liquidity creation.  
 
6.5.3. Capital Requirements and Risk 
In line with the estimation results for deposit insurance in chapter 4, the presence of state-
level capital requirements (capital stringency in estimations) appears to have a positive 
relationship with all 4 measurements of LC, though the level of significance varies across 
regions.  This contradicts the concern expressed by some literature, that formal capital 
requirements will severely hinder the lending activity of financial intermediaries, at least in 
contexts where the external market volatility is a greater concern than prudent capital 
regulation.101  
The findings suggest that it is neither the presence of deposit insurance nor formal capital 
requirements, which cause a negative relationship between capital and liquidity creation in 
                                                          
100
 Results are similarly positive and significant for EECA and SA, but these have not been included due to the 
small  (below 100) number of usable observations available, rendering the results unreliable. Results can be 
found in appendices B and C. MENA could not be run at all. 
101
 The impact is particularly clear in East Asia, where the presence of capital stringency appears to crowd out 
the effect of regulatory status in 3 of the 4 measurements for LC. The region, which greatly varies in terms of 
macroeconomic growth and stability, is not one of the regions included in this study, but the estimation results 
can be found in Appendix C, and warrants further study. 
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MFIs, but rather the tendency in microfinance for institutions to generally hold on to larger 
sums of capital, to ensure ability to absorb unexpected shock.   
The MFIs do not hold on to the capital because they are required to by regulatory 
legislation, but because it is the safest way to ensure against short-term financial instability. 
In line with previous findings and those detailed in previous literature from traditional 
intermediaries, the relationship between capital and liquidity creation is consistently 
negative and significant. This intuitively makes sense – the more capital the intermediary 
withholds from the market, the less liquidity will be created.  
However, across all estimations and LC measurements, the level of bank risk, expressed as 
the ratio of the loan portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30), is consistently negative, though 
inconsistent in significance. Based on this, I find no evidence of a relationship between 
undue institutional risk-taking, and increased liquidity creation.  Rather, the results suggest 
that if anything, undue risk taking reduces liquidity creation long-term. 
 
6.5.4. Size and Age 
In both cross-country and regional estimations, the MFI’s size is consistently and positively 
correlated with pure, deflated values of liquidity, and negatively correlated with scaled LC. 
Intuitively, a positive relationship between pure values of LC and size, which is measured as 
a log of MFI assets, should not surprise; the more assets the intermediary holds, the more 
loans can typically be distributed.102  
The consistent negative relationship between scaled LC and size, however, suggests that 
unit for unit, smaller institutions are better liquidity creators in microfinance than larger 
intermediaries. There are likely a number of reasons for this, and no doubt the prevalent 
usage of joint lending in smaller intermediaries (found to be a consistent and highly 
significant driver of liquidity creation in chapter 5, has an impact. However, as could also be 
seen in chapter 5, the negative correlation between scaled LC and size exists on its own as 
                                                          
102
 A similar, though less significant relationship is observed if the log of assets is replaced with number of 
active borrowers. 
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well. This is possibly due to highly localised but more specialised knowledge of community 
conditions than what a larger intermediary may be able to cultivate. 
In terms of the age of the individual intermediary, there is only weak and inconsistent 
evidence of any correlation with the used LC measurements.  The relationship appears to be 
consistently negative. If the life-cycle theory, which states that non-profit MFIs tend to 
commercialize as they mature is accurate, then the negative relationship further rejects the 
suggestion that commercialisation of microfinance institutions necessarily leads to 
improved performance and outreach. 
 
6.5.5. The Macro Environment 
The effect of inflation is consistently negative for scaled levels of liquidity creation, though 
levels of significance vary greatly across regions.103  GDP growth is generally not significant 
in the specified relationship between regulation and liquidity creation. However, a similar 
region-specific pattern of inflation is observed for HDI, where the socio-economic 
development levels appear significant and positive in some regions, while negative or 
insignificant in others.  Further discussion of both can be found in the following section, 
discussing region-specific results.  
 
6.5.6. Regional Results 
While the key findings of this study are consistent across regions, there are nonetheless a 
number of relevant differences revealed in estimations run at regional level for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, East Asia and Latin America.  The included estimation results are found with data 
pool sizes ranging from 340 to 654 observations.  
 
Regional Inflation 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the primary results directly reflect the cross-country findings, with 
identical correlation and significance levels for regulatory status, capital and size. However, 
in addition to these, the two macroeconomic variables, inflation and HDI, also appear to 
significantly impact the level of liquidity created in this region (Table 6.5) 
                                                          
103
 Non-ratio LC values were deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
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The nature of headline inflation remains significantly more volatile in SSA than most other 
regions worldwide, due to an unstable agricultural sector and high share of food in the CPI 
(Nguyen et al., 2015). In some previous research, a positive relationship has been found 
between measures of MFI performance and inflation (e.g. Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; 
Demigur-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). However, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
estimations in this study suggest a consistent negative relationship between liquidity 
creation and inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa, highly significant at 1% for LC scaled by size and 
equity.   
These results are in line with more recent results from the IMF, which suggested that the 
main drivers of inflation in the region have started to change, from primarily domestic 
supply shocks, to weather shocks, the economic importance of agriculture, as well as the 
lack of prudent trade, monetary policy and regulatory frameworks (Nguyen et al., 2015).  
The study argues that the previous prevalence of supply-side shocks as the primary driver of 
inflation reduced the importance of the imposition of monetary policies in the past, but that 
with the change in primary determinants in recent years, the impact of ‘coherent and 
forward-looking’ monetary policies increase, as these can be used to reduce fluctuations in 
aggregate demand (Nguyen, 2015).   
A stable and enabling macro- and meso- environment thus helps reduce the perceived risk 
associated with microfinancial lending, and with it, increase the MFI production of liquidity 
for the market. This is further supported by the positive relationship observed between LC 
and the regional levels of human development (as measured by the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index) described below.  In the remaining regions Latin America and South 
Asia, inflation is insignificant in relation to liquidity creation (tables 6.6 and 6.7).104 This may 
be because rates of inflation are lower and institutional frameworks are more 
comprehensive, so any negative impact may have been drowned out by the effects of other 
factors. 
                                                          
104
 A similar relationship is found in EAP, where inflation is insignificant for pure numbers of LC, but highly 
correlated with all 3 measures of scaled LC. The results could benefit from additional study, once sufficient 
data can be collected. The level of inflation and general economic growth varies greatly in the region; 2017 
levels of inflation in Mongolia are, for example, almost 3 times the level of Taiwan (Asian Development Bank, 
2017).  See appendix C for estimation results from the region. 
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Table 6.5: Regulation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 LC (log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GLP 
Regulatory status  0.410*** 
(0.14) 
0.082*** 
(0.03) 
0.490*** 
(0.24) 
0.119*** 
(0.04) 
Capital 
 
Size 
 
Bank risk 
 
Capital stringency 
 
Age 
 
Age2 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP Growth 
 
HDI 
 
 
Constant 
 
-1.553*** 
(0.29) 
 0.931*** 
(0.04) 
-0.605 
(0.44) 
0.025 
(0.03) 
-0.010 
(0.01) 
-0.370*** 
(0.06) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
0.068 
(0.08) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
 0.002 
(0.00) 
-4.666*** 
(0.61) 
-0.001 
(0.08) 
 2.236* 
(1.26) 
-0.025 
(0.05) 
 0.017 
(0.01) 
-0.589*** 
(0.09) 
0.008 
(0.01) 
 0.552* 
(0.24) 
 0.002 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.00) 
-0.012 
(0.17) 
-0.005 
(0.04) 
-0.236 
(0.38) 
-0.132** 
(0.06) 
-0.006** 
(0.00) 
 0.039** 
(0.02) 
 2.229*** 
(0.75) 
 
-1.075* 
(0.62) 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
 0.003 
(0.00) 
 0.386** 
(0.17) 
 
0.348*** 
(0.15) 
-0.014*** 
(0.01) 
-0.012 
(0.03) 
 2.498* 
(1.48) 
 
 2.188 
(1.37) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
 0.004 
(0.01) 
 0.710** 
(0.27) 
 
0.074 
(0.25) 
R-sqr 
Adj R-sqr 
Probability F > 0 
Dfres 
BIC 
Root MSE 
Observations 
0.856 
0.850 
0.000 
171 
1032.6 
0.741 
421 
0.268 
0.237 
0.000 
171 
-266.7 
0.158 
421 
0.423 
0.399 
0.000 
 171 
1548.6 
1.367 
421 
0.356 
0.329 
0.000 
171 
138.0 
0.256 
421 
Stars *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.  Country-level fixed effects estimations with clustering at firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  LC is pure values 
of liquidity creation, deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  LC/GTA is LC scaled by total assets. LC/E is LC divided by equity.  LC/GLP is LC divided by gross loan portfolio. Capital is measured as equity ratio, 
size and age are logs of assets and years since establishment, age2 is age squared. Bank risk the portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30).  Regulation status is a dummy, indicating whether the MFI is formally regulated,. 
Capital stringency is an index indicating the stringency of a country’s capital policies.. Finally, GDP growth per capita is GDP growth per capita, Inflation is the % change in the GDP deflator, and HDI is the UN’s Human 
Development Index. 
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Table 6.6: Regulation in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 LC (log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GLP 
Regulated  0.234** 
(0.10) 
0.039** 
(0.02)  
0.498*** 
(0.16)  
0.032 
(0.02)  
Capital 
 
Size 
 
Age 
 
Age2 
 
Bank risk 
 
Capital stringency  
 
Inflation 
 
GDP Growth 
 
HDI 
 
 
Constant 
 
-1.571*** 
(0.29) 
0.942*** 
(0.02)  
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-0.040 
(0.10) 
-1.174 
(0.83) 
0.018 
(0.01) 
-0.287*** 
(0.05) 
-0.011** 
(0.01) 
-0.001* 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.02) 
0.092 
(0.13) 
0.008*** 
(0.00) 
-4.362*** 
(0.51) 
-0.010 
(0.05) 
-0.020*** 
(0.00) 
-0.113 
(0.16) 
1.782* 
(1.01) 
0.046 
(0.03) 
-0.415** 
(0.07) 
-0.016** 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.039 
(0.03) 
0.518 
(0.32) 
0.004 
(0.00) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
0.233 
(0.93) 
 
-0.082 
(0.54) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
0.296** 
(0.12) 
 
-2.713 
(1.83) 
-0.007 
(0.03) 
1.497 
(1.36) 
 
-4.254 
(3.42) 
-0.004 
(0.00) 
0.434 
(0.36) 
 
 -3.825 
 (2.61) 
R-sqr 
Adjusted R-sqr 
Probability F > 0 
Dfres 
BIC 
Root MSE 
Observations 
0.906 
0.903 
0.00 
169 
1187.0 
0.558 
654 
0.300 
0.267 
0.00 
169 
-872.6 
0.122 
654 
0.504 
0.481 
0.00 
169 
1854.3 
0.941 
654 
 0.266 
 0.230 
 0.00 
 169 
-419.4 
 0.165 
 654 
Stars *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.  Country-level fixed effects estimations with clustering at firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  LC is pure values 
of liquidity creation, deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  LC/GTA is LC scaled by total assets. LC/E is LC divided by equity.  LC/GLP is LC divided by gross loan portfolio. Capital is measured as equity ratio, 
size and age are logs of assets and years since establishment, age2 is age squared. Bank risk the portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30).  Regulation status  is a dummy, indicating whether the MFI is formally regulated,. 
Capital stringency is an index indicating the stringency of a country’s capital policies.. Finally, GDP growth per capita is GDP growth per capita, Inflation is the % change in the GDP deflator, and HDI is the UN’s Human 
Development Index.  
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Table 6.7: Liquidity Creation and Regulation in South Asia 
  
 LC (log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GLP 
Regulatory status   0.212* 
(0.11) 
0.040* 
(0.02) 
0.071 
(0.32) 
0.044* 
(0.03) 
Capital 
 
Size 
 
Bank risk 
 
Capital stringency 
 
Age 
 
Age2 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP Growth 
 
HDI 
 
 
Constant 
 
-0.998*** 
(0.36) 
 0.900*** 
(0.03) 
-1.279 
(0.87) 
-0.038 
(0.03) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.336*** 
(0.05) 
-0.024*** 
(0.01) 
0.030 
(0.11) 
-0.007 
(0.00) 
 0.000 
(0.00) 
-7.759*** 
(0.75) 
0.180** 
(0.08) 
-0.363 
(0.91) 
-0.045 
(0.06) 
 0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.383*** 
(0.07) 
-0.011 
(0.01) 
-0.023 
(0.13) 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
-0.015 
(0.03) 
-0.141 
(0.36) 
 0.024 
(0.04) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
 0.026 
(0.03) 
-1.117 
(0.79) 
 
 2.412*** 
(0.73) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
 0.027 
(0.19) 
 
-2.599 
(1.93) 
 0.006 
(0.02) 
-0.067 
(0.06) 
-2.079 
(1.90) 
 
 10.811*** 
(1.62) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.015* 
(0.01) 
 0.007 
(0.24) 
 
 0.870*** 
(0.22) 
R-sqr 
Adj R-sqr 
Probability F > 0 
Dfres 
BIC 
Root MSE 
Observations 
0.807 
0.797 
0.000 
 132 
776.2 
0.658 
 340 
0.281 
0.244 
0.000 
 132 
-404.7 
0.118 
 340 
0.434 
0.404 
0.000 
 132 
1383.8 
1.631 
 340 
0.232 
0.191 
0.000 
 132 
-167.0 
0.167 
 340 
Stars *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.  Country-level fixed effects estimations with clustering at firm level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  LC is pure values 
of liquidity creation, deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  LC/GTA is LC scaled by total assets. LC/E is LC divided by equity.  LC/GLP is LC divided by gross loan portfolio. Capital is measured as equity ratio, 
size and age are logs of assets and years since establishment, age2 is age squared. Bank risk the portfolio at risk for 30 days (PAR30).  Regulation status  is a dummy, indicating whether the MFI is formally regulated,. 
Capital stringency is an index indicating the stringency of a country’s capital policies.. Finally, GDP growth per capita is GDP growth per capita, Inflation is the % change in the GDP deflator, and HDI is the UN’s Human 
Development Index. 
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The Human Development Index 
The HDI attempts to measure the degree of human development, through a composite 
index focusing on a trio of health, education and income indicators. In the estimation results 
from Sub-Saharan Africa, the relationship with LC is highly significant and positive, while 
positive but only weakly significant in the other two regions. The relationship observed 
suggests that the socio-economic framework within which MFIs operate is likely to 
positively impact the MFI’s ability to create liquidity, especially in areas with unstable 
financial markets.  For example, if institutions at a very basic level can expect basic 
mathematical and financial understanding at client-level, the intensity of the required 
monitoring may be reduced, or change format.  
 
6.6. Conclusion 
The relationship between regulation and liquidity creation in microfinance reaches well 
beyond the traditional borders of development research and deep into long-standing 
debates about the advantages and disadvantages of state involvement in micro-level 
activities. The most recent global financial crisis of 2008 highlighted this, and resulted in a 
call from some for increased financial stability and social effectiveness (Thakor, 2013). 
However, other voices have warned against increasing the level of state intervention in 
market mechanisms. They argue that the inevitable distortion of economic activity will have 
unintended and adverse consequences at the micro-level, such as raising monitoring and 
administrative costs so much that possible new players in the market are barred from entry 
(Hartarska and Mersland, 2013). 
Because they today play such an instrumental role in most emerging markets across the 
globe, it is a precondition for prudent regulatory and supervisory policymaking, that we 
understand the relationship between the regulatory framework, the institutional 
environment and the ability of MFIs to perform as intermediaries and liquidity creators for 
the poor. It is especially important because regulation and state intervention are politically 
sensitive, and therefore hijacked in the general debate about whether to support one 
political perspective or another. 
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The results of this study are quite clear; there exists a highly significant and positive 
relationship between formal regulation and the levels of liquidity creation, both in real and 
in unit terms.  The lag of the right-hand-side variables further suggests a causal relationship 
beyond correlation, wherein changes to the regulatory framework and status impacts the 
level of liquidity produced, rather than the other way around.   
The cross-country results are echoed in the regional estimations, where the relationship 
between regulatory status and all 4 measures of liquidity creation is positive and significant, 
though with varying strength. The findings are particularly clear in the cross-country results, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. 
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7. Conclusions 
Microfinance institutions often play a significant role to in the economies within which they 
operate. They provide loans and issue deposits on par with traditional intermediaries. 
However, they do so in areas where clients previously have had no alternative outside the 
informal lending market, and thus been vulnerable to usurious lending practices. In reaching 
the previously unbanked, the MFIs play a key role in reducing the informal financial sector, 
while increasing client protection and the level of liquidity created in markets typically 
starving for capital. 
 
7.1. MFIs as Liquidity Creators 
 
How do deposit-taking microfinance institutions perform as liquidity creators for their 
surrounding markets?105 
 
The duality of the MFI’s purpose makes it uniquely challenging to study, especially when it 
comes to institutional performance. The intermediaries seek to fulfil two separate but key 
objectives:  some measure of profitability (or at the very least, self-sustainability), and social 
outreach.  However, the weight of either depends on the individual institution, its structure 
and its external context. In profit-oriented institutions, it may be appropriate to use return 
on assets or equity (ROA/ROE), while operational self-sustainability (OSS) and financial self-
sustainability (FSS) measurements are more appropriate in non-profit institutions. Here, the 
sustained longevity of its programs is still important, but the depth of the MFI’s outreach is 
usually the primary objective. However, ultimately both sets of performance indicators are 
internal to the institution, and say little about whether the intermediary is fulfilling its 
financial and societal role as capital provider.106  
                                                          
105
 Research question from chapter 4. 
106
 The OSS also has its critics, who argue that the measurement is inadequate because it is not adjusted like 
financial-self-sustainability (FSS) is. The counter-argument is that such adjustments would, in the context of 
current development data, be little more than guesswork. For a further discussion of this, see Yaron, J. and 
Manos, R., 2007; Schäfer, K., 2011 and Khan, Z. et al., 2017. 
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Measuring liquidity creation alongside the traditional performance parameters provides an 
additional dimension to understanding the contribution of financial intermediaries in 
microfinance. Rather than directly studying the financial health of the institution, it studies 
the ease, time and cost transformation of its financial output, relative to its input; the 
liquidity creation process beyond simple changes in maturity.  In microfinance, this is of 
particular importance, because the loans are typically small, with short maturities relative to 
traditional lending. The transformation is primarily in the ease and cost of access, in 
reaching into a market considered too risky by traditional intermediaries, and making new 
clients out of the previously unbanked. 
The determinants of liquidity creation in microfinance are slightly different than in 
traditional intermediaries operating in more stable financial markets, though there are 
similarities. Capital is strongly and negatively correlated with liquidity creation, which is 
consistent with the findings for smaller financial institutions in previous literature.  Similarly, 
scaled LC appears to be negatively correlated with size, which combined with the positive 
correlation with NGO status in chapter 4, suggests that small, locally embedded institutions 
produce more liquidity unity for unit, possibly due to their higher understanding of local 
conditions and stronger social collateral (figure 4.5). They know the needs of their clients 
and client circles, and their direct link with the local community helps put additional 
pressure on clients to repay their loans on time, effectively creating insurance against 
default.  While perhaps counter-intuitive to some, the results fall well in line with more 
recent findings, which suggest that for-profit institutions engaged In microfinance are not 
necessarily the most profitable or most efficient, and a benevolent non-profit institution is 
able to deliver at least the same level of welfare (and equal performance) as the competitive 
market. (e.g. de Quidt et al., 2018; Lützenkirchen, 2012). 
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7.2. The Impact of Specialisation 
 
What is the impact of specialisation and on levels of liquidity creation?107 
Taking a closer look at the drivers of liquidity creation, the impact of specialised, locality-
specific knowledge and lending methodologies stands out. Institutions that rely on fewer 
lending schemes create more liquidity for the surrounding market. The high degree of the 
complexity of both lending itself and the subsequent monitoring and evaluation processes 
may be part of the reason for this; without collateral, the primary tool against default is 
making sure that your lending approach is appropriate to the given situation. 
Microfinance clients tend to switch to new loan types as they grow, moving from group 
loans to individual lending once the required loans are of a sufficient size.  As MFIs typically 
want to hold on to their more successful clients, there may be a potential clash in mission 
statements, if the institution is also concerned with outreach; specialising the lending 
strategy increases the level of liquidity produced by the individual MFI, but internal 
interests, especially in commercial institutions, may push the MFI toward holding on to 
individual lenders, even if these require loans that may be difficult to meet, especially by 
smaller, capital-constrained institutions, and this may limit the loans available to more 
marginalised clients. 
 
7.3. The Impact of Joint Lending Methodologies 
 
What is the impact of joint lending strategies on levels of liquidity creation?108 
Joint methodologies are highly correlated with liquidity creation, across all 4 measurements 
for LC in estimations, and for both estimation models used to calculate the ratio of joint, 
group and individual lending approaches. In contrast, individual lending is either negative or 
                                                          
107
 Research question 5a. 
108
 Research question 5b. 
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insignificant. These findings support the theoretical suggestion that the unique lending 
approaches employed by MFIs to overcome the lack of collateral serve as a form of risk 
reduction mechanism for the intermediary. Rather than relying on the usual pressures to 
ensure repayment, the MFIs engaging in joint lending use social pressure and knowledge of 
local conditions to ensure repayment. Given the size of loans, this is likely to be more 
successful in the long run, since the cost of traditional measures to ensure repayment after 
default, may not be available or financially viable for most MFIs. 
The impact of joint lending methodologies as a way for microfinance institutions to lower 
associated risk is becoming increasingly important. As the push to commercialize 
microfinance continues, recent studies have pointed to a decline in joint lending 
methodologies used in microfinance, and a shift towards individual lending (de Quidt, J. et 
al., 2018).  If joint lending schemes are one of the primary drivers of liquidity creation in 
microfinance, as the results here suggest, their disappearance may have marked impact on 
the continued ability of microfinance intermediaries to adequately perform as liquidity 
creators. 
 
7.4. The Impact of Regulatory Status and Risk 
 
What is the impact of regulation on the level of liquidity created by microfinance 
institutions?109 
 
The findings throughout all 3 empirical chapters show that the formal regulation of a 
microfinance intermediary is strongly correlated with the creation of liquidity, and based on 
the right-hand-side, lagged results appears to have a regulation-LC causal relationship. This 
is in line with the ‘risk absorption’ hypothesis, which states that a prudent regulatory 
framework can absorb some of the risk which faces financial intermediaries, especially when 
operating in unstable and scattered financial markets. 
                                                          
109
 Research question 6. 
198 
 
The presence of a formal regulatory framework allows MFIs to extend more illiquid loans to 
their borrowers with lower associated ‘ease’ and higher ‘time and cost’, and without taking 
undue risk. As portfolio risk is generally found to be insignificant (and when significant 
consistently anti-correlated with liquidity creation in the cross-country estimations of all 3 
chapters), the increased levels of liquidity creation does not appear to be causing the MFIs 
to take undue risk, or to withhold effort on behalf of the borrowers. This finding is further 
supported by the insignificant relationship between deposit insurance and the four 
measurements for LC. 
Any debate involving a discussion of state-level imposition on micro-level market conditions 
is bound to be contentious and complicated by political agenda, but precisely for this 
reason, it is important to continue to expand our understanding of the relationship between 
the external meso- and macro-level environment, and micro-level performance. The results 
here suggest that in developing and emerging markets, a prudent regulatory framework 
may serve as a risk-reducing mechanism especially to small intermediaries. However, the 
results also suggest that there are significant geographical differences, and that continued 
study of the impact of external regulation and supervision is therefore warranted, especially 
as access to better financial data in emerging regions become available. 
 
7.5. The Impact of Deposit Insurance, Capital and Capital 
Stringency 
 
How do deposit insurance, capital and capital stringency impact the level of liquidity 
created by deposit-taking MFIs?110 
 
The strongly anti-correlated relationship between capital and liquidity creation in 
microfinance institutions supports the findings of previous literature on traditional banking, 
and suggests that the financial fragility hypothesis, first put forth by Diamond and Dybvig, 
                                                          
110
 Research questions 4a and 6a, 
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may have some validity (Diamond an Dybvig, 1983; Berger and Bouwman, 2009; Horvath et 
al., 2014). According to this hypothesis, reduced financial fragility increases the bank’s 
bargaining power, leading to a reduction in depositor trust (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; 
Diamond and Rajan, 2001).  
However, this hypothesis is less valid in the light of additional findings in the area of 
microfinance. If capital was negatively associated with liquidity creation due to the 
reduction of financial fragility for social and macro-political reasons, I would expect any 
policy implemented to reduce this same fragility, to also be negative and significant. 
However, that is not the case for deposit insurance. None of the 4 measurements of 
liquidity creation are significantly correlated with deposit insurance (chapter 4, table 4.15, 
section 4.5.2), and where capital stringency is significant, the relationship with liquidity 
creation is positive (chapter 6, table 6.4, 6.4.2).  These findings lend support to previous 
literature finding a similar positive relationship between other parameters of performance 
and capital stringency in intermediaries operating in more developed economies (e.g. 
Beltratti and Stulz, 2009). 
In the case of deposit insurance, the guarantee does not appear to limit bank effort 
significantly, perhaps because of the same intermediary’s need to fulfil its social goals 
successfully, an effect which may help explain why non-commercial institutions also are 
correlated with higher liquidity creation in microfinance  (chapter 4, table 4.15).  The higher 
level of security gained through the deposit insurance means reduced risk for the deposit-
taking MFI, but this also enables the same institution to push its social poverty alleviation 
agenda through an increase rather than decrease in its lending. 
Ultimately, the results indicate that the risk-reduction and stability gained through prudent 
financial policy regimes appear to have greater positive effect on the ability of microfinance 
institutions to function successfully as liquidity creators for the surrounding market. 
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7.6. The Impact of the External Environment 
 
How does the external environment and developing market characteristics impact the 
regulatory framework and liquidity creation?111 
 
While the level of liquidity appears to be impacted by a range of industry-specific 
conditions, as well as the presence of a formal regulatory framework, the results are less 
clear when it comes to other macro-indicators. 
GDP growth is positive and significant at 5% for pure deflated values of LC, but insignificant 
for scaled liquidity creation (chapter 6, table 6.4). This intuitively makes sense; the richer the 
economy, the larger the average intermediary, and the more loans being funded. However, 
unit for unit the larger and wealthier institutions do not create more liquidity than the 
smaller intermediaries, in fact the opposite appears to be more likely. Curiously, GDP per 
capita is negatively associated with pure, deflated values of LC and LC scaled by GLP, also 
significant at 5% (chapter 4, table 4.15). This could be due to upward GDP movement either 
not being reflected in the poorest segments of society, or it could indicate a general client 
move out of poverty, away from microfinance and toward more traditional bank services. 
Overall however, the results are not consistently significant, or even consistently displaying 
a positive or negative relationship with LC. In development research, GDP Growth and GDP 
per capita has been under fire for being inadequate in its measure of macroeconomic well-
being, primarily due to the great income disparity found in many developing and emerging 
economies.112  
To balance GDP data, I have also included the Human Development Index, which measures 
economic well-being and human development on a broader and more nuanced scale, which 
also takes education and physical health into account. The relationship between HDI and 
liquidity creation returned largely positive results for scaled LC, though with varying degrees 
of significance.  The same is the case for inflation, where scaled LC is anti-correlated at 5% in 
                                                          
111
 Research question 6c. 
112
 Estimations were also run with real GDP values, which returned insignificant. 
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cross-country estimations, but (not surprisingly) displays considerable geographical 
disparity, where inflation is highly significant in Sub-Saharan Africa, but appears insignificant 
to all 4 LC measures in Latin America and South Asia.  Generally, while some traditional 
measurements for the state of the macro-environment do seem to influence unit for unit 
liquidity creation, especially when scaled to unit production, the inconsistency in 
significance suggests that the primary determinants of liquidity creation are not to be found 
here. 
 
7.7. Implications for Policymakers and Practitioners 
At the very heart of the policy discussion in microfinance is a continued and sometimes 
contentious debate about the fundamental nature of the industry, and what role it can and 
should play in and outside development. One side, with Yunus, the Grameen Foundation 
and other NGOs at the forefront, argue that the primary use of microfinance is and should 
remain as a development tool for poverty reduction (Yunus, 2003; Carrick-Cagna and 
Santos, 2009). Anything else carries the very real risk of making MFIs little more than 
formalized moneylenders, charging usurious interest rates in the name of profit. On the 
other side, newly commercialised and for-profit institutions argue that if microfinance is to 
ensure its long-term survival, it is absolutely crucial that intermediaries learn to become 
financially self-sustainable.  Without it, the industry will never move beyond infancy, and 
will permanently be reliant on notoriously fickle external financing such as contributions 
from donor agencies.  Whatever the conviction, the debate is important, and increased 
understanding of the interactions between social and financial behaviour more important 
than ever. We need to fully understand the industry’s capacity for traditional financial 
intermediation as well as its ability to fulfil social goals, in order to understand how to 
regulate it.  
However, formalisation does not necessarily mean increased regulation, and a better 
regulatory framework does not necessarily imply increased commercialisation of the 
industry. The results found here suggest that while policymakers in particular should 
continue to support the development of sector-relevant meso- and macro-level enabling 
environments, including prudent regulatory frameworks, there is no evidence that 
202 
 
commercialised for-profit institutions create more liquidity for the market. Rather, non-
profit status is positively associated with higher levels of liquidity creation. Given the 
findings of previous literature that for-profit status does not mean better performance in 
MFIs, it is worth reconsidering whether an aggressive push toward increased 
commercialisation of the industry is the right course of action, or whether continued 
institutional development will garner better results in the long run, both when measured by 
financial and social criteria.  
The debate today is moving away from questions of basic financial performance and client-
level impact, to more fundamental questions regarding what the core identity of 
microfinance is, and with it what role microfinancial institutions should play in the general 
economy.  Within this context of an ever-evolving industry, 4 key areas are currently moving 
to the forefront of the microfinance debate: a) the identity of microfinance, b) the search 
for efficient lending strategies, c) the macroeconomic impact of microfinance, and d) the 
increase of the scale and scope of microfinance. These 4 categories are explored further in 
the following chapter on recent trends in microfinance research. 
  
7.8. Implications for Academia – Future Research 
Cross-country liquidity creation in microfinance has not previously been studied, and further 
attention to the field is warranted moving forward. A better understanding of the financial 
behaviour of MFIs, and its impact on the stated social goals, is important for both 
practitioners and policymakers to best help foster future growth and development in the 
industry. It is my hope that measures for liquidity creation may prove to be useful along 
with the more traditional financial measurements for performance, and offer much-needed 
increased insight into the external performance of financial intermediaries in development.  
However, on a very fundamental level, the field is still in need of improved financial data. 
While standards have certainly improved over the years, the amount of audited and verified 
data, beyond the most basic elements, is still inconsistent and insufficient. As available data 
grows and becomes consistent, so should academic confidence in the findings of new 
research. This is especially important for an area such as microfinance, which already is 
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under extensive political scrutiny and interest, which is unlikely to change anytime soon, 
especially given the move toward its increased usage in more developed economies.  
 
7.8.1. Liquidity Creation and Social Parameters 
The studies in this dissertation have primarily been focused on the financial drivers of 
liquidity creation. However, in institutions where the social goals are at least as important as 
financial goals, the question of whether there exists a trade-off between social goals and 
external performance, as liquidity creator, needs further study. In this context, there is no 
shortage of questions that still remain unanswered: How do the clients of stronger liquidity 
creators fare in terms of alleviating long-term poverty? Do institutions which lend primarily 
to a specified population segment do better or worse than other intermediaries, in terms of 
LC? What about savings and insurance: do higher liquidity creators perform significantly 
better or worse in areas beyond microlending? 
 
7.8.2. Expanding the Study of the External Environment 
However, despite the primary focus on financial variables in this dissertation, there are still 
a wide range of relevant financial parameters which deserve further study. This is especially 
the case with market-level and macroeconomic variables, where a wide range of factors 
within the external environment could plausibly have impact on levels of liquidity creation 
by MFIs. 
One of these areas is the central bank, and the degree to which the financial institutions 
involved in microfinance are able to draw from the central bank, and if so how much and 
with what reference rate. The impact of these macroeconomic variables are particularly 
important to consider, if a deeper look at the regulatory and supervisory framework 
surrounding liquidity creation in microfinance is to be studied. 
In addition to this, the strength of the legislative framework guiding the individual 
microfinancial markets is also highly plausible to have impact on the ability of MFIs to 
function as liquidity creators. Currently, the amount of studies examining the legislative 
context of microfinance is somewhat sparse, in large part due to difficulty in getting 
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adequate and useable data.  However, given that the legislative framework is a primary 
guide to how MFIs are regulated, and what policies are implemented; it is an area that 
deserves much further scrutiny. 
 
7.8.3. Regional Liquidity Creation 
In addition to these, there are both regional and market issues that deserve a closer look. 
The impact of formal capital requirements in East Asia deserves a second look, as does the 
curious disappearance of rural banks across regions post-2008.  In terms of inter-market 
conditions, the effects of increased competition and clustering are also areas that may well 
impact the external performance of MFIs as liquidity creators. Finally, from a cross-cultural 
perspective, the structural and organisational differences evident cross-country deserves a 
second look, especially once the dataset becomes large enough to do country-level 
comparisons of institutional types and cultural settings.  
All of the areas listed above will contribute significantly to our understanding of the social 
and financial behaviour of microfinance institutions, and ultimately help illuminate the 
conditions under which MFIs may best contribute to the continued alleviation of poverty 
and capital constraints in their individual markets. 
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Appendix A: Liquidity Classification of Bank Activities 
Source: Berger and Bouwman 2009: 3791  
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Appendix C: Liquidity Creation and Regulation in East Asia and Pacific 
 
 
 LC (log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GLP 
Regulatory status -0.087 
(0.10) 
0.013 
(0.02) 
0.285 
(0.18) 
0.084** 
(0.03) 
Capital 
 
Size 
 
Bank risk 
 
Capital stringency 
 
Age 
 
Age2 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP Growth 
 
HDI 
 
 
Constant 
 
-2.443*** 
(0.38) 
 0.959*** 
(0.04) 
-0.907*** 
(0.30) 
-0.079 
(0.32) 
 0.925* 
(0.50) 
-0.524*** 
(0.06) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
-0.086 
(0.07) 
0.202***  
(0.06) 
 0.208* 
(0.12) 
-6.188*** 
(0.71) 
0.025 
(0.06) 
-0.429 
(0.80) 
 2.139*** 
(0.65) 
 0.625 
(0.68) 
-0.671*** 
(0.12) 
0.008 
(0.01) 
-0.101 
(0.10) 
 0.370*** 
(0.09) 
0.278* 
(0.16) 
-1.403* 
(0.74) 
-0.308* 
(0.18) 
-1.295 
(1.07) 
-0.412* 
(0.25) 
-0.061 
(0.04) 
-0.042 
(0.04) 
 37.856* 
(22.60) 
 
-22.967* 
(13.12) 
-0.024*** 
(0.01) 
-0.019** 
(0.01) 
-6.756* 
(4.05) 
 
 3.918* 
(2.36) 
-0.166*** 
(0.05) 
-0.074 
(0.07) 
-92.850** 
(42.82) 
 
 52.121** 
(24.21) 
-0.035*** 
(0.01) 
-0.026** 
(0.01) 
-12.004** 
(5.60) 
 
 6.392* 
(3.27) 
R-sqr 
Adj R-sqr 
Probability F > 0 
Dfres 
BIC 
Root MSE 
Observations 
0.878 
0.870 
0.000 
125 
719.1 
0.563 
377 
0.440 
0.405 
0.000 
125 
-450.6 
0.119 
377 
0.493 
0.461 
0.000 
125 
1244.7 
1.130 
377 
0.411 
0.374 
0.000 
125 
-10.5 
0.214 
377 
Stars indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Appendix D: Liquidity Creation and Regulation in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
 
 
 
 LC (log) LC/GTA LC/E LC/GLP 
Regulatory status  0.514** 
(0.19) 
0.093** 
(0.04) 
0.654** 
(0.27) 
-0.074 
(0.09) 
Capital 
 
Size 
 
Bank risk 
 
Capital stringency 
 
Age 
 
Inflation 
 
GDP Growth 
 
HDI 
 
 
Constant 
 
 0.784 
(1.14) 
 0.712*** 
(0.18) 
 0.491 
(2.89) 
-0.086 
(0.15) 
-0.050 
(0.17) 
-0.018 
(0.03) 
0.240 
(0.46) 
-0.010 
(0.01) 
-3.292*** 
(1.03) 
-0.039 
(0.19) 
 0.647 
(3.35) 
 0.018 
(0.11) 
0.042 
(0.23) 
0.046 
(0.04) 
 0.395 
(0.67) 
-0.005 
(0.02) 
 0.599 
(0.42) 
 0.034 
(0.06) 
 0.156 
(0.47) 
 0.040 
(0.09) 
-0.015 
(0.02) 
-0.012 
(0.04) 
-66.757 
(48.05) 
 
 47.603 
(32.76) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
-7.712 
(5.14) 
 
 5.889 
(3.52) 
-0.018 
(0.03) 
-0.017 
(0.04) 
-107.745** 
(50.43) 
 
 74.844** 
(34.66) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
 0.001 
(0.01) 
-17.446* 
(9.70) 
 
 11.226* 
(6.39) 
R-sqr 
Adj R-sqr 
Probability F > 0 
Dfres 
BIC 
Root MSE 
Observations 
0.878 
0.814 
0.000 
26 
230.1 
0.775 
82 
0.525 
0.274 
0.000 
26 
-88.0 
0.112 
82 
0.745 
0.610 
0.000 
26 
261.0 
0.936 
82 
0.455 
0.168 
0.000 
26 
-5.5 
0.184 
82 
Stars indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Appendix E: Correlation Matrices 
 
Chapter 4 – Correlation matrix – Liquidity Creation, Capital and Deposit Insurance 
 Capital Size Regulated 
Profit 
Status 
Risk 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Age Inflation 
GDP 
Growth 
HDI 
 Capital 
1.0000                     
 Size 
-0.3361 1.0000                   
 Regulated 
-0.1810 0.2649 1.0000                 
 Profit Status 
-0.0988 0.1763 0.3329 1.0000               
 Risk 
-0.0450 -0.1078 0.0242 0.0359 1.0000             
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
-0.0203 0.1140 0.0477 0.0071 -0.0959 1.0000           
 Deposit 
Insurance 
0.0905 -0.0613 0.1764 -0.1105 -0.0541 -0.0316 1.0000         
 Age 
-0.1634 0.1809 0.1192 -0.0768 0.0587 0.1016 -0.1167 1.0000       
 Inflation 
0.0361 -0.1269 0.0178 0.1085 0.0785 -0.0058 0.1283 -0.1297 1.0000     
 GDP Growth 
0.0245 -0.0277 0.0390 0.0916 -0.0930 0.1353 0.0166 0.0128 0.0577 1.0000   
 HDI 
-0.1851 0.2226 -0.0180 0.0151 -0.0053 0.0403 -0.3170 0.1498 -0.1604 -0.1117 1.0000 
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Chapter 5 – Correlation Matrix – Liquidity Creation and Specialisation 
 HHI Capital Size Age Risk 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Profit Status Regulated 
HHI 
1.0000               
Capital 
-0.1570 1.0000             
Size 
-0.1026 -0.3446 1.0000           
Age 
0.0423 -0.1341 0.2364 1.0000         
Risk 
0.0009 -0.0362 -0.0562 0.0683 1.0000       
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
0.0145 0.0610 0.0190 0.0878 -0.0792 1.0000     
Profit Status 
-0.1874 -0.0726 0.2935 -0.1251 -0.0085 -0.0033 1.0000   
Regulated 
-0.0557 -0.1864 0.2646 0.0639 -0.0105 -0.0568 0.2953 1.0000 
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Chapter 5 – Correlation Matrices – Liquidity Creation and Lending Methodologies 
 
Joint lending – model 1 
 
Joint Lending 
(Ratio) 
Capital Size Age Risk 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Profit Status Regulated 
Joint Lending (Ratio) 
1.0000         
Capital 
0.0839 1.0000        
Size 
-0.2891 -0.3667 1.0000      
Age 
-0.1663 -0.1827 0.3059 1.0000      
Risk 
-0.1008 0.0039 -0.0444 0.0419 1.0000     
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
0.0263 0.0713 0.0378 0.0761 -0.1262 1.0000    
Profit Status 
-0.2479 -0.0944 0.3010 -0.0636 -0.0701 0.0099 1.0000   
Regulated 
-0.2947 -0.1621 0.2398 0.0721 -0.0533 -0.0539 0.3621 1.0000 
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Group Lending – model 1 
  
Group Lending 
(Ratio) 
Capital Size Age Risk 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Profit Status Regulated 
Group Lending 
(Ratio) 
1.0000               
Capital 
0.0113 1.0000             
Size 
-0.2571 -0.3643 1.0000           
Age 
-0.1042 -0.1549 0.2993 1.0000         
Risk 
-0.0731 -0.0005 -0.0707 0.0706 1.0000       
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
0.0085 0.0736 0.0255 0.0813 -0.1545 1.0000     
Profit Status 
-0.2704 -0.1104 0.3085 -0.0335 -0.0916 0.0097 1.0000   
Regulated 
-0.2393 -0.1868 0.2190 0.0772 -0.0626 -0.0659 0.3301 1.0000 
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Individual lending – model 1 
 
Individual 
Lending (Ratio) 
Capital Size Age Risk 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Profit Status Regulated 
Individual Lending 
(Ratio) 
1.0000               
Capital 
-0.1378 1.0000             
Size 
0.0396 -0.3536 1.0000           
Age 
0.0760 -0.1401 0.2332 1.0000         
Risk 
0.0630 -0.0421 -0.1066 0.0584 1.0000       
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
0.0210 0.0263 0.0375 0.1068 -0.0917 1.0000     
Profit Status 
-0.1175 -0.0874 0.2748 -0.1246 -0.0159 -0.0148 1.0000   
Regulated 
0.1370 -0.1754 0.2556 0.0614 -0.0248 -0.0573 0.2646 1.0000 
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Joint lending – model 2 
  
Joint Lending 
(Dummy) 
Capital Size Age Risk 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Profit Status Regulated 
Joint Lending 
(Dummy) 
1.0000               
Capital 
-0.0018 1.0000             
Size 
-0.1131 -0.3333 1.0000           
Age 
-0.0302 -0.1567 0.2120 1.0000         
Risk 
-0.0681 -0.0382 -0.0930 0.0890 1.0000       
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
-0.0028 0.0430 0.0049 0.0392 0.1000 1.0000     
Profit Status 
-0.1256 -0.1372 0.2532 -0.0681 0.0143 -0.0198 1.0000   
Regulated 
-0.0998 -0.1977 0.2607 0.1065 0.0173 -0.0259 0.3280 1.0000 
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Group lending – model 2 
  
Group Lending 
(Dummy) 
Capital Size Age Risk 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Profit Status Regulated 
Group Lending 
(Dummy) 
1.0000               
Capital 
-0.0134 1.0000             
Size 
-0.1092 -0.3333 1.0000           
Age 
-0.0349 -0.1567 0.2120 1.0000         
Risk 
-0.0621 -0.0382 -0.0930 0.0890 1.0000       
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
-0.0008 0.0430 0.0049 0.0392 0.1000 1.0000     
Profit Status 
-0.1041 -0.1372 0.2532 -0.0681 0.0143 -0.0198 1.0000   
Regulated 
-0.0395 -0.1977 0.2607 0.1065 0.0173 -0.0259 0.3280 1.0000 
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Individual lending – model 2 
  
Individual 
Lending 
(Dummy) 
Capital Size Age Risk 
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
Profit Status Regulated 
Individual Lending 
(Dummy) 
1.0000               
Capital 
-0.1633 1.0000             
Size 
0.1472 -0.3333 1.0000           
Age 
0.0116 -0.1567 0.2120 1.0000         
Risk 
0.0144 -0.0382 -0.0930 0.0890 1.0000       
Operational Self-
Sufficiency 
-0.0161 0.0430 0.0049 0.0392 0.1000 1.0000     
Profit Status 
-0.0400 -0.1372 0.2532 -0.0681 0.0143 -0.0198 1.0000   
Regulated 
0.0737 -0.1977 0.2607 0.1065 0.0173 -0.0259 0.3280 1.0000 
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Chapter 6 – Correlation Matrices: Liquidity Creation and Regulation 
 
Liquidity Creation and Regulation, Cross-Country 
  
Regulated Capital Size Age Risk Capital Stringency Inflation GDP Growth HDI 
Regulated 
1.0000                 
Capital 
-0.2000 1.0000               
Size 
0.2682 -0.3248 1.0000             
Age 
0.1111 -0.1590 0.1957 1.0000           
Risk 
0.0401 -0.0449 -0.1016 0.0571 1.0000         
Capital Stringency 
-0.0239 -0.1576 -0.0196 0.0101 0.0337 1.0000       
Inflation 
0.0161 0.0272 -0.1254 -0.1229 0.0592 0.0275 1.0000     
GDP Growth 
-0.0251 0.0326 -0.0306 0.0184 -0.0759 -0.1413 0.1392 1.0000   
HDI 
-0.0695 -0.1468 0.2147 0.1471 -0.0159 0.0828 -0.1605 -0.1398 1.0000 
 
